On Evidence & Proof, Pt. II: Questions From Lifeguard
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In Pt. 1, we discussed SI's version of the oft-repeated "no evidence for God" argument. In the thread, Lifeguard asked a few good questions:
Can an ironclad case for God’s existence can be made? Absent an ironclad case, regardless of why such a case cannot be made, then what is a believer left with besides the naked decision to believe? If even an IRONCLAD CASE does NOTHING without having ALREADY made the decision to believe, then what does that say about the warrant for belief in the absence of an ironclad case? Doesn’t this amount to saying that evidence for the existence of God only becomes evident when you’ve already made up your mind to believe? Isn’t that putting the cart in front of the horse?
I believe answering these questions as clearly as possible is mandatory in making myself understood here, so let's tackle the necessary definitions first.
By ironclad case, I mean an argument whose every point is supported by cogent logic. With that in mind, I say yes – one can make an ironclad case for God's existence – and you should not find it surprising that I say one can also make an ironclad case for God's absence. Now that I've answered Lifeguard's first question, let's return to his second:
Absent an ironclad case, regardless of why such a case cannot be made, then what is a believer left with besides the naked decision to believe?
In the absence of an ironclad case, a believer could base their faith on one or more pieces of circumstantial evidence. That Kayla's case was a miracle cannot be proven, but why shouldn't her experience be allowable as circumstantial evidence? She's certainly based her faith on something more than intuition, hearsay, wishful thinking or naked decision, right? In a murder trial, the prosecution may not have an ironclad case, but does that mean there's nothing left to support a conviction besides naked decision? Similarly, why I perceived Lifeguard's comparison as a false dichotomy, because more options than ironclad case and naked decision exist.
Lifeguard replied,
That was not the dichotomy I presented. The dichotomy is "ironclad case" and "less than an ironclad case." If, even when presented with the ironclad case, one must decide to believe, then aren't you admitting that even under a best-case scenario, the evidence is insufficient absent the willingness of the judge to not only entertain the logical possibility of the supernatural, but to accept it as proven? Isn't that a decision of the will – to accept as proven that which can only be demonstrated to be, at best, logically possible?
This confused me. To me, it seemed the original question implied that nothing could support belief besides naked decision in the absence of an ironclad case. I disagree with that, while I realize that many people do believe based on naked decision.
The point is, saying that acceptance or denial of a proposition is volitional does not entail that the judge must put the cart before the horse, or accept the "logically possible at best" as proven. While not necessarily always a decision of the will, conflating logical possibility with proof is always an error, and that's not what I'm doing. All I'm saying here is that no matter what the argument, acceptance and denial are volitional. People can refuse to believe ironclad cases. People can refuse to see evidence for what it is. They do it all the time.
In SI's thread, part of my strategy was to argue that no matter how persuasive the evidence for a particular proposition might be, humans are fallible creatures, forever vulnerable to slothful induction. For example, many creationists consistently deny the ironclad case for a LUCA, so we see that ironclad cases don't necessarily work on their own. To me, this further suggests that belief and denial are acts of volition, things people must consciously choose to do.
While several factors can interrupt the chain of healthy induction, in my experience, the key motivator behind slothful induction is the attempt to avoid an unwelcome conclusion, and I think we can all agree that slothful induction is a hurdle both atheists and believers must struggle to overcome. If it's possible for believers to reject an ironclad case for something, it must be possible for atheists to commit the same mistake, right?
Continuing, Lifeguard asked,
If by "ironclad case" you mean merely "a rationally sustainable argument" – which you've already conceded both sides can make – why is it "slothful induction" to deny an ironclad case for theism?
Presenting an ironclad case for atheism does not give one license to deny an ironclad case for theism. Let's say we both put forth ironclad arguments for (a)theism. In such a scenario, if both cases are ironclad, and nothing in either case mutually excludes anything in the other, then the rational conclusion is that yes, while neither of us can necessarily prove our case, we can rationally support our beliefs. In this scenario, for one of us to deny the other would be irrational, because it's slothful induction to deny any ironclad case without justifiable dissent. For TWIM's regular readers, I see an analogy here in the common ground Lifeguard and myself seem to share regarding the Problem of Evil.
Lifeguard asks,
If even an IRONCLAD CASE does NOTHING without having ALREADY made the decision to believe, then what does that say about the warrant for belief in the absence of an ironclad case?
The warrant for belief in the absence of an ironclad case is circumstantial at best. I'm not saying "an ironclad case does nothing without having already made the decision to believe," as this would imply that one must already believe in order to accept the ironclad case. I'm saying an ironclad case does nothing without the willingness to follow the evidence wherever it leads. I'm saying an ironclad case does nothing when an individual is influenced by one or more common motivators that often subconsciously interrupt the chain of healthy induction. Here's Lifeguard's last question phrased a bit differently, but still getting at the same idea:
..[cl] did say that even an ironclad case for theism accomplishes nothing if one doesn't make the decision to believe. Doesn't that mean that the ironclad case itself doesn't logically compel belief without an act of the will? Doesn't that mean you have to be willing to believe before you've even heard the evidence?
Doesn't this amount to saying that evidence for the existence of God only becomes evident when you've already made up your mind to believe? Isn't that putting the cart in front of the horse?
I still feel the need to clarify my position: I'm not saying one needs to believe beforehand. I'm not saying we need to believe in order to see the evidence. I'm saying that whenever somebody does not follow the evidence wherever it leads for whatever reason, an ironclad case does nothing. I'm saying that both atheists and believers can and do deny ironclad arguments across the wide spectrum of ideas we discuss.
I really don't see how that is debatable, but I'm always up for discussion.
Lifeguard
says...Sorry for the late response, but I needed to get away from these discussions for a while. In any event, here goes:
1) You wrote: “In a murder trial, the prosecution may not have an ironclad case, but does that mean there’s nothing left to support a conviction besides naked decision? Similarly, why I perceived Lifeguard’s comparison as a false dichotomy, because more options than ironclad case and naked decision exist.”
In even the weakest murder prosecution there will always be some evidence to support a conviction, but if all of the evidence fails to eradicate reasonable doubt, then there is no support for a conviction. The verdict must be not-guilty. The more apt analogy for dueling ironclad cases might be a civil trial where the burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence where the jury feels the evidence comes out 50/50. What is the basis for a verdict in such a case? Psychologists who have studied how juries make decisions have generally found that where the evidence is highly ambiguous, individual jurors tend to resolve the ambiguity based upon their own sympathies, prejudices and attitudes rather than the evidence itself (why jury selection is so important). That’s what I mean by a naked decision– each juror can point to some evidence that supports there own preference, but it is merely their preference. In other words, the outcome they would have preferred even before ever having heard testimony or examined the evidence.
If one shakes off, for just a moment, pre-conceived atheism or theism, how do you resolve the matter given two competing ironclad cases? The hardcore atheist will say “atheism wins,” and the theist will say “theism wins.” But, again, I believe if an individual steps outside of their own prejudice, it’s rather plain that agnosticism or a soft atheism (by which I mean to live your life and choose your values without reference to the dictates of any supposed supernatural being) are the most sensible choice. Otherwise, the individual is basically cherry picking.
Incidentally, I think it’s the internal sense that this is all one is doing in taking a hard stance is exactly why people react so violently when challenged by someone who’s basket is full of a different variety of cherries.
2) You wrote: “All I’m saying here is that no matter what the argument, acceptance and denial are volitional. People can refuse to believe ironclad cases. People can refuse to see evidence for what it is. They do it all the time.”
I agree. That’s my point. What the evidence IS, is ambiguous at best. From my own perspective, I see how the evidence you present for god’s existence is probative of god’s existence. I see just as much evidence that is probative that god does not exist. My question is “What motivates the volition to make one decision as opposed to another?” As stated above, I believe, more often than not, the answer probably comes down to a desire to maintain the integrity of one’s prior beliefs on the subject one way or the other as opposed to a sober appreciation for the fact of ambiguity and a responsible attempt to resolve the emotional turmoil that comes with not knowing and deciding how to proceed with life from there.
3) You wrote: “In SI’s thread, part of my strategy was to argue that no matter how persuasive the evidence for a particular proposition might be, humans are fallible creatures, forever vulnerable to slothful induction.”
To borrow from the law, evidence is a piece of information that is probative (tends to prove or disprove something) and relevant (pertaining to the matter at issue). Then there’s the issue of “weight.” How probative is this? How much does it tend to prove.
I’ll concede that Kayla’s case is a piece of evidence, but, given the perfectly reasonable inferences that can be made in favor of both sides of the argument, how probative is it? How great is it’s tendency to prove that god exists or performed a miracle? How is it slothful induction to say that this evidence doesn’t prove a thing as opposed to saying that, because it cannot be disproven to be a miracle, it therefore constitutes persuasive evidence that it is a miracle.
What I find slothful is the eagerness to believe (hope might be the more appropriate word) that Kayla’s case is a miracle or to claim that evolution makes god a logical impossibility.
4) You wrote: “Let’s say we both put forth ironclad arguments for (a)theism. In such a scenario, if both cases are ironclad, and nothing in either case mutually excludes anything in the other, then the rational conclusion is that yes, while neither of us can necessarily prove our case, we can rationally support our beliefs. In this scenario, for one of us to deny the other would be irrational, because it’s slothful induction to deny any ironclad case without justifiable dissent.”
Agreed. My question is, given all that, how then shall we live?
5) You wrote: “I’m saying an ironclad case does nothing without the willingness to follow the evidence wherever it leads.”
You’re leaving out the opposing “ironclad case” here, aren’t you? If two opposing ironclad cases exist, then the evidence doesn’t necessarily lead anywhere– unless you’re looking at the evidence through the tinted glasses of your own personal prejudices. With two opposing ironclad cases, you cannot arrive at one conclusion or the other unless you are leading the evidence exactly where you want it to go.
6) You wrote: “I’m not saying one needs to believe beforehand. I’m not saying we need to believe in order to see the evidence. I’m saying that whenever somebody does not follow the evidence wherever it leads for whatever reason, an ironclad case does nothing.”
I’m not saying one needs to believe beforehand either. I’m saying one can’t follow ambiguous evidence anywhere, UNLESS they already know where they want the evidence to go.
cl
says...No worries; those are words of wisdom. Sorry it took me so long to respond back. It’s been busier than usual around here lately. I guess I’ll take’em in order. Here’s my response to #1:
This is true, and I agree a civil trial is a better analogy, but what I was getting at was more along the lines of this: when all the evidence fails to eradicate reasonable doubt (IOW fails to justify going from atheism to theism in our analogy) – it is not always due to insufficiency of the evidence – right? Say yes, because you know that’s true. Inability to eradicate reasonable doubt can also be due to juror imperviousness to reason. If you agree to that, then you agree to the intending meaning of what originally sparked our disagreement.
So, then do you see what I meant by ‘false dichotomy’ now? I wasn’t tryin’ to bust yer balls, I was just trying to say, “Whoa, hold on, we’ve got other options here.” Yes, of course jurors are more liable to sympathies, prejudices and attitudes when something we can actually call proof exists. I don’t even need psychological tests to buy that. Still, that doesn’t limit every decision of individual belief to either an ironclad case or naked decision, because however ambiguous it might be, the original evidence still exists.
Additionally, wouldn’t you agree that one shortcoming of both civil and criminal trial analogies is the inherent structure thereof? Meaning, when people make belief decisions, they’re not given a limited set of data points as evidence, nor must they all infer from the same set of data points. Yes, objective reality is “the same data points” for everyone because that’s just how it is, but people have unique sets of data points because everyone lives a subjective, unique, individual existence.
Sure, this can and does happen, but we’re discussing hypothetical jurors which remain just that.
We don’t resolve the matter. We say “we believe” and proceed accordingly. The matter will resolve itself in time just fine. There’s another discrepancy between the actual scenario we’re pondering, and murder / civil trials. As far as cherry-picking, I don’t think that’s necessarily the case, either. Cherry-picking means acknowledging evidence that supports a conclusion and ignoring evidence that doesn’t. That’s not necessarily what we’re discussing I think. What we’re discussing is the scenario by where both hypotheses are equally borne out by the evidence. As far as what fallacy we’re committing when we arbitrarily select a conclusion based on the “naked decision” you alluded to, well, it’d probably be more like confirmation bias.
Well, each person will be different. In many, this is probably the case. But those who don’t dig deeper when there’s a clear intellectual responsibility to do so merit whatever privations that eventually result.
Regarding #2, you said,
See! And you busted my balls at SI’s, claiming I was “putting the cart before the horse” when it turns out we squarely agree. Just so you know, I knew this then, and it made me cry. Well, not really, but you know what I mean.. :)
I’ll humbly take that as a compliment.
Well, I’m sure we’ll keep talking..
That’s a good question. Surely some people are just trying to keep a sinking ship afloat, and I think we all make the attempt at coping you mentioned.
Regarding #3,
How high is your bar? Everyone’s is different, no? Honestly, I couldn’t believe SI conceded as much as he did. I think atheists are full of jelly in the head on evidence and God, and to prove it I’m going to come out with a post where we switch sides: I’ll be the atheist, and commenters the believers – only they have an outrageous advantage over their real-world counterparts: the ability to proffer any logically permissible transition from potency to act as evidence. I will attempt to at least show that we can’t prove God with evidence, and hopefully why we can’t.
It’s not. It’s a correct statement I agree with. What is slothful induction is to say, “Absolutely zero evidence for theism exists” like SI, Philly, Evo, Chaplain and most everyone else in that whole crew. They can’t even concede as much as you have, that at least my arguments are probative in some number of cases. That’s BS, I say.
Actually, I think it would be the opposite of slothful; those are cases of swift induction, right?
Regarding #4, you said,
Well, how much of a gambler are you? :) Of course I’m kidding. What can we do? Our best. We go by our heart. We try our best to remain intellectually honest and never shrink back from difficulties in arguments. In my case, I can pray and seek the wisdom of the Scriptures, and observe the results. Much, if not most, of Christianity consists of quite testable claims. The Psalms say, “Taste and see.”
Regarding #5, you said,
In a civl or criminal trial, perhaps, but when people make faith decisions, they’re not given a limited set of data points as evidence, nor must they all infer from the same set of data points. Yes, objective reality is “the same data points” for everyone because that’s just how it is, but people have unique sets of data points because everyone lives a subjective, unique, individual existence.
Regarding #6, you said,
In civil / criminal trials I’ll agree. However, the evidence in every believer’s individual life is not necessarily ambiguous.
Damn, that was a long one. I hope you respond to all this. I’m not even gonna proofread it.
Lifeguard
says...CL:
1) You wrote: “[W]hen all the evidence fails to eradicate reasonable doubt (IOW fails to justify going from atheism to theism in our analogy) – it is not always due to insufficiency of the evidence – right? Say yes, because you know that’s true.”
Correct. It’s not ALWAYS due to insufficiency of the evidence. What I’M getting at is that assessments of the sufficiency of evidence is ALWAYS more difficult from someone who hopes or believes the evidence points one way or the other as opposed to taking a neutral stance.
2) You wrote: “As far as cherry-picking, I don’t think that’s necessarily the case, either. Cherry-picking means acknowledging evidence that supports a conclusion and ignoring evidence that doesn’t. That’s not necessarily what we’re discussing I think. What we’re discussing is the scenario by where both hypotheses are equally borne out by the evidence. As far as what fallacy we’re committing when we arbitrarily select a conclusion based on the “naked decision” you alluded to, well, it’d probably be more like confirmation bias.”
I’m not particularly hung up on how we label the fallacy, but, either way, there’s a fallacy there, and it involves ignoring that “both hypotheses are equally borne out by the evidence” (which is at least debatable, right?). Even assuming a “dead heat,” isn’t doing anything other than suspending belief (essentially choosing a-theism) fraught with the hazard of intellectual sloth? I suppose shrugging one’s shoulders is no better, but I don’t think adopting the stance I’m suggesting necessarily involves giving up on asking the questions and struggling for answers. In fact, it sounds a lot more like Sysiphus that anything else.
3) You wrote, regarding standards of evidence “How high is your bar? Everyone’s is different, no?”
Sure. Perhaps I’m just a cynic at heart, but I believe, when it comes to psychologically threatening issues, everyone has their own standard based largely upon the kinds of conclusions they are and are not willing to entertain. Just to be clear, I don’t exclude myself from that statement.
4) You wrote: “I will attempt to at least show that we can’t prove God with evidence, and hopefully why we can’t.”
And why we should believe anyway? I’m looking forward to that series.
5) You wrote: “Yes, objective reality is “the same data points” for everyone because that’s just how it is, but people have unique sets of data points because everyone lives a subjective, unique, individual existence” and later
“the evidence in every believer’s individual life is not necessarily ambiguous.”
Doesn’t that mean we can all believe whatever the heck we want? I have my right to my unique set of data points, right?
cl
says...No. Shrugging our shoulders would be intellectual sloth. In the event of a “dead heat” we need to press harder. In real-world criminal and/or civil trials, this is only possible to a certain degree. But in an individual’s personal quest for God, the world is literally at their fingertips.
No, I was getting at the difference between criminal / civil trials, and individuals pursuing the ultimate truths about God and life. All participants in the former necessarily share the same data points as admissible evidence. To contrast, all participants in the latter have an additional level of permissible evidence: the subjective. Meaning that in theory, the sum of empirical reality constitutes a macro-set of evidence available to all seekers of truth; only on top of that, each seeker also has a unique sequence of events that is their own personal life, which needs to be factored into the equation. Meaning that, an example of a data point we must share would be the fact that spirits are not scientifically proven phenomena. Fair enough, that we must share, but if you were tormented by spirits, then you would share that additional data point that needs accounting for.