Obligatory Osmosis, Or, My Response To DD’s Evidence Against Christianity, Pt. 2
Posted in Blogosphere, Logic, Philosophy, Religion, Responses, Skepticism, Thinking Critically on | 6 minutes | 14 Comments →
So, I saw an opportunity to combine a response to DD's Loser's Compromise into the ongoing post-by-post dissection of his series Evidence Against Christianity. According to DD,
There’s a particular approach to the truth that I call the Loser’s Compromise, and it goes like this: “We can’t know the truth about X, so let’s just agree that different people are equally justified in believing whatever they like about it.” Considered superficially, it sounds open-minded and fair, because it appeals to a certain live-and-let-live quality that avoids putting anyone in the wrong. In reality, though, it’s a deceptive rationalization, and an excuse for avoiding the truth instead of embracing it.
First, I've never once stated or implied that if we can't know the truth about something, people are equally justified in believing whatever they like about it. What I have said and what I still say is that when two or more hypotheses are equally consistent with all of the available data, although provisional belief in either would be rationally justified, truth claims remain unsustainable until further evidence favors one hypothesis over another. Truth claims are entirely different philosophical beasts than rationally justified beliefs!
Moving along – and actually in what I think is a quite relevant direction – in his fourth post, DD addresses Jayman's objection to DD's predictions of what we would expect from scripture were the Myth Hypothesis correct:
…if the Myth Hypothesis were true, we would expect that Scriptures would inevitably have to make some kind of accommodation to God’s absence. This does not mean, however, that the Scriptures must necessarily admit that God is really absent, and in fact one of the chief ways Scripture can compensate for God’s absence is by filling in the gap with stories that purport to show God’s presence. (DD)
DD says that if his MH is true, we would expect stories about God's presence – because the writers would have to account for God's absence – and if there is no God, then certainly their only alternative would be to invent stories. Of course. Yet, stories about God's presence are also exactly what we would expect if God really did show up, so how would we be able to reliably know whether the Bible writers wrote stories of fact or fabrication? Our two-month long miracle discussion proved only that we can't prove anything supernatural. How does this relate to the Loser's Compromise? Well, obviously, we would expect stories about God whether God existed or not. So long as we don't contend such is proof of anything, it's certainly no rationalization or compromise to admit that we'd expect stories whether God existed or not, right?
Second, I'd like to skip ahead a few weeks to make an important distinction that I think has been missed in the discussion over there: Again, I'm not trying to make DD's GH cast identical predictions as his MH. I never have been. I want to make this point as clear as possible in order to prevent any confusion about my position that may have resulted from DD's thirteenth post:
In the case of the Myth Hypothesis, supporters of the Gospel Hypothesis will be constrained in their apologetic by God’s inability to show up in real life. They won’t be able to deny that real life does indeed conform precisely and consistently to the consequences that would follow from the Myth Hypothesis being true. Therefore they will need to try and find some kind of rationalization that produces the effect of making the Gospel Hypothesis predict the same outcomes as the Myth Hypothesis. (DD)
Well sure, but where are the supporters of DD's Gospel Hypothesis? Neither Jayman, Facilis nor myself support DD's Gospel Hypothesis. More importantly, we have no need to make DD's GH predict the same outcomes as DD's MH: because we don't support it as I just mentioned, and because the logically impossible is always logically impossible. The GH is defined as God's undeniable presence, the MH as God's undeniable absence. The two can never predict identical outcomes.
Yet still, DD continues along these lines in his fourteenth post:
..if someone could show logically and reasonably why the Gospel Hypothesis ought to produce the same consequences as the Myth Hypothesis, then it would be appropriate to caution us regarding drawing definitive conclusions based on evidence that’s the same for both. (DD)
It's always appropriate to caution against drawing definitive conclusions when two or more hypotheses are supported by all the available data, and to repeat myself again – DD's GH cannot produce the same consequences as his MH – so why would anyone even try?
But so far this has not happened; we’ve only heard promises that such things are possible and might actually be presented some day. (DD)
DD is correct to note that nobody has successfully achieved the logically impossible by making his GH cast identical predictions as his MH. While I can't speak for others, DD is incorrect to state "we’ve only heard promises that such things are possible." I've never once promised to make DD's GH produce the same consequences as his MH – precisely because it's not possible.
I’ve got reasons (as I intend to post on more fully in the coming week) for feeling fairly confident that cl will not be able to come up with a legitimate explanation for why we ought to expect the Gospel Hypothesis to produce consequences indistinguishable from those of the Myth Hypothesis. (DD)
Correct. I can't come up with a legitimate explanation for why we ought to expect the Gospel Hypothesis to produce consequences indistinguishable from those of the Myth Hypothesis, because again, such is not possible. That such is not possible speaks nothing on the ultimate outcome of our exercise.
In the thread, DD answered what he claims we're to do when one or more hypotheses lead to identical consequences:
If indeed two hypotheses do lead to identical consequences, then one cannot be a “reasonable believer” in either one; the only legitimate and intellectually honest position would be frank agnosticism. (DD)
I disagree strongly. The very core of rationalism is to accept ideas that are supported by evidence, and this should not change just because more than one idea is supported by evidence.
To clarify my position one last time: when two or more hypotheses are equally consistent with all of the available data – although provisional belief in either would be rationally justified – truth claims remain unsustainable until further evidence favors one hypothesis over another.
Truth claims are entirely different philosophical beasts than rationally justified beliefs!
John Morales
says...Are you sure?
Because a more accurate paraphrase, I believe, would be
“The GH is defined as God’s undeniable existence, the MH as God’s undeniable nonexistence.” – veridical, epistemic existence, that is, not ontological conceptual existence.
I quote:
“For convenience, we can refer to these two alternatives as the Myth versus the Gospel. The Myth hypothesis holds that the Christian God does not exist outside the thoughts and imaginations of men, and that the popular beliefs about Him arose through common psychosocial phenomena that can be observed even today among believers. The Gospel alternative, by contrast, holds that mankind has an almighty, all-wise, objectively real Creator God Who loves us enough to become one of us and to die for us so that He could enjoy an intimate, personal relationship with each and every one of us for all eternity, as is His desire. We won’t all necessarily benefit from that desire, some say, but that is what He allegedly wants.”
John Morales
says...Can you sustain this claim with a real-life (preferably scientific) example of any such hypotheses, such that one is not more parsimonious than the other?
Consider that, for any hypothesis H, you can append additional clauses to modify it to H’, where such clauses do not contradict any of the available data*. H’ can similarly be modified into H”, and so forth.
Though H is more parsimonious than H’, itself more than H”, etc., all meet your criterion and hence are presumably equally justifiable for provisional belief.
That is where the principle of parsimony comes in; do you have a reason for not including it as a criterion?
—
* I note data is not information.
Data, as a category, cannot be in any meaningful way “consistent”.
John Morales
says...You do not make explicit your additional conditional that these two or more hypotheses are equally explanatory and predictive.
To qualify as equal, consistence is not the only justifiable criterion (cf. my previous comment).
John Morales
says...I contrast
with
cl
says...John,
Re comment 1: It seems to me we’re both on the same page, and have been. When I use ‘presence’ in my formulation, I’m envisioning exactly the “veridical, epistemic existence” you describe.
Re comment 2: You asked,
I’ve made a few rudimentary attempts along these lines already, but both were hypothetical, and I’ll note that our discussion over at DD’s is logical-philosophical and not scientific. Still, I’ll answer this question in a strictly scientific context with greater detail soon, as I’d already realized such would only strengthen my case. In the meantime, I’d be interested in hearing your reaction to the asteroid and OxyContin analogies.
Re comment 3: You said,
It’s true that the extent to which we do so strengthens our hypotheses. In a strictly scientific setting, we would be able to test our predictions in the laboratory, repeatedly, as often as time and resources allowed. We don’t have those luxuries at all in our discussion at DD’s, wouldn’t you say? Thus, we’re limited as to the types of predictions we can entertain. I’m not too keen on the idea of proffering reliable predictions concerning the behavior of a purportedly O^3 God.
Re comment 4: Note from the OP I’m not claiming we’d expect stories about God whether DD’s MH or DD’s GH were true. This is because according to DD’s GH, God should be right here, right now, in person, on the evening news and on magazine covers to help us understand His will, so stories about God under DD’s GH aren’t unnecessary in the first place, right? Who tells stories about the sun? Further, saying we’d expect stories about God whether God existed or not does not entail I’ve claimed DD’s GH and MH should cast identical predictions in all criteria – as they shouldn’t – and neither does such preclude that DD’s GH and MH won’t occasionally produce identical predictions in some particular sub-criteria (but never all criteria).
John Morales
says...Yes, clearly presence requires existence, unlike absence. But there is a categorical difference between the two concepts, and to use them as synonyms is to obfuscate the issue.
If you do not distinguish between presence and existence, your possibility space is limited to [present/existent, absent/nonexistent].
Clearly, the possibility space should include [absent/existent].
For meaningful discourse, furthermore, temporal modalities should be admitted – to include such possibilities as (it has always been the case that God has been present) vs. (it is sometimes the case that God is present).
John Morales
says...Logical-philosophical determinations of the existence of natural phenomena and causality historically fell into desuetude after the transition from natural philosophy to science, and is these days generally limited to casuistry.
As to the asteroid and OxyContin analogies, you will have to refresh my memory; I don’t recall them except vaguely.
I do recall though that my above response was related to your claim about the existence of multiple hypotheses consistent with a given dataset about which there may not be a justifiable discriminant.
John Morales
says...Yes. Your response is very reasonable, but I think it a non-sequitur – the reason being that my point was that there are multiple criteria upon which competing hypotheses may be preferred – I mentioned parsimony, explanatory power and predictive power, as examples. There are multiple others I could come up with off the top of my head – domain of applicability, for example.
As per my comment 2, I am highly dubious that you can come up with a specific real-life example of two or more such equal hypotheses where one cannot reasonably be preferred, when you include these reasonable and additional criteria in the considerations.
In short, I do not consider your contention as self-evidently justifiable or relevant, but an example will be irrefutable evidence that such exist, at which point its relevance can be established by showing that the GH and MH fall into this category.
John Morales
says...Thanks, that is what I considered to be the case.
I drew your attention to it because, in normal discourse, statements such as “DD’s GH cannot produce the same consequences as his MH” are by convention considered to be using the universal rather than the particular qualifier. Had you written something akin to “DD’s GH cannot always produce the same consequences as his MH”, I would not have noted it.
Your clarification is functionally an emendation in this case, indicating you originally expressed yourself either imprecisely or ambiguously (depending on POV, of course! ;)
John Morales
says...[meta]
cl, I hope you take my criticism as it is intended and as I think (hope?) I would, i.e. as an opportunity for you to either refute it or address and incorporate it thus strengthening your case thereby due to its increased rigor.
cl
says...Re 6:
Not when we both know damn well what we’re talking about – which previous comments established – so save it.
Yes – although not in those exact words – I’ve made that argument before to DD, several times. In fact, this distinction weakens DD’s so-called “Undeniable Fact,” wouldn’t you say?
That was the entire point of my DM/FR distinction, which DD never saw fit to make. Tell him.
Re 7:
Again, why not tell that to DD? His entire experiment is logical-philosophical, and hardly scientific if at all. I’m merely playing by his rules, lest I be accused of trying to break them.
DD’s thirteenth and fourteenth posts in the series.
Re 8:
Did I ever disagree with that? If I remember correctly, I agreed with and acknowledged it.
Apply this to your own example of wave-particle duality, and tell me what you come up with.
It’s comments like this that make me want to ask: Are you honestly listening to me? Or just out to get a gotcha? This entire post was dedicated to clarifying the fact that “showing that the GH and MH fall into this category” is NOT my argument. The GH/MH cannot fall into this category. Doesn’t such seem logically impossible to you? If no, where do you get your weed? If yes, why do you ask me to undertake the logically impossible?
Re 9:
That’s fine, I’m really against universal qualifiers for the most part, and although many “brute-force” debaters might consider your criticisms pedantic, I appreciate criticisms like this one, even with their minute amounts of snark. So many of the problems arise via discrepancies in language.
Clarity is a good thing, right?
Re 10:
Of course. I derive a great deal and even learn from some of your comments, as some of them are rather nuanced, well-articulated and well-reasoned. In others – however – you act like any other pretentious, smarty-pants atheist who gets a bite of knowledge and mounts a high horse. Pre-empting further claims of hypocrisy, we’re at my house now. As you can see from the Feedback sidebar, I don’t care if people make personal remarks and attacks over here, as I don’t have to worry about disrespecting my host, being called a troll, or getting banned for responding similarly. I think of it like the real world: People spout off to me at someone else’s house, well, okay… I might say a quick thing or two back, but will let it ride for the most part, out of respect for the homeowner. It’s a whole different story in my own house.
But let’s not try to go that route anymore. I think we can get past all the BS that’s near-exclusively interfered with reasoned discussion hitherto.
John Morales
says...Excellent! Thank you.
John Morales
says...Well, if you choose to use presence and existence as synonymous and don’t consider it obfuscatory, I will endeavour to work within that definition.
Perhaps you will remind me should I slip and distinguish between the two, in future.
I already have, in essence: As it seems apposite, I quote something I wrote to cl at his blog in the context of challenging his similar contention that, in real life, there can be “multiple criteria upon which competing hypotheses may be preferred – I mentioned parsimony, explanatory power and predictive power, as examples.”
As with his, yours is a claim regarding the possible existence of multiple hypotheses consistent with a given dataset about which there may not be a justifiable discriminant.”
However, since we’re now working with existent and present as synonymous, clearly intermittent presence is equivalent to intermittent existence, and the present absence is de-facto present nonexistence.
This is confusing to me.
I see.
I will look.
Well, you were speaking of circumstances where a given hypothesis could not reasonably be preferred, and only mentioned one criterion, which engendered my comment “I am highly dubious that you can come up with a specific real-life example of two or more such equal hypotheses where one cannot reasonably be preferred, when you include these reasonable and additional criteria in the considerations.”, to which you have responded:
Commenter Tacroy has already addressed my example cogently: “I don’t think your example of wave-particle duality really applies”.
John Morales
says...[meta]
Whoops, blockquote failure.
By the time I got to seeing it on review, the edit time period had expired.
I do hope it’s still clear who is who.