False Argument #18: Personal Anecdotes = Empirical Evidence, or I Believe Mother Teresa, Not George Bush
Posted in Blogosphere, Daylight Atheism, False Arguments, Logic, Thinking Critically on | 5 minutes | 23 Comments →
Please, somebody help me determine that I am not crazy, mentally deficient, or possibly worse. I've now heard the following argument in the blogoshpere two times, and I immediately pegged it as a fallacious case of special pleading with absolutely zero bearing in logic whatsoever.
What do you think? Here's the argument, from a website titled, Why I Hate Jesus:
If we seek god, we'll find him, right? Well, this is a rather easy assertion to deal with. The existence of atheists that have deconverted from Xianity is empirical evidence that this simply is not so, especially those atheists who were once fundamentalists – and they do exist. These people wanted to find god, they asked, but no god would present itself to them. If this is not enough, it's been reported that even Mother Theresa (sic) (a horrible woman no doubt, but none can deny that she truly wanted to see god) was even unable to find god. (emph. mine)
Okay, here's some more backstory. The claim was originally made in a comment thread titled On Inerrancy, and here's a paraphrased summary of its progression there. The claim's proponent, a commenter calling himself OMGF who also claims to be a rationalist, said,
Why does (God) not show himself to people like MT and others?
I replied,
To me, MT's difficulties and doubts in no way entail God's lack of communication. On what evidence might I base my conclusion? I don't know that God didn't communicate to MT. I don't know how MT approached her beliefs or her prayer life or anything else during her entire life. Sure, from the outside, her works might suggest a moral character consistent with one who believes in God, but such can give no clue as to how she really felt. In fact, I thought immediately of the new Meryl Streep movie Doubt, which is entirely about believing in things without evidence, and a great movie that all fans of these types of debates should watch. Streep's character is analogous to MT in a way, and relates directly to this post.
OMGF replied,
So, it seems god did not talk to her.
So he simply takes her word for it? I further pressed,
How does that qualify as empirical evidence? When a person claims that God does talk to them, for example George Bush, skeptics typically don't take their word for it, and typically don't accept that word as proof of anything. In fact, many skeptics even berate the person who makes such a claim as illogical or irrational, for example Sam Harris. Why? It's a subjective, anecdotal claim. So how is the converse claim not equally subjective and anecdotal?
OMGF responded,
Because the situations are different.
Oh, I see… well that explains about absolutely nothing! I further pressed him as to how the situations were different. In my mind, in both scenarios, we are dealing with subjective anecdotes about whether or not God speaks to person X or Y. Correct?
Next, OMGF offered confirmation bias in the case of person who claims they've heard God as justification for his argument. Now, although it's not an adequate justification at all, and in fact is actually a red herring, I understand his point. The person who wants to hear God and concludes that they have heard God surely retains the possibility of being misled via confirmation bias. Such is correct, but how does such establish that a subjective anecdote in either direction can be counted as empirical evidence?
Let's break this down a bit further to see how confirmation bias does not solve the problem. This defense gets worse for OMGF than I think he initially realized. MT surely had a confirmation bias, that is, if she desperately wanted to hear God as she stated, correct? I agree. Now, the argument here seems to be that because MT's confirmation bias was not met, that her testimony somehow becomes valid. Yet, we still have the exact same lack of evidence we had in the beginning. Further problematic is that this defense also works in the other direction, and by offering such, OMGF provides more than ample rope to hang himself with.
I replied,
What about Saul of Tarsus, aka Paul? This man suffered from a confirmation bias against Jesus as Lord so intense that he persecuted those who held that belief. Yet, according to the Bible, Jesus appeared to Paul and convinced Paul that Jesus was Lord. Paul's confirmation bias was clearly not met. Was Paul's testimony valid? No answers to this dilemma were forthcoming, and this was effectively the end of the discussion.
Concluding, I replied,
You have not provided reasonable grounds for the claim that the one who hears God is not credible, while the one who does not hear God
is credible. I see this as special pleading in its purest form. Secondly, you and
many other skeptics claim that God is not falsifiable, and that no evidence
for God exists, therefore the person who claims God speaks to him or
her speaks subjectively at best, correct? As such, the person who
claims God does not speak to them also speaks subjectively at best, correct?
In what I sense might have been an effort to pad himself against my charges of special pleading, OMGF's next response was,
It's actually not my position that the person who says that god talks to them is automatically wrong…
Maybe, maybe not, but either way, the claim that a subjective anecdote can qualify as empirical evidence has not been justified, which further supports my hunch that the entire argument advanced comes far more likely from illogical special pleading stemming from bias, not logic. In essence, it boils down to, "I believe Mother Teresa, but not George Bush."
So I ask you, the reader: How do subjective anecdotes qualify as empirical evidence?
jim
says...Hiya, cl!
I think your criticism hinges on some assumptions regarding the original claim. IF it is true that God will reveal Himself to anyone who sincerely seeks Him, THEN if God doesn’t reveal himself, I believe that’s empirical evidence against God’s existence. Of course, there are some subjective qualifications loaded into the original premise. For instance, you have to assume actual sincerity on the part of the subject. Now, if we ever reached a technological stage where we could measure a person’s sincerity index, that hurdle would be eliminated. Of course, there’s also the problem of interpreting the specifics of the premise. Like, maybe God doesn’t mean He’ll IMMEDIATELY reveal Himself, but some time down the road before the subject dies. There might be some others problems I’m not thinking of right now.
I generally believe that you’re gonna have genuine sincerity among a cross-section of people who claim they’re seeking, or have sought after, God. That’s why I don’t tend to question folks’ personal assertions concerning religious experiences; that is, as far as the fact that they’ve experience SOMETHING. From a personal standpoint, that’s where I start my inquiries, trying to discover what the experience actually WAS, instead of what it’s been interpreted to BE, which usually means adoption of the local cultures belief systems pertaining to what it IS.
Anyway, if you accept the validity of the original claim, and further believe that there are genuine seekers who die without have God reveal Himself to them, then yeah. That’s pretty good empirical validation. And if you want to reject that as subjectivism, then you’re on shaky ground claiming the validity of ANY subjective state. Maybe nobody’s really happy, or sad, or angry, or curious? Who knows? But I don’t think we want to go down that solipsistic road, because there the conversation ends, no?
jim
says...This, btw, is the tack many theists take, simply disqualifying anyone as ‘insincere’ who doesn’t come to the realization of their God. It’s an approach I find ultimately disingenuous; but, on the plus side, it’s an argument that can’t be empirically countered, and the believer can walk away with his/her faith intact.
cl
says...jim,
Good to have ya back! First, you said,
I don’t take that approach. If A tells B that A sincerely sought after something and didn’t find it, and B belittles A as insincere, A is disingenuous. So like you, I tend to assume that A is sincere, but such does NOT entail that A is correct. Agree?
Second, my question is this, and I don’t think you’ve addressed it. In both cases, we have zero evidence, and in both cases, we have nothing more than personal anecdotes, correct? So on what possible evidence might a rational, non-biased individual accept Mother Teresa’s personal anecdote as valid, but not George Bush’s?
I also take issue with the conclusion you reach through your IF/THEN statement:
I don’t. I say, “IF it is true that God will reveal himself to anyone who sincerely seeks Him, AND God doesn’t reveal himself, several conclusions are possible:
1) The person could actually have been insincere;
2) God could have certainly revealed himself, perhaps just not in the way the observer expected;
3) Perhaps God doesn’t reveal himself to anyone who sincerely seeks him;
4) Perhaps there is no God.
Any one of those might be correct in the event that God does not reveal himself to somebody, correct? So I feel you’ve jumped the gun, so to speak.
You said,
Exactly my point. Perhaps George Bush sincerely thought that he did hear God, but actually heard something else? In similar fashion, maybe Mother Teresa sincerely believed that she did not hear God, but perhaps God did actually speak to her? It all boils down to, “How do we know?”
With nothing more than personal anecdotes on either side, how might the rational individual uphold either claim over the other?
cl is a coward and a liar
says...Thanks for mangling my argument you intellectual coward and liar.
cl
says...And as usual, no evidence is forthcoming, just more hateful speech. Aren’t rationalists supposed to prove their assertions?
cl is a coward and a liar
says...That you misrepresent my argument after I told you that you were doing such doesn’t surprise me coming from someone who is an intellectual coward and a liar and a huge hypocrite. You are pretty low. You’ll do or say anything in order to gain a debate point. So, the question is why I would try, once again, to explain this to you (that you aren’t talking about my actual argument, and how I frame it/use it) when you obviously only want to misrepresent me in order to try and make yourself look better?
I wonder if Jesus approves of your lies so long as you do them in service of him?
cl
says...Blah blah blah… just more ad hominems to add to the pile, I suppose.
I’m a liar and a coward, yet you actually created an email address specifically to insult me and then came here lying about your identity with a sockpuppet to accuse me? People who have confidence in their arguments typically don’t do this.
Is this not the one and only OMGF, from DA?
Now, if you’d like to debate, let’s debate. Defend your position. If you feel I’ve misunderstood it, demonstrate how, with thought-out arguments, not heated, emotional rhetoric and childish sockpuppetry.
cl is a coward and a liar
says...That you are misrepresenting my argument is not an ad hominem attack. Nor is it ad hominem to say that you are a liar and a coward, because I’m not claiming it invalidates what you say. The fact that you are full of straw is what invalidates what you say. But, once again, why should I spend my time explaining to you, once again, how you’ve got my argument wrong, when you didn’t read it the first time? The only reason I’m here is so that others that come to your blog and read this crap you call “reason” will realize that you are not representing my argument fairly and know that your whole entire post here is full of shizz. I don’t expect you to do the honorable thing and admit as much.
cl is a coward and a liar
says...Oh, and try sending email to the address I listed and see if it’s a real address. How stupid are you? Do you really think that I had to create that email address in order to spoof the blog software? What an idiot.
The Thinker
says...Dribble, no substance again. How about the real question? Has God ever spoken to any of you? Why not? What does this say about you? And how did I get over here?
jim
says...cl: Let’s take your points one at a time…
1) The person could actually have been insincere.
That’s why I added the qualifier that the subject IS sincere. Starting from that assumption, and staying within the context of the axiom ‘God will reveal Himself to anyone who sincerely seeks him’, then if God does NOT reveal Himself to the subject, the axiom is disproved, including the God which the axiom supports.
2) God could have certainly revealed himself, perhaps just not in the way the observer expected.
It is inherent in the meaning of the statement ‘God will reveal Himself’, that ‘reveal’ means in a way understandable to the subject, at least to the extent that the subject can respond appropriately. Otherwise, there is no true revelation.
3) Perhaps God doesn’t reveal himself to anyone who sincerely seeks him.
Then this is not the God of the original axiom. You’ve switched gods in midstream here.
4) Perhaps there is no God.
Then the axiom is false by definition.
“With nothing more than personal anecdotes on either side, how might the rational individual uphold either claim over the other?”
Easy! Let’s take another subjective state…happiness. Firstly, we have to assume that happiness exists; otherwise, the conversation
stops here. So, we draw the necessary descriptors correlating with what we understand happiness to be, then we move on from there. We study the subject, and look for the outward traits that we’ve recognized are indicative of personal happiness. Of course, interpretation can be tricky sometimes, but there’s a threshold where it becomes reasonable to make a rather definitive evaluation.
And we can go further. We can correlate happiness as it relates to particular environments, to foods, to drugs, to times in the day, etc. We can draw probability charts. In fact, there’s PLENTY of empirical work to be done here, and plenty of empirical conclusions to draw. Same goes with the question about God- remember, we’re talking about a God who consistently supports a particular axiom. Of course, the looser the definition, the more God is allowed to slide outside the parameters of the original axiom, the more you can claim but what if…but what if…but what if…! However, in so doing, you’ve lost the thread of the original argument. I could go on with this line of argumentation. What if God is inconsistent? What if God is a liar? What if we completely misunderstand every word of the original axiom, such that in God’s eyes it means “Dogs eat moth wings in October.”?
So, let me try to restate the thing from scratch as succinctly as possible, as this has gone ’round the block a few times:
1. The original axiom, including its obvious implications, goes ‘God will make his existence apparent to anyone who sincerely seeks Him’.
2. The subject has sincerely sought Him, but God has NOT revealed Himself.
3. The God of the axiom does not exist. Empirical fact.
Damian
says...Hi cl, I haven’t seen the original argument so I can’t say whether it was a good one (it would have been both respectful, as well as intellectually honest, if you had linked to it), but there is, in my opinion, a good argument for the general point that OMGF was seemingly trying to make.
For a start, the atheist could simply claim that “personal revelation” of that sort is completely off limits, either way, as it is a notoriously unreliable form of evidence. That doesn’t really leave the theist with a great deal to argue with — at least in terms of empirical evidence — but the atheist still has the lack of any credible visual sightings (which there almost certainly should be, given that God supposedly wants a personal relationship with us, and given our normal, everyday experience of relationships), as well as the fact that science has explained almost all phenomena by natural means.
Anyway, that is not what I am going to argue. There are several reasons why God’s failure to communicate with non-believers (at least as they — we — see it) is a more powerful, as well as credible, form of evidence than God’s supposed success in communicating with believers. First, though, we need to agree on a few things. Subjective, anecdotal evidence is not considered to be anywhere near as credible as is measurable, repeatable evidence (generally from the “hard sciences”), and I hope that we can both agree on this point?
But as neither of us is appealing to this kind of evidence, it is irrelevant to the argument. I also hope that we can both agree that subjective, anecdotal evidence is a form of evidence that increases in credibility, the more numerous and consistent the testimony? Now, we can be fairly sure that most nonbelievers — at least those who claim to have been genuinely seeking — will report that they have heard absolutely nothing from anybody, or anything. That would appear to be a large body of evidence that is remarkably consistent in its message. And that would generally count as a firm body of evidence in the negative, with respect to God attempting to communicate with us.
(I hope that you can see where I’m going with this)
The problem for the theist is several fold. For a start, almost all “personal revelation” (claims that God is personally communicating with an individual), when seriously examined using a well tested methodology (from the soft sciences), reveals very little consistency in the message that is supposedly being communicated. Now, I’m am not suggesting that there needs to be the exact same message communicated to each and every believer (although that might help), but that many of the messages appear to contradict each other. Also, both in the current era, and throughout history, there are many reports of people claiming to have communicated with an entirely different God to the one that you believe in, not to mention that (as far as I am aware) people who belong to different sects of the same religion, not only seem to “hear” messages that affirm the precepts of their own particular sect, but often things that other sects do not believe to be true, or even part of Christianity, at all. This begs for an explanation, if we are to consider both types of evidence as having equal merit.
And there is also the fact that throughout history people have claimed to be communicating with all sorts of other beings, not necessarily relating to God. There must surely be an explanation for this, and unless you are willing to either argue that they must be crazy, and that you are uniquely in possession of the truth, or that God is somehow a trickster, and that it was Him that was communicating with them all along, but that he decided to make it seem as if they were talking to the devil, or an alien, or any number of other non-God’s, I fail to see how you can escape the inevitable conclusion.
And it gets worse. For example, Christianity makes up roughly 1/3 of the population of the planet, and not all claim to directly communicate with God. So that means that 2/3 of the planet, at the very least, are experiencing a different message (or none at all) to yourself and all other Christians that claim to be communicating with God. So who do you suppose that we should believe? And to top it all off, there are probably tens of thousands of ex-Christians who used to believe that they were communicating with God, but now claim, quite sincerely, that they were essentially talking to themselves all along. Again, all of this needs to be explained before we can even begin to suggest that the two forms of evidence — one, clear, numerous and consistent, and the other, numerous, but contradictory and unclear — are on an equal footing.
And if you wish to imply that personal, anecdotal evidence is of no value at all, I do hope that you realize that you are throwing away almost all of human knowledge (and a whole lot more) with this line of reasoning — that is, if you want to follow it to its logical conclusion. It would mean that almost nothing in the bible could or should be believed (particularly the revelatory aspects!), and that those who claim to have communicated with god would have no justification for affecting public policy (with respect to their own religious convictions). That’s fine by me, and I’d be perfectly happy to concede the argument at that point.
But it would also mean that you’d have no reason to believe anything that anybody ever says, and that almost all but the hard sciences would become instantly useless as a means of forming even semi-reliable beliefs. No history, politics, social sciences, criminal justice system, etc, etc — heck, you might as well give up both your friends and family if you can no longer believe a word that they say. Of course, you didn’t really mean to suggest that, but it’s important to point out the full implication. And you cannot fall back on the position that what others tell you in the course of everyday conversation doesn’t count as a form of (albeit “soft”) empirical evidence, because it is, and it does, and you’re taking a position that almost no-one else in the world accepts, and with the flimsiest of justification, as well.
So it seems that while OMGF may or may not have justified the use of personal anecdotal evidence as a form of knowledge (I honestly can’t say), and particularly with respect to the quality and balance of evidence on either side of the debate, you have so much work ahead of you to justify your own opinion on this matter, that I’m not entirely sure that you have even given it the slightest bit of thought.
(From wiki: “Empirical research is any research that bases its findings on direct or indirect observation as its test of reality. […] The researcher attempts to describe accurately the interaction between the instrument (or the human senses) and the entity being observed.)
By the way, it is important to make clear that I don’t consider verbal evidence to be anything like as reliable as either direct or inferred data driven evidence of the type that jim has described. And it is always possible that, without any form of data driven evidence, all sorts of wacky things could be considered as having a basis in reality. But that is why volume and consistency, as well as strict methodological practices, are so important with respect to this kind of evidence. That does not, however, mean that — absent of any kind of instrumental, data driven evidence — nothing can ever be concluded, with a fairly high degree of certainty.
cl
says...The Thinker said,
If I were to say yes or no, that would be a subjective, personal anecdote. What that would say about me is up to you to decide. And I don’t know how you got over here.
cl
says...jim,
I understand your reasoning,
I really do, and I’m not trying to disagree just to be a fuss. What I’m saying is this: In #2 above, how do we know that God has not revealed himself? On what evidence? Mother Teresa’s statement that God has not revealed himself, correct?
In the case of George Bush, how do we know that God talks to George Bush? On what evidence? George Bush’s statement that God talks to him, correct?
So, we have two statements that, when both are taken as credible, produce a contradiction. Earlier you said you tend to believe people’s personal assertions about God. Well, now what? Sans further evidence, which is not part of the original axiom, can you reasonably believe that both of these statements are correct? If so, how? If not, how might one of them carry any more weight than the other?
cl
says...My mistake about the link. I usually do link to every article I comment on, and also sometimes send trackbacks. I’ve linked to one of these articles before, BTW. At any rate, I’ve got both links in this post now, for people that might not have known they existed elsewhere.
In your second paragraph you say,
My argument is one claim from one person vs. another claim from another person, so that changes things. However, I can still comment on your arguments.
Exactly my point, and surely I do agree.
And there is an equally (possibly larger) body of evidence in the other direction that is equally consistent in its message, in that they’ve heard something. What they hear might not be similar, and may even be contradictory, but all people who think they hear from God claim to hear something, correct? So, sans additional evidence which is not part of the original axiom, how do you know which one is correct? The people who say they heard nothing? Or the people who say they heard something? To me, your argument breaks down to, “The non-believer hears the same thing no matter what – nothing. The believers hear different things.” But that doesn’t refute the argument at all, nor does it answer the question at hand.
Tangentially, you implied that “almost all” human knowledge stems from anecdotal evidence, and I disagree strongly, but that’s another issue. And I would be glad to see the religious right lose their justification for affecting public policy, but that’s another issue as well. Third, hard sciences aren’t based off what people say; They’re based off what people can prove. And lastly, note that your definition of empirical evidence is problematic for your argument, because the fundamental problem at hand here is that there is no entity being observed. There are no observations. Voices in someone’s head don’t count. No empirical proof of any interaction exists whatsoever, correct?
So, if you want to convince me, it’s definitely possible, just answer why, how, and on what evidence Mother Teresa’s word has any more inherent worth or truth than George Bush’s. That’s my question.
jim
says...cl:
“n #2 above, how do we know that God has not revealed himself? On what evidence? Mother Teresa’s statement that God has not revealed himself, correct?
In the case of George Bush, how do we know that God talks to George Bush? On what evidence? George Bush’s statement that God talks to him, correct?”
Correct, but only so far as it goes. In fact, there’s an asymmetric qualifier which makes the evidence unequal regarding the original axiom. Initially, we grant that both parties are sincerely relating their experiences, or lack thereof. In the first case this alone disavows the axiom. However, the second case requires a two-tiered proof supporting the axiom, as I’ll demonstrate…
” Earlier you said you tend to believe people’s personal assertions about God.”
No, what I said is that I tend to believe peoples’ assertions regarding certain religious (or other, for that matter) EXPERIENCES. Or, to further elucidate in case I wasn’t entirely clear, I acknowledge their claims of having had an ‘experience’. However, an experience is subject to investigation and interpretation. Remember, the axiom isn’t just a statement that ‘if you sincerely seek out God, you’ll have an experience…’ If this were the case, then ANY EXPERIENCE WHATSOEVER would qualify. Who knows? GB’s experience might wind up translating to being gas from a roast beef sandwich. An empirical approach is called for, the process of which goes beyond the scope of this subject.
However, MT’s lack of experience is a fully realized proof unto itself; certainly from her subjective standpoint, but also for us if we play by the rules of our previous agreement. It goes something like this:
1. God will reveal Himself to anyone who sincerely seeks Him.
2. Mother Theresa sincerely sought out God, and God did not reveal Himself to her (and no fair asking if she misunderstood the revelation; that’s already been covered).
3. We agree to accept her at her word.
4. The God of the axiom does not exist.
I’ll end my reply by way of analogy regarding my proposed asymmetry. Let’s say there have been reports of strange things in the sky every day at a certain time, in a certain place. We form two groups to investigate the phenomenon. Group A is comprised of skeptics. Group B is comprised of UFO enthusiasts. The groups are chosen to be, on balance, equal in terms of quality of IQ, and eyesight. The axiom will be this…
‘At 12 noon every day, a flying saucer filled with alien beings appears in the sky at such-and-such coordinates, hovers for 5 minutes, then flies away until the next day.’
So, the observers are positioned. Noon arrives. At 6 minutes after noon, both parties are interviewed as to what they experienced. Group A reports fully negative results-nothing appeared in the sky. Group B proclaims success! A flying saucer DID appear in the sky! We seem to have a contradiction here. What now?
Well, group A’s part in the experiment is over. Nothing to report. But for group B, the questions have just begun. Ok, we agree you believe you saw SOMETHING, but what, indeed, did you actually see? Remember, we’ve agreed to accept both parties’ personal experience of having seen or not seen something. However, now we’ve entered into the second level of the investigation. What, exactly, did you see? Could it have been a bird, a military plane, a weather balloon, a trick of the weather, the moon, a visual hallucination triggered by expectation, etc.
The above analogy is, in fact, a real life scenario, and is the way many unusual claims are investigated, including miraculous claims as in Lourdes and elsewhere. Hope I’ve addressed your question adequately, cl. Take care.
cl
says...It seems to me that you’re saying, “I believe Mother Teresa because she says God did not reveal himself, and she can’t possibly be wrong if she didn’t experience anything, for she has nothing to report. And although George Bush claims God did reveal himself, I don’t believe him because, well, how do I know that what he really experienced was God?” Is that a reasonable paraphrase of your argument?
If so, I still think it fails because the same skepticism should apply to Mother Teresa’s claim. Any capacity for error must be shared equally by both parties. George Bush is as sure it was God who revealed himself as Mother Teresa is sure it was God who didn’t reveal himself. And remember, George Bush isn’t claiming to have had just some arbitrary experience; that’s your own skepticism applied to Bush’s statement post-hoc. So why do you not apply this same skepticism to Mother Teresa’s claim? If George Bush retains the potential to misinterpret God’s alleged revelation, Mother Teresa certainly retains the potential to misinterpret God’s alleged silence, correct? Why Mother Teresa gets a free pass while George Bush is expected to provide further evidence just seems fishy to me.
In the argument, it’s not that George Bush just hears something. George Bush isn’t claiming to just have had an experience; he’s claiming that God revealed himself to him. And you’re not taking George Bush at his word if he tells you God revealed himself to him, and you simply say, “Are you sure? How do you know God wasn’t gas from your roast beef sandwich?” So, to Mother Teresa, you should also say, “Are you sure? How do you know gas from your lentil soup didn’t obscure your vision or that God wasn’t right in front of you the whole time?”
What’s even less persuasive about your position is that when we actually do take both parties at their word, an insurmountable
contradiction results. You ran through it with Mother Teresa’s claim under fire, now consider it with George Bush’s:
1) God will reveal himself to anyone who sincerely seeks him;
2) George Bush sincerely sought God, and God revealed himself to George Bush (remember, you have to take him at his word, like you said);
3) We agree to accept George Bush at his word;
4) The God of the axiom does exist.
There’s obviously a very major problem with this logic if it can produce genuinely contradictory results. The God of the axiom can’t possibly both exist and not exist. And we’re back to square one – why do you believe Mother Teresa, but not George Bush?
jim
says...cl:
“t seems to me that you’re saying, “I believe Mother Teresa because she says God did not reveal himself…”
“Mother Teresa certainly retains the potential to misinterpret God’s alleged silence, correct?”
No, because there are only these possibilities-
1. God actually DID reveal Himself, and MT misunderstood, which violates the axiom vis-a-vis the necessary understandability of the revelation, or
2. God did NOT reveal Himself, despite MT’s sincerity, which disproves the axiom.
“We agree to accept George Bush at his word.”
We agree to take GB at his word regarding having had an experience; however, his interpretation of that experience is open to question. MT’s lack of experience, on the other hand, is self sealing. In other words-
MT-no experience, no God
GB-experience, maybe God, maybe something else
Just to drive the point home:
“How do you know gas from your lentil soup didn’t obscure your vision or that God wasn’t right in front of you the whole time?”
Not allowable, since God’s revelations are axiomatically self-substantiated.
I’m gonna let this one go now, cl. I sense running in circles approaching soon. See you around!
jim
says...cl: Thinking back, I may have given you short shrift in my last reply; I was in a rush out the door to take my daughter to school (finals week…arghhhhhhhh!) Let me try to draw these threads together, and distill my argument:
First of all, I need to make clear that we’re not questioning the existence of subjective states here. Rather, we’re questioning the assertions tied to those subjective states (or lack thereof). The original axiom is ‘God will reveal Himself to one who sincerely seeks him’.
Now, in MT’s case, her lack of revelation in the face of sincere seeking DEFINITIONALLY disproves the axiom. There’s simply nowhere else to go, other than to doubt her sincerity. It’s a closed proof (or disproof, in this case).
The parameters of the axiom shut off any and all questions regarding the nature of her subjective experience. And in that same vein, her non-experience is closed to questions of interpretation, since it is the very LACK of experience which disproves the axiom in the first place.
In GB’s case, however, the nature of his positive revelation IS open to question, even though we’ve granted the sincerity of both his seeking, and his assertions. This doesn’t mean that GB has misinterpreted his subjective experience vis-a-vis reality. He may very well be right. However, his assertions are open to alternative interpretation, while MT’s are not.
Now, beyond these questions there’s the contradiction you’ve spoken of. Let’s say that both of them are telling the truth, and furthermore, that both their interpretations are correct (here I’ve taken the further step of accepting GB’s interpretations as correct). If GB’s God is real, but MT sought after Him, and He didn’t reveal Himself, where does that leave us? The existence of God is proven, but He’s NOT the God of the original axiom, which was the thing under fire in the first place. The axiom remains disproved.
One more analogy, and them I’m done with this subject. The axiom is ‘There’s a boogie man hiding under your bed, and tonight while you’re asleep, he’s going to sneak out, and tattoo his name on the back of your right hand’.
Scenario 1: You wake up, and discover there is, in fact, no tattoo. The axiom is disproved.
Scenario 2: You wake up, and there IS a tattoo. Does this prove the existence of boogie men? Or are there naturalistic explanations which seem more likely, like the fact that your roommate, a tattoo artist, and who has a penchant for mischief, was the one who told you this story in the first place?
That’s about as far as I feel like going with this one, cl. Nice convo; made me think. Thanks!
jim
says...cl: Thinking back, I may have given you short shrift in my last reply; I was in a rush out the door to take my daughter to school (finals week…arghhhhhhhh!) Let me try to draw these threads together, and distill my argument:
First of all, I need to make clear that we’re not questioning the existence of subjective states here. Rather, we’re questioning the assertions tied to those subjective states (or lack thereof). The original axiom is ‘God will reveal Himself to one who sincerely seeks him’.
Now, in MT’s case, her lack of revelation in the face of sincere seeking DEFINITIONALLY disproves the axiom. There’s simply nowhere else to go, other than to doubt her sincerity. It’s a closed proof (or disproof, in this case).
The parameters of the axiom shut off any and all questions regarding the nature of her subjective experience. And in that same vein, her non-experience is closed to questions of interpretation, since it is the very LACK of experience which disproves the axiom in the first place.
In GB’s case, however, the nature of his positive revelation IS open to question, even though we’ve granted the sincerity of both his seeking, and his assertions. This doesn’t mean that GB has misinterpreted his subjective experience vis-a-vis reality. He may very well be right. However, his assertions are open to alternative interpretation, while MT’s are not.
Now, beyond these questions there’s the contradiction you’ve spoken of. Let’s say that both of them are telling the truth, and furthermore, that both their interpretations are correct (here I’ve taken the further step of accepting GB’s interpretations as correct). If GB’s God is real, but MT sought after Him, and He didn’t reveal Himself, where does that leave us? The existence of God is proven, but He’s NOT the God of the original axiom, which was the thing under fire in the first place. The axiom remains disproved.
One more analogy, and them I’m done with this subject. The axiom is ‘There’s a boogie man hiding under your bed, and tonight while you’re asleep, he’s going to sneak out, and tattoo his name on the back of your right hand’.
Scenario 1: You wake up, and discover there is, in fact, no tattoo. The axiom is disproved.
Scenario 2: You wake up, and there IS a tattoo. Does this prove the existence of boogie men? Or are there naturalistic explanations which seem more likely, like the fact that your roommate, a tattoo artist, and who has a penchant for mischief, was the one who told you this story in the first place?
That’s about as far as I feel like going with this one, cl. Nice convo; made me think. Thanks!
cl
says...jim,
Why? Sincerity is certainly a subjective state, correct? And MT’s is an assertion tied to a subjective state, correct? In the same vein of, How can you prove GB experienced God and not gas from his roast beef sandwich, how can you prove that MT was sincere, or that she didn’t forget her revelation, or that nobody paid her a bunch of money to make her negative claim, or that she’s not mad at God and simply lying?
And even with the sincerity issue tossed aside, there are other options. Perhaps MT was sincere, and Satan blinded MT so she can’t remember the revelation? Perhaps she’s getting old and for purely natural reasons, she can’t remember the revelation? Perhaps MT is like Meryl Streep’s character in the movie Doubt? Self-delusion is a very real possibility, no? Etc. etc. So there are clearly several other places to go, but why don’t you? You doubt GB’s correctness, right? Why not doubt MT on any one of these other points?
I suppose if we structure the axiom such that doubting MT’s sincerity or correctness is not allowed, while doubting GB’s correctness is, then of course, you’ll win every time. But IMO, if any assertion is open to doubt, so must be the converse assertion.
I disagree. The axiom says that God will reveal to the sincere, correct? If we grant GB’s sincerity and correctness, and God reveals to GB, then the God of the axiom appears proven. If we grant MT’s sincerity and correctness, and God does not reveal, then the God of the axiom appears disproven, and we’re still stuck with the contradiction.
And the larger issue that’s still unanswered to my satisfaction is, How can subjective, personal anecdotes possibly count as empirical evidence? From Wikipedia,
Your tattoo analogy fails for this reason: The tattoo is observable to anyone, correct? So we’re no longer discussing a subjective, personal anecdote in the absence of other evidence, which was the parameters of the original axiom.
And I still maintain that subjective, personal anecdotes are not empirical evidence, but I’m open to further ideas.
And as always, you got me thinking as well. Perhaps even a bit worried at times.
The Thinker
says...Maybe MT was so busy praying to God that she never stopped to listen. Maybe she doesn’t want to share her discussions with God because she would get a lot of flack from the non-believers. Maybe it is really none of our business what she and God talked about.
She was a sincere woman who gave her whole life to caring for her fellow man. I am inclined to think that she was sincere; they did make her a saint you know. She didn’t have ALL the qualifications for sainthood but that’s what the Catholic Church wanted to do.
GB will be later.
Question: Is a writen account of a discussion in which God speakes to a believer qualify as empirical knowledge?
cl
says...Great points. Add these to the many other options that can exist and clearly we see the question is not so Boolean.
That tends to be my opinion as well. The only reason I raise the issue of sincerity at all is because it’s certainly open to doubt.
Although technically tangible, a written account of a subjective, personal anecdote remains a subjective, personal anecdote in its relevance as evidence. As another example, courts do tend to accept sworn witness testimonies as credible evidence, but the range of evidence that can be called credible for legal purposes is wider than in science.
So for the most part, I’m saying no, but I’m open to further ideas.