Is A Screwdriver Better Than A Ratchet? or, My Response To Evidence-Based Faith vs. Evidence-Free Faith

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So I stumbled across this article in the blogosphere yesterday, which argued for the superiority of reason in formulating our worldviews. More specifically, the author was responding to claims that the validity of logic and reason have to be taken on faith. Apologists often criticize atheism as a faith-based worldview, which may be true in a trivial sense. However, such does not necessarily level the playing field and what the author of EBFVEFF correctly notes is that even in the restricted sense that atheism is a faith-based worldview, it's based on a different type of faith; faith that proceeds from empirical, observable evidence. 

Even so, does this make evidence-based faith inherently superior to evidence-free faith?

I don't think it does. I think situation and context determines the relative superiority of the method. Both approaches seek to apprehend truth; the former is rooted within the jurisdiction of real-world phenomena, the latter is rooted within the jurisdiction of an unfalsifiable reality. Does that render the latter useless or inherently inferior to the former? I don't think it does.

Let's take a look at a few of the statements in EBFVEFF:

"[R]eason is reliable.."

This is only correct to the degree to which it is sound. Reliability is not an intrinsic feature of reason or reasoning. However, reliability does seem to be an intrinsic feature of pure reason and true reasoning.

"..truth is consistent with itself."

Granted, if by this we mean to assert that actuality is the measure of truth.

"Reason and logic are simply the self-consistency of the truth, expressed as a pattern of consistent rules describing how truth relates to itself."

The pattern of consistent rules is merely the observation that correspondence to actuality is the measure of truth. Is that not how truth relates to itself, that, "If there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true… reciprocally, if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, then there must be a man?”

"So we do know that evidence and reason (are) superior to faith alone.."

This claim is entirely subjective and depends on the nature of the question being explored. At this point I must ask, Is a screwdriver better than a ratchet? In real-world applications, it should be expected that evidence and reason-based explanations always triumph faith-based or metaphysical ones, because the phenomena in question occur in the real, observable world. This is no surprise, and to pit two different methods of explanation against one another when one of them is always outside the jurisdiction of the argument a priori seems like stacking the deck. Sure, a screwdriver is better than a ratchet – for fixing a pair of eyeglasses. But what if we need to loosen a bolt? That ID remains unfalsifiable strongly suggests that evidence and reason are not the correct tools for apprehending religious or faith-based questions. The story of Galileo strongly suggests that faith and religion are not the correct tools to apprehend scientific or reason-based questions. That people attribute supernatural causality to things we can explain with evidence and reason shows only their misunderstanding of religion or faith's domain, and not any inherent weakness that renders evidence-free faith inferior to evidence-based faith.

"In the first place, the self-consistency of the real world is so superior to the self-consistency of any alternative 'truth' that, if our real-world observations cannot be trusted, the alternatives must be even less trustworthy."

I'll agree that empiricism is more appealing to reason than religion. Even so, I have three gripes with the argument used here to support this point:

1) The real world is also highly inconsistent and to use its consistency as evidence for the superiority of reason is not a strong argument, because you have to cherry-pick it from evidence supporting the inconsistency of the real world.

2) The reasonable believer doesn't posit faith as an alternative truth, but a complementary one.

3) This is the exact same form of argumentation Dawkins uses to refute the cosmological argument in TGD, p.109: "A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right." This is not logically cogent, because inability to explain God's complexity does not preclude God's ability to have actually created the universe. Similarly, if we grant that our real-world observations cannot be trusted, such does not preclude the trustworthiness of alternative observations.

"[T]he real world that we perceive provides the conceptual foundation for everything we know.."

I agree. This remains true even if we grant that divine revelation occurs in actuality, because if it does, then it is part of the real world the subject perceives.

"We have no concept of 'truth' other than what we can derive from seeing things that match the real world and things that don’t."

This, however, is false if divine revelation occurs in actuality.

"Any 'reality' which we can neither perceive nor influence is simply an irrelevant 'reality.'"

This is very similar to Carl Sagan's hypothetical dragon-in-the-garage argument which I've always thought was quite short-sighted. This is tantamount to claiming only that which is empirically perceptible or amenable to influence can have value, worth or relevance, and such is incorrect. I object on at least three grounds:

1) I object logically because of the out-of-scope quantifier any.

2) I object philosophically because to say a construct is irrelevant is to assign a value to it. How can one assign any reasonable value to something they can neither influence or perceive? This is a hidden given, a free lunch. Lastly, imperceptibility and influencability are not intrinsic or necessary properties of relevance.

3) I object empirically because such is not born out in the real world. Before the discovery of Pallas, Juno, and Vesta, the concept of asteroids as intra-space objects that could collide into Earth was 100% imperceptible and 100% beyond influence, yet also 100% relevant to the point that we could not debate their relevance without them. Prior to its discovery, plate tectonics was 100% imperceptible and it still remains 100% beyond influence, yet it is also a certainly relevant reality.

In conclusion, I'll say that whenever we're discussing things that are amenable to evidence and reason, then surely evidence-based faith is superior. However, when we're discussing things that are by their very nature beyond the jurisdiction of evidence and reason, then evidence-based faith becomes essentially useless.

Hence, the claim that evidence-based faith is superior to evidence-free faith is entirely subjective and dependent on context, and does not conclusively amount to anything. It is no more correct or persuasive than the claim that a screwdriver is a better tool than a ratchet.


5 comments

  1. jim

     says...

    Since you seem to be comparing evidence based ‘faith’ to evidence FREE faith, perhaps it might be more accurate to ask “is a screwdriver I bought at the hardware store, for which I have a receipt, better than an invisible ratchet that I claim to have which apparently doesn’t tighten any bolts (other than invisible bolts, perhaps).
    Rather than go through every point in your very interesting article, I think I’ll just touch on your point #3 for now. The common understanding of the cosmological argument you’ve put forth goes like this-
    “Look at the world. Complexity, intelligence, beauty and the like simply cannot just BE for no reason at all. Intelligence particulary requires a causal explanation.” I would submit that, if this is so, an intelligent God logically and NECESSARILY requires a causal explanation as well…
    1) Intelligence requires a creator.
    2) God is intelligent.
    3) God requires a creator.
    On the other hand, if intelligence can exist WITHOUT having been created- either through purely naturalistic processes, or just BECAUSE, as supposedly is God’s case (ultimately they come down to the same thing, since the fundamental principles of naturalistic processes also exist JUST BECAUSE), then the cosmological argument loses its teeth, and we’re back to determining truth through evidence.
    One more thing: I think the argument for faith without evidence is really a red herring, since as soon as we begin discussing the objects OF that faith, the conversation necessarily turns to evidentiary claims, even if that evidence is provided in the way of subjective feelings, hearing the voice of God, etc. In other words, as soon as you start describing a basis for a particular faith on any grounds you choose, you’ve already revoked your ‘evidence free’ position, and have entered the evidentialist’s field of play. ‘Faith’, then, becomes superfluous, doensn’t it?

  2. cl

     says...

    jim,

    ..is a screwdriver I bought at the hardware store, for which I have a receipt, better than an invisible ratchet that I claim to have which apparently doesn’t tighten any bolts (other than invisible bolts, perhaps).

    Different tools, different tasks, IMO. There’s a problem-solving approach to knowledge which is amenable to empiricism, and there is a creative-intuitive approach to knowledge that is not typically amenable to empiricism.

    The common understanding of the cosmological argument you’ve put forth..

    As far as the cosmological argument, I didn’t really ‘put it forth’ in the sense of arguing for it, or defending it, I just referenced it to make a comparison between the way two people arrived at an illogical conclusion. I never really thought it had much teeth to begin with. I currently don’t think a successful ontological argument exists, and haven’t for a while. God may or may not need a creator; but our inability to explain God’s complexity does not preclude God’s ability to have actually created the universe and so Dawkins’ argument fails. Similarly, if we grant that our real-world observations cannot be trusted, such does not preclude the trustworthiness of alternative observations.

    I think the argument for faith without evidence is really a red herring..

    In the sense I’ve addressed it, I don’t think it is, because I haven’t attempted to create any tangential arguments. But I’m interesting in seeing what you mean here. Evidence-based faith was a vital part of the topic we were discussing. Also, as commenter Crafty Witch noticed, getting a reasonable believer to concede that all of faith lacks evidence is also a given.
    Of curiosity, what did you think about the asteroids and plate tectonics? Do you think that perceptibility and influence-ability are necessary attributes of relevance? Or, would you say relevant realities exist which are beyond perception and influence?

  3. jim

     says...

    Since I haven’t read The God Delusion, I might be misrepresenting Dawkins here, but if I’m understanding correctly when he says…
    “A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right.”
    …I BELIEVE he’s refuting the argument that complexity requires a designer, but that, if this is so, then by the same logic God himself requires a designer. If I’m not taking something out of context, then my argument (as well as his) stands.
    I just went and reviewed Sagan’s dragon in the garage argument. It seems mostly to be an admonition to be skeptical about claims for which there is no apparent evidence. Now, you’re asking me (I think) if I believe there might be realities that simply are not open to scientific testing; now, and perhaps…ever? I would say yes, there probably are many things about existence we don’t understand, and perhaps will never understand.
    So, you come to me and say “I suddenly understand something new.” Well, the first thing I’m going to do is ask for a description of what this ‘something new’ is. How does it work? What does it do? What’s it telling you? At this point, you have two choices. Either you stare back at me blankly, or you give me some answers that relate to the world I know.
    But here’s the rub. If you choose the 2nd alternative, you’re going to have to enter the world of common experience, which is a world that can be examined, logically questioned, and perceived in some way. In short, we’re back to evidence again. I mean, anybody can claim anything, from a dragon in a garage, to a triune, universal superbeing who fills up the universe, and yet can abide on the head of a pin. But why should I believe them? How can I? ESPECIALLY when there’s been a bevy of such claims down through history, but with good, understandable alternative explanations from the naturalistic side of the fence?
    Of course, none of this proves there’s no god, just like it doesn’t mean there are no leprechauns, or unicorns, or turtles all the way down. After all, in the world of all speculative possibilities, all things are possible. But to an atheist, the more prosaic explanations having to do with myth, superstition and the like just seem a sight more reasonable that the deific alternative.

  4. Brad

     says...

    1) I think that asking the question “Is evidence-based belief superior to evidence-free belief” implicitly assumes a domain where both exist to be compared in. Wherever there is evidence and reason to support a position over other positions, it is more rational/justified to take the supported position over others. However, in a domain where there exists no evidence or reason for one position or another (or we just don’t possess any evidence/reason to lean on), then there literally isn’t any evidence-based belief, so the question is meaningless in such a context.
    2) Based on my reading of some other of Duncan’s posts on ER, I presume by “consistency” this guy means more specifically logical consistency. That is, no x + (-x). Obviously the word can be used in a weaker sense to simply mean uniform in appearance, so it’s more constructive to be clear in what sense one is using the term.
    3) You write,

    The reasonable believer doesn’t posit faith as an alternative truth, but a complementary one.

    The problem therein is how one justifies an objective “complementary” belief without appeal to evidence/reason.
    Just out of curiosity, cl, how do you define the term ‘faith’? Is it a word than can be equivalent to ‘belief’?

  5. cl

     says...

    jim,

    …I BELIEVE he’s refuting the argument that complexity requires a designer, but that, if this is so, then by the same logic God himself requires a designer. If I’m not taking something out of context, then my argument (as well as his) stands.

    I don’t think it does. I see no reason caused complexity cannot proceed from an uncaused source. Whether we involve personal God or gods or not.

    Either you stare back at me blankly, or you give me some answers that relate to the world I know. But here’s the rub. If you choose the 2nd alternative, you’re going to have to enter the world of common experience, which is a world that can be examined, logically questioned, and perceived in some way. In short, we’re back to evidence again.

    Not entirely and fully depends on the context and the degree of proof demanded. For example, two people can relate to the real world via analogy. If you don’t mind the fact that what I propose is not necessarily as tangible as you’d prefer, we can still make progress via analogy.
    Brad,

    However, in a domain where there exists no evidence or reason for one position or another (or we just don’t possess any evidence/reason to lean on), then there literally isn’t any evidence-based belief, so the question is meaningless in such a context.

    I’m not so sure though. A reasoned set of personal conclusions corroborated by personal experience is sufficient evidence for an individual to believe upon. It may not be sufficient evidence to convince another person to believe upon, and that makes sense. We all walk different walks.

    The problem therein is how one justifies an objective “complementary” belief without appeal to evidence/reason.

    But see, such is only a problem for those who will not admit a reasoned set of personal conclusions corroborated by personal experience as sufficient evidence for an individual to believe upon. There is no problem for those who do.
    Faith is reasonably synonymous with belief, I think. But as with anything, there are matters of scope, and what one person means by faith might just be intellectual concession whereas what another person means by faith might be much more.

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