The Argument From Probability
Posted in Atheism, Logic, Religion, Syllogisms on | 1 minute | 12 Comments →P1 Cessation of consciousness upon death entails zero ontological possibilities;
P2 Continuation of consciousness after death entails several ontological possibilities;
C Continuation of consciousness after death has a higher chance of ontological actuality than cessation of consciousness upon death.
Dominic Saltarelli
says...P1: That no one is behind you entails zero ontological possibilities;
P2: That someone is behind you entails several ontological possibilities;
C LOOK OUT, HE’S GOT A KNIFE!
lolz!
:D
just messing’ w/ ya…
Zeta
says...This may be cogent in some kind of context or domain, but I think it’s useful to highlight the fact that probability is fundamentally relative. More to the point, I think the syllogism offered suffers from a form of presumptuous naivety that is frequently found in such probabilistic logic.
Let me explain how probability is relative. The quantity that represents the chance of X is based off of information about X. Since information about X can be different and fragmented between many cases, many different probabilities can be assigned to X among various standpoints. This is why we have such a thing as conditional probability, where Bayesian updates can take place upon the arrival of new or even backwards-revising data. All of this, of course, is based on assumptions in the form of “prior probabilities,” which are the probabilities we assume events or states-of-affairs to have a priori, before we even know anything about them.
In this case, it is assumed that all “ontological possibilities” have equal probabilities, and therefore the likelihood of cessation is simply 1 divided by 1 plus “several.” In other words, very low. However, this doesn’t take in to account at all what the nature of consciousness is or any related facts, which may change the prior probabilities drastically.
**I have to go now. I may add more to these thoughts later.
Zeta
says...Here’s a demonstration of the fallacious mathematical error this argument relies on: Suppose we play a game called the St. Petersburg Gamble. To play, you simply roll two six-sided die repeatedly. But the catch is that if you ever roll anything other than snake eyes, the game ends. You’d expect to have a 1/36 chance of making it past the first roll. But according to the logic presented in this post:
P1 Rolling anything other than snake eyes entails zero further possibilities for the rest of the game.
P2 Rolling snake eyes entails an infinite number of further possibilities for the rest of the game.
C Rolling snake eyes has a higher chance of actually happening than rolling anything other than snake eyes.
So apparently 1/36 > 35/36 now.
XPK
says...What about the non-existence of consciousness before you were alive?
cl
says...Zeta,
Elaborate, if you don’t mind. Toss us a “such as” or two.
XPK,
What about it? I’m not sure what you’re asking. If I think it existed? Didn’t exist? If I think it’s prior existence or non-existence affects this argument??
XPK
says...“What about it? I’m not sure what you’re asking. If I think it existed? Didn’t exist? If I think it’s prior existence or non-existence affects this argument??”
Yes, I’d like answers to the last three questions, please.
cl
says...Do I think our unique consciousness’ existed before birth? I honestly have no idea. I don’t see any reason to force that one way or the other.
I don’t think that the prior existence of consciousness affects this argument, as the argument seeks to evaluate the ontological potential of post-mortem individuals.
John Morales
says...cl, I believe I’ve never quite heard that expression of substance dualism before.
By “the ontological potential of post-mortem individuals” you do mean their souls, right?
—
PS there wouldn’t be “a higher chance of ontological actuality” (cardinality?), rather a change of category of certain entities from the abstract to the concrete. Souls are mythological entities.
XPK
says...If “continuation of consciousness after death has a higher chance of ontological actuality than cessation of consciousness upon death”, then God is dead.
cl
says...John,
Actually, what I really should have typed was what I typed in the first line: consciousness, as in the ontological potential of post-mortem consciousness. When I say soul, I refer more to the interface between man’s physical body and what the Bible would call spirit. I’m pretty sure you use soul as I use spirit, which is basically to describe a disembodied consciousness, right?
XPK,
How so? I can think of a few explanations one might advance to justify that statement, but what did you have in mind?
John Morales
says...Well, that’s confused me. Never mind.
They’re pretty synonymous, in ordinary language. Aren’t souls supposedly what go to Heaven and to Hell, in your mythology? That’s what I mean by soul.
The point being, you seem to think minds can exist without being physical.
The only way I can see consciousness persisting after bodily death is if it’s somehow copied and implemented on a different physical substrate (uploading) – but that’s only science-fiction, right now.
XPK
says...@cl – well to be honest, I was slightly drunk on that last post so bear with my as I typethink out loud…
In short I think it comes down to my consciousness existing before I existed. There is no research that I am aware of to study pre-existent consciousness (somewhat like “what was the universe like before the big-bang?”).
Alright, if consciousness continues after death, then the only way God as some disembodied consciousness could exist is if he was also dead.
Another way of saying this would be my consciousness came into existence when I was created. For god to exist as consciousness she/it/he//they would also have to be created.