Trilobytes Don’t Deny Evolution Because Humans Weren’t Around In The Cambrian

The title will make sense later and this post has nothing to do with evolution.

Last month I got involved in a thread which has turned out to be quite productive in my opinion. Although I can't speak for the others involved, I've gained considerable insights into a variety of epistemological arguments and ideas. Miracles have been the topic that have underscored our debate, and we've bantered about the amount of credibility one can reasonably assign to episodes like Zeitoun and Bernadette McKenzie for example. The blog's host, Deacon Duncan (DD), also made a claim he calls the Undeniable Fact, and commenters both here and there have agreed and disagreed with that.

DD devotes considerable thought to the comments which keeps the discussion going and for that he gets good mention. It also helps that he's a good writer. If you have good logic, you don't get good writing for free, so people that have both are fortunate. This related post of DD's is among the better I've read in terms of writing that succinctly and persuasively portrays the inherent dilemmas in miracle claims and the amount of credibility we can assign to them.

I've objected since the beginning of our discourse on the idea that we should define our discussion on miracles with pre-agreed criteria and interpretations of terms, whose discernment must be reasonable and precisely quantifiable. I realize those are subjective terms as much as any others, but the point is that we need something more than, "It's gotta be unambiguous!"

At any rate, the discussion's been good and although there have been a couple small flare-ups along the way, for the most part everything has been reasonable, rational, progressive discussion. But don't take my word for it – read on and make up your own mind. Remember this is part of an ongoing thread, as you can see by all the links above, so there's considerable backstory that is definitely liable to cause obfuscation if unaccounted for. If something doesn't make sense, give us the benefit of the doubt. We're likely just omitting something that we of course take for granted because it was stated previously, and such underscores the difficulty of accurately articulating online debates about nuanced topics.

I objected to what DD described in his introductory statements as:

…the nature and extent of the impact God’s absence has on Christian theology. (emph. mine)

My problem here is that DD simply takes for granted that which he's trying to prove, which is God's absence. So every point that flows from here is likely going right over the head of your average believer, most of whom emphatically do not believe that God is absent in their lives.

Along similar lines, later DD says,

God is supposed to be a perfect, loving, merciful Heavenly Father Who is intimately involved in the lives and destinies of His children,

Well sure, that's a reasonable "general truth." However, DD's argument here is potentially irrelevant to anyone who does not interpret these "supposed to be's" the same way as DD. Let's say we're in the context of the Bible: 1) What does DD mean by God? 2) Do these "supposed to be's" apply to YHWH only? 3) Or do they apply to the Trinity – YHWH, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit? This is not mere semantic sophism, there are important and potentially paradigm-shifting points that can be made from answers to these questions.

DD argues that based on what the Bible claims about God, we should be able to "detect" God in the "real" world,

…these alleged facts about God ought to enable us to make some reasonable predictions as to what we ought to see Him doing in real life.

Certainly, but to what degree are those predictions justified and/or reliable, and on what grounds might we assume God should agree with our timeline and particular manners of reckoning? Sure, the Bible says "Thou shalt not murder," so yes, we can reasonably expect that if Jesus was God that Jesus wouldn't murder. That's all fine and dandy as an acceptable prediction. But how do we account for the paradox of short-lived and relatively unintelligent, flawed humans reasonably and/or reliably predicting a purportedly eternal and omniscient Being? That's where I begin to roll my eyes:

…if we described a human father who was loving and kind and intimately involved in the lives and development of his children, we wouldn’t find anything strange at all in that father showing up and spending time, in person, tangibly present, in 2-way, face-to-face interactions with his children.

Of course, but are you not aware that such is exactly what believers in a "relationship with God" purport to experience? The only difference in your description is the "face-to-face" thing, but that doesn't matter because many, most and possibly all believers also argue that we will meet God face-to-face. Further, some claim to have met God or one of God's agents face-to-face, so when DD says,

But believers already know that God does not show up in real life.

Do they? All believers? Most? Many? Would Joseph Smith agree with DD? Moses? The ancient Israelites? How many countless other people claim to have experienced God(s) showing up in real life? So no, we cannot say categorically that "believers" do not know God does not show up in real life. Some believers claim God has shown up in real life. Other believers claim they experience God in other ways that are intangible but equally "real" and not metaphorical. And we always have our standard miracle claims in which God might certainly have shown up, or at least sent some divine agent. Perhaps most confusing of all are the believers who say they've never felt, seen or heard anything describable as God or one of God's agents. Regardless, we obviously can't just make the blanket claim that "believers already know that God does not show up in real life."

God’s pervasive and consistent absence puts severe constraints on what Christian theology is permitted to ascribe to God,

Again though, DD simply presupposes "God's pervasive and consistent absence." Can anyone else see or agree with me that we can't just presuppose something what is perhaps the pivotal point of the discussion?

Now, I will admit that there is a limited sense in which DD is justified to say God has not shown up (unambiguously) in the real world. In reference to the verses from Revelation chapter 21 regarding the new heaven and new Earth and the new city of Jerusalem, DD says,

Notice there are no objections here like, “How will we be able to be sure the photographs of New Jerusalem aren’t fakes?” or “How will future skeptics know these two glorious beings are the real Lord God Almighty and the Lamb?” (emph. mine)

There's much we can say along these lines. First, I'd agree with DD that Revelation 21 does give the impression that believers will have zero ambiguity about God's existence in the future. Although in a spirit of true rational rigueur I wouldn't say 100%, I feel sufficiently confident in declaring it an undeniable fact that the situations described in Revelation 21 have not yet happened. In that sense, we can reasonably say that most certainly, God has not shown anytime recently. But again, sans omniscience, we cannot make the blanket, universal negative claim that God has never shown up in some disparate instance(s) between Creation and Revelation, right? How could we know?

Second, notice the emphasized "we" and "future skeptics" in the above quote. DD presupposes that there are going to be skeptics in the new heaven and new Earth and the new city of Jerusalem, but if such is the purported dwelling of believers that occurs after the so-called separation of the wheat from the chaff, how does that affect DD's argument? Do the healthy lay around in hospital beds?

He continues,

So in fact, there’s nothing unchristian or unbiblical about my assessment of what sort of behavior ought to result from the characteristics and motives the Bible ascribes to God.

Well, I'll agree in limited scope, but the problem is that DD seems to demand that it occur on his timeline. Continuing with his father analogy, we can say that our hypothetical father is away for a little while, but intrinsically good and fully intending to be with us shortly. Although the absence seems so long to us, even a Fundamentalist has to admit that nobody this side of the flood waits much longer than 120 years, and say 80's the average. What's a mere 80-120 years compared to — gasp — eternity?

So although there’s nothing unchristian or unbiblical about DD's assessment, the assessment itself is tantamount to arguing that our father has failed us because he couldn't make it to the hospital to witness our birth. The skeptic might reply, "But God can do anything, and what kind of father that had the power wouldn't show up at their child's birth? Well, that's a good question that exposes the weakness of my analogy, and this puts us effectively back on the road to discussion of omnipotence and what it reasonably entails.

There’s no good reason for God not to show up, except for the fact that everybody already knows He does not,

My objection here is twofold. Again, DD presupposes 1) that God has not shown up and 2) that there's no good reason to explain why God has not shown up. Now, if by "shown up" we mean some disparate instance between Creation and Revelation, we cannot make that claim at all. How do we know? Further, why would DD, myself or anyone far less intelligent than the builders of Giza presume that we could reasonably declare an omniscient God can have "no good reason" for anything? There is no good reason to say God has no good reason. What if there are other people and universes out there for God to deal with? Let's not focus unduly on ourselves and presume that God has no good reason to not be here with us face-to-face right now.

And if by "shown up" we mean the situations described in Revelation 21, God could have any one of a million possible valid reasons for not effecting the new heaven and new Earth and new city of Jerusalem right now. DD's argument is tantamount to a trilobyte faulting evolution because there were no humans around in the Cambrian period.

A few more quibbles and I'm about out of gas on this one:

…Christians have to retrofit their theology to conform to real-world constraints.

Why would they? As an astute trilobyte would not fault evolution for lack of humans in the Cambrian, many, most or possibly all "Christians" would simply reply that there's a time for everything and they would not fault God for temporarily withholding the final kingdom, or however "Christians" would describe it.

This is where the field of apologetics comes from: the need to rationalize theology in order to make the contradiction between dogma and reality less apparent.

First, what particular "dogma" does DD contend is contradicted by reality? There is no possible contradiction we can deduce from "dogma" that pertains to a future event such as Revelation 21.

If we use forward-thinking (observing what consequences ought to result from God’s character and motives), we come up with a list of consequences that falsify Christian beliefs, because we don’t observe them in real life.

This is completely off and one-sided. First, many or most of the consequences DD says "ought to result from God’s character and motives" are 1) arguably ascertainable in disparate experiences, and 2) purported to occur in the future. A few brief consequences that would corroborate "Christian" beliefs would be answered prayers and miracles. And guess what? Many claim to have observed these things. Can we reasonably justify falsifying future claims in the present? Are we reasonably justified in faulting physics and astronomy because we're currently in the Stelliferous and not the Degenerate Era? As surely as physics claims the sun goes kaput, the Bible claims we'll all one day stand before God.

Apologetics is backwards thinking: starting from the known conditions, and reasoning backwards to try and find some plausible-sounding scenario that reconciles the original premises with a reality in which God consistently and universally fails to show up.

This is equally completely off and also bit unfair to theology. Should we equally smear science and detective work with a negative connotation of "backwards thinking?" In science and detective work, we "start from the known conditions and reason backwards to try and find some plausible-sounding scenario that reconciles the original premises" of whatever it is we're seeking to understand. Right? Let's not forget that Science arose from Scholasticism.

DD continues,

So whenever we hear complaints like, “It’s too hard to know what a genuine miracle would look like,” or “How could we know it was really God even if He did show up?” it’s because God’s universally known, experienced, and verified absence is forcing theology to have those weaknesses and limitations.

I disagree, and personally, although they must be dealt with in any discussion of what is and isn't a miracle, I don't endorse those types of complaints. I don't think it's too hard at all to know what a genuine miracle would look like. I honestly tend to believe I've experienced a few small miracles myself. But guess what? My definition of a genuine miracle doesn't demand that it be scientifically reproducible, videotaped or photographed. So on the one hand, no, I don't suppose it's hard at all to know what a genuine miracle would be like (to use the word look unnecessarily frames the miracle in a sighted or sensory context), but its sure going to be hard to get even a handful of people to come up with a baseline definition that allows for a reasonable evaluation of any claim. I think that if we ever did create such a definition, and I was in fact willing to present a case that met those definitions, such would entail concession on behalf of the skeptics, and my intuition is that skeptics will not set a bar that can be jumped. Regrow a limb they'll say, but that's not the issue: Why would the documented regrowth of a limb be convincing, and at what point are we justified in declaring the documentation and evidence as credible?

Lastly, and on a side note, I remember giving DD some legitimate grief over the star analogy he made, but when expressed like this I can at least understand and agree with his idea:

Nobody argues about which star in Orion’s belt is our sun once the real sun rises.

This concise point is well-taken, but neither the original analogy nor this concise point with which I agree justify the so-called Undeniable Fact, or that the star analogy itself entails an irrecoverable category error.

Sans omniscience, nobody can know that God has never shown up to believers at some disparate point between Creation and Revelation, and I'm having a hard time understanding the fierce resistance to this idea.