I’m Burning Out! And Thoughts On Haiti
Posted in Blogosphere, Morality, Thinking Critically on | 4 minutes | 33 Comments →
I never thought it would happen, but I'm afraid I have to admit it's true: regarding blogging, my general feelings so far in 2010 can be summarized in the statement, "for the birds." Nothing really interests me anymore, at least not on the atheist blogs I've grown accustomed to reading. However, I will say that jim's series Proof of God's Existence is probably the best thing going in the aetheosphere right now, and I do hope he keeps at it.
Now, I am definitely not saying I've lost interest in writing or philological work, because that's not true at all. Actually, I'm now more enthused in my work than ever. Lately I've been spending quite a bit of time fine-tuning the new homepage, last updated February 2nd 2010 and currently presenting just short of 100 arguments pertinent to (a)theist discussion. I'm doing work, it's just not immediately visible. So that explains the reluctance to write new posts every day. I've burned out on the aetheosphere, and decided to put my work where I imagine it might count for something more: the book.
That being said, by no means am I through with the blogosphere. In fact, just this morning I read a post over at MS Quixote's that got the gears turning: A Problem of Evil…
In reference to recent events in Haiti, MS Quixote wrote,
The world, which necessarily includes all events within it, is indifferent precisely because matter, energy, space, time, and any other physicality if there be such a thing, do not possess properties necessary for non-indifference… Under this view, there’s no such thing as evil. There are events. There are perturbations of matter and energy. There are earthquakes. They are but occurrences, not meaningfully different under Naturalism than the gravity exerted between Jupiter and Saturn.
I literally raised both hands in the air and declared an emphatic "yes" when I read those sentences. There exists what I describe as a sort of "ideological middle ground" between the Christian and the Naturalist. I make the distinction "ideological middle ground" because I tend to agree with Bob Dylan that, "you either got faith or unbelief, and there ain't no middle ground," (spiritually speaking).
The ideological middle ground is this: many Christians tend to view natural disasters empathetically, as horrible yet contingent unpleasantries that resulted from the fall of man. However, swap "horrible yet contingent unpleasantries that resulted from the fall of man" with "horrible yet non-contingent unpleasantries that necessarily result from an imperfect Earth," then note that many Naturalists react to natural disasters the same way as the aforementioned Christians. To me, therein lies the inconsistency.
What I'm getting at is this: Quixote's sentences should serve as a wake-up call to Naturalists who embrace this "ideological middle ground." I'm sure on many atheist sites I'd catch a can of whoop-ass for what I'm about to say, but I honestly believe that one cannot be a Naturalist and have justified moral outrage at events like the recent one in Haiti. In fact, coming from a Naturalist point of view, I think we can make a strong argument that the world needs more earthquakes, tsunamis and natural disasters, to wipe the inharmonious scourge of mankind from the face of this beautiful planet we call home. Such events would certainly serve Earth better if they occurred in the industrialized nations, but who's to say these natural disasters aren't Earth's way of excising the human cancer that threatens all species? If we're all just a conglomeration of chemicals on the brink of permanent non-existence, then why not embrace the cruel indifference of the world and quit feeling sorry for the recipients of natural disasters?
Now, please note that this is NOT my true reaction to the tragedy in Haiti. However – assuming it were – it would seem to me that the best any atheist or Naturalist could say in response would be something along the lines of me "being cruel" or "lacking empathy," and to those Naturalists I would ask: can you give me one reason why I should care?
After all, are not events such as those in Haiti as equally meaningless as "the gravity exerted between Jupiter and Saturn?"
MS Quixote
says...Hey cl,
Looking forward to the book. Please keep us posted…
Thanks for the thoughtful comment…I’ll just respond here for both places.
“To me, therein lies the inconsistency.”
Exactly. I’m glad you brought this out, because I left it ambiguous utilizing the underdefined phrase: all consistent thinkers. Camus was a consistent thinker whose existentialism led to recognizing the gentle indifference of the world embraced by Meursault in The Stranger. In The Plague, his main character watches the agonizing death of a child, and through this event, and the near destruction of a major city through disease, Camus describes the existential plight of man, battling against evils that are ultimately meaningless.
It is just as you say: one cannot be a Naturalist and have justified moral outrage at events like the recent one in Haiti, or any others for that matter. I mean, a naturalist can be morally outraged, but only by forgetting his philosophy, it seems to me. Interestingly, Camus’s personal life exhibited a forgetting his philosophy. The best general treatment I’ve read of this is Schaeffer’s “The God Who is There.” Moreover, what grounds the goodness that arises out of these events under naturalism?
It seems to me that the “Old Atheism” was by and large much more intrepid in affirming meaninglessness than is the “New Atheism.” I’m not certain what the actual cause of this is, but I suspect it’s equal parts left-leaning politics, warmed over sixties kum ba yah perhaps, and public relations. After all, not many people are willing to embrace nihilism. Just a hunch, but as I’ve stated publically elsewhere, much–though certainly not all–of internet atheism is founded on pilings other than logical argumentation.
“In fact, coming from a Naturalist point of view, I think we can make a strong argument that the world needs more earthquakes, tsunamis and natural disasters, to wipe the inharmonious scourge of mankind from the face of this beautiful planet we call home.”
This is a novel point, cl, and a good one. Since mankind is not priveleged in any manner under naturalism, there’s no clear reason to think the earth wouldn’t be better off without us. There’s also a nice question of beauty and asthetics hidden in there somewhere as well, I think.
“I’m sure on many atheist sites I’d catch a can of whoop-ass for what I’m about to say”
Ha! If anyone knows cl, it’d be you :)
Dominic Saltarelli
says...No reason to care if you’re a Christian, either, you’d just be a cruel Christian who lacked empathy. What was the point of this post?
If you feel that way, then yeah. If you happen to react to natural disasters, then no.
I’ve always wondered how people actually try to make an argument out of this. If a woman says to me, “they’re just boobs, ya know”, all I do is look up into her eyes and say “yeah, and?”
Trying to make the argument that a Naturalist doesn’t have permission (somehow this makes sense to religious people) to feel things because the Naturalist doesn’t believe that the universe was made with a point to it in mind by some superbeing is record breaking absurdity.
Here’s how this argument sounds to me whenever its made, using a different set of circumstances to highlight why it’s so asinine.
A naturalist burns his hand on a hot skillet. The naturalist reacts, says “ouch!”, and complains about having burned his hand. The theist then argues with the naturalist, saying that it was only a chemical reaction starting with nerve endings that resulted in the transferral of sensory information to the brain, no different than being tickled or tasting an apple, thus the naturalist has no warrant to justify feeling pain. Whereas the theist is justified in feeling pain because they believe in a God who decided what pain should be ahead of time.
It’s so ridiculous that one hardly knows whether to laugh or cry whenever hearing this whole “Only us believers in God are allowed to distinguish between A and B because God decided there should be a difference.”
And I hear it a lot.
Feeling something is a bedrock observation. You either feel it or you don’t. Same as seeing colors or hearing sounds, you either get stimulated by something or you don’t. There is no justification needed anywhere.
Feeling moral outrage at something is the same as telling the difference between hot and cold, you don’t need someone else’s permission to distinguish the two.
I’ll say it again, the naturalist doesn’t have to put naturalism on hold to distinguish between good and bad any more than he/she has to put naturalism on hold to distinguish between red and blue. It’s that simple.
MS Quixote
says...“Feeling something is a bedrock observation.”
Agreed, Dominic. The argument should never be that naturalists do not feel empathy, or that they do not act on it morally.
“I’ve always wondered how people actually try to make an argument out of this.”
Axiological arguments are powerful for many people, actually.
If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Objective moral values and duties do exist.
Therefore, God exists.
“Trying to make the argument that a Naturalist doesn’t have permission (somehow this makes sense to religious people) to feel things because the Naturalist doesn’t believe that the universe was made with a point to it in mind by some superbeing is record breaking absurdity.”
Again, agreed. The argument is not that the naturalist does not have permission or can’t feel things; Theists insist that naturalists feel things, and use this as evidence for objective moral values and duties. This is easily seen when arguing with naturalists, different than yourself, who argue in fact that there is no good and evil and that all feelings, intuitions, and observations about such things are meaningless or illusory.
“And I hear it a lot.”
I do too, and it’s irritating. But now try to hear the argument as it is intended.
“There is no justification needed anywhere.”
You seem to be claiming that intuitions of morality are properly basic. This works well for the theist with the above argument if you’re willing to grant it like this. In this manner, my intuition and apprehension of moral values and duties would be properly basic, and thus a warranted apprehension of natural law as support for premise two.
“Feeling moral outrage at something is the same as telling the difference between hot and cold”
I’ve seen the argument before, but before I respond, are you really suggesting that moral values and duties hinge upon the universe as some sort of physical property such as heat?
“It’s that simple.’
Yes, it’s that simple. The naturalist does not have to put naturalism on hold to distinguish between good and bad. The naturalist must put naturalism on hold to believe there’s anything meaningful about good and bad, and to act in an ultimately meaningful way. The question is never can I be good without God. Of course, you can. The question is always can there be good without God.
cl
says...Hey guys.
Sorry for this long and meandering comment I’m about to write, but the more I think about this, I think what I’m really challenging here is the foundation for the Naturalist’s impetus to eliminate suffering. To simply chalk it up as “empathy” and call it “properly basic” seems like a inconsistent philosopher’s hat trick to me.
It seems to me that empathy could only be called properly basic if we accept the premise that suffering should be avoided. Else, why be outraged at mere perturbations of matter, especially when they don’t affect us? Seriously. Why care? It reminds me of those people (usually whiny liberals) who try to make others (usually successful conservatives) feel guilty for their success because others are so poor. Hypothetically,
“But people are suffering in Haiti, cl… don’t you get it?” (Naturalist)
“Yeah, I get it. So what? People are suffering on Haight Street, too. If what you’re telling me is true, suffering is a part of nature’s course just like sunshine and I didn’t see anyone over here sending telegrams when the weather was fair in Haiti, so where’s the consistency?” (cl)
Or, let’s think of it this way: A bear wouldn’t be morally outraged because we got too close to her cubs. She’d just tear our heads off without a second thought about the suffering she caused us, and probably without a lick of guilt or empathy afterwards. So why does that change when the “animal” is human?
Dominic,
I completely agree. I never said a word about Naturalists not having “permission to feel things” and I apologize if I was unclear. I did say I’d like the Naturalist to explain the foundation for their moral outrage over natural disasters such as the recent one in Haiti. If I understand your response correctly, you are saying Naturalists need not explain that moral outrage, right? That it’s properly basic, as Quixote said? If that’s what you’re saying, I see that as an inconsistency.
I know you said you don’t read my dialogues with jim, but did you happen to catch Pt. 3? I ask because in that post you’ll find,
I agree with you that feelings do not require justification, that they are “bedrock observations” as you say, and my argument is NOT that “atheists are unjustified to feel things, theists are.” Hell, I’m not even sure I have an argument in this post. I saw it as more of a question.
Yeah, that does sound pretty ridiculous. I’m curious though: how’d you get to that from what I wrote?
I don’t think the Naturalist has to put naturalism on hold to distinguish between their personal likes and dislikes, but the minute Naturalists start talking about “good” and “bad” in any objective sense, I believe they’ve departed from consistency. I’m betting you don’t have an opinion as to whether the gravity between Jupiter or Saturn is “good” or “bad” right? Might that be because said gravity doesn’t entail human suffering?
MS Quixote,
I will definitely keep you, Dominic and the rest of my internet pals abreast of book developments. It would not be the same book without all of your input and for that I am thankful.
Roger that, but the writer of Ecclesiastes had them all beat!
LOL! What a great sentence that was. It seems to me that if Naturalism is true, refusal to embrace nihilism becomes a refusal to accept reality as it is. That so many Naturalists refuse to dance with nihilism suggests that they intuitively accept the premise that “lack of suffering = good” as properly basic, which is eerily similar to what God implied in the beginning of Genesis.
MS
says...“It seems to me that if Naturalism is true, refusal to embrace nihilism becomes a refusal to accept reality as it is.”
Precisely, and there is no shortage of naturalists who would agree with this.
“That so many Naturalists refuse to dance with nihilism suggests that they intuitively accept the premise that “lack of suffering = good” as properly basic, which is eerily similar to what God implied in the beginning of Genesis.”
Note that it was Dominic who was suggesting that we as humans experience empathy immediately, just as we would sense pain, or the color blue, both of which are properly basic, if there is such a thing. I only wanted to determine if that is what he really meant (the third person here is not intended to marginalize, btw. I owe that sensitivity to your friend, Brad, who is greatly missed around these parts). If so, it seems a powerful confirmation of general theism, as you suggest, and as I did as well.
“I never said a word about Naturalists not having “permission to feel things” and I apologize if I was unclear.”
I second that, Dominic. Regardless, though I don’t comment much, I do read a lot, and based on what I’ve read, you’ve always represented your side well and with class, so I wouldn’t want you to take the wrong idea away from this exchange.
“I will definitely keep you, Dominic and the rest of my internet pals abreast of book developments.”
Please do.
cl
says...MS,
I agree wholeheartedly. Though, I did found his response to Marianne George less than satisfying (Love ya Dominic just bein’ real).
Hell, I found everyone’s responses to Marianne George less than satisfying. They either ignored her, mocked her, or tried to marginalize her paper on account of betel nut.
I understood the distinction, and await his answer.
I’ll second that. I wonder about Brad often.
Brad
says...Yeah, yeah, yeah, okay, I got it people, you can all stop guilt-tripping me now. :)
Backstory in brief: I had long ago delivered myself from many tacit blog commitments after a week-long summer vacation sans computer and internet connection sparked my interest in rejuvenating my sanity to full health; hence my extraordinary hiatus. It was rather rude to leave without warning, but to be frank you shouldn’t expect much on the internet. Anyway, I’m back here for the time being.
I will, in fact, respond to a large portion of the items listed on your front page, cl, though that might take some time. The tl;dr of it is that some of it is genuinely interesting, while some of it disappointing (given my past experience with and perception of your quality of writing and thinking). For the moment I’ll respond to this entry right here, which falls under the latter aforementioned category according to my impression.
I’m not exactly sure what you mean by justified moral outrage. Since there’s no intention and thus no blame behind it all, is this really a matter of morality? Perhaps a spiritual outrage? (“Spiritual” can have a decidedly secular definition; simply review the common phrases in use such as “in high spirits,” “a spirited discussion,” “wine and spirits,” etc.) The definition of a “spiritual outrage,” to me, would be an event or circumstance that causes rage directed at itself, specifically a rage caused by the spiritual effects of said event or circumstance. The Haiti earthquake caused massive pain and loss of hope; we don’t like this fact so we feel negatively towards it; therefore it is a spiritual outrage.
Is this inconsistent with any of naturalism’s precepts?
There’s nothing objectively better about the planet being “beautiful” as opposed to harboring the “scourge,” of mankind, and to load the sentences at hand with aesthetically charged vocabulary deliberately distracts from this fact. The question is subjective, and ultimately boils down to who would actually want the Earth to be beautiful without anybody to enjoy it more than they would want the conscious human individuals currently and potentially in existence to cease to exist for the sake of its beauty.
Why shouldn’t you? There’s no “objective” motivation to embrace indifference just as there’s no “objective” motivation to embrace sympathy. This is the domain of the subjective, not the objective. Furthermore, the fact we are chemicals has no strictly logical import on the issue of sympathy versus indifference: it is purely emotional.
You ask the question, “Why should we care.” I think this betrays a shallow interpretation of the interplay between feelings and logic within the mind, if only as a reflection of what you (quite apparently) think a naturalist must necessarily believe to consistently be a naturalist. First, in the absence of feelings for or against anything whatsoever, no decision can be called “better” than any other decision (“better” defined as being valued greater). This is virtually tautological: without a difference in value between things, there is no difference in value between choices. Hence feelings are properly basic for any “why should” query in the sense that without them there are no true answers at all.
As a matter of nuance, notice I keep saying ‘feelings,’ which is broader than simply ’empathy.’ Even if a meticulous serial killer like H. H. Holmes did not feel anything alongside his unfortunate victims, he almost certainly felt something akin to ‘thrill’ or ‘joy’ in their curious plights at his dominating hands. Also, I mean ‘feelings whatsoever’ to be broader than just those feelings we are consciously aware of and capable of verbally reporting… explaining what I mean by this convention in more detail would require some neuroscience, but I’m leaving that out for now; suffice it to say that I do not believe consciousness is necessarily totally “unified.”
Second (and more significant): is what to feel in a situation premeditated and decided-upon? Are feelings simply a subset of conclusions? I am not aware of any data of any kind supporting this implicit contention. My understanding of my own mental activity is that my feelings are not deliberative choices: I do not consciously decide upon them prior to feeling them. I am not directly aware of the mechanics that govern them; in other words, they are spontaneous and only indirectly controllable at best once they emerge.
Given this, it is nonsensical to ask why one should choose to feel a certain way when feeling a certain way is not a matter of choice in the first place. Bluntly and honestly, this fact intuits so obviously to me that I suspect theists may be willfully misunderstanding atheists and the nature of the mind when unleashing this tawdry question.
Meaning exists objectively: any thought or feeling is some measure of meaning. Thoughts exist, feelings exist, therefore meaning exists. Life isn’t meaningless unless you have never thought a thought or felt a feeling. Nothing so far contradicts any tenet of a naturalist’s worldview. So what’s all this hubbub with the run-of-the-mill assertions atheists can’t consistently believe in spirituality and meaningfulness? I’ll concede there’s no objectivity to be had, but it does not follow there is no spirituality or meaning to be had.
If I may submit my own suspicion here, it would be this: the theists in these sort of cases question whether matter and energy are allowed to “feel” when all they can do by rule is rearrange. This is a fundamental question because feelings are axiomatic in the foundation of spirituality, morality, and existential meaning, and materialism speaks to only matter. A deeper generalization would be the Hard Problem of Consciousness as originally framed by Chalmers.
(http://consc.net/papers/facing.html)
That deserves a separate discussion, though. If my views be in demand at the moment, they are that consciousness transcends form and substance, the duality of which is supposed to exhaustively account for all existence under philosophical materialism. I think that sound contemplation in the direction of the Hard Problem will lead away from naturalism…
So yeah, that’s pretty much the biggest news with me.
Brad
says...Because whatever turned my copypasta URL into a link is stupid and doesn’t comprehend parentheses:
http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
Dominic Saltarelli
says...What I was getting at was the use of the term “justified” in regards to feeling moral outrage at something. It just doesn’t apply.
The people who argue w/ theists that morality is all an illusion do so to stress the subjective nature of said morality and eliminate the idea that there is in all actuality an objective standard of good and evil that really exists independent of people.
I said feeling things is a bedrock observation that doesn’t require any kind of justification. Theists use this to argue for the existence of said objective standard. Here’s something to chew on, though.
Feeling moral outrage is on par with feeling hot and cold, you just do it. Run your hand under cold water after waking up in the morning, emerging from a toasty cocoon of 98.6 degree dead air. Run the same temperature water over your hand after playing outside in the snow for an hour (you know, when you decided to come inside because your fingers are numb). The former feels ice
cold, the latter feels scalding hot, even though its the exact same physical phenomenon. You can’t say either observation, either “feeling”, is justified according to any objective standard.
Same with getting mad or happy about something.
Just to clear things up though, I am aware of the fact that a large number of people arrive at nihilism via naturalism. I will say that this isn’t due to any logical necessity. A large number of people are simply idiots. You can arrive at nihilism via ANY belief system. Just keep asking “and then what?” till you run out of answers, and voila, utter pointlessness to existence, time to wear black lace and write bad poetry.
Dominic Saltarelli
says...Just wasn’t much to say I’m afraid. Good articles though. Since you were introducing them as evidence to support a larger point, I didn’t see any reason to dispute the evidence just to be a contrarian. The only thing that caught my eye was the bit about the betel nut. I figured you catch enough flak from other people, and deserved the benefit of the doubt.
cl
says...Huh. Ask and you shall receive!
Brad,
Hello. Welcome back. Hope the rest was restful and no, leaving tacit blog commitments isn’t rude at all. I always respected people who did their own thing. Health and sanity trumps opinion anyday if you ask me. Reminds me of a buddy I have who just slips out unnoticed no matter what event we’re attending. No good-bye’s, handshakes, pounds or pleasantries. He just goes, and we see him when we see him.
I’m really looking forward to hearing which articles fall into the “disappointing” category, and also why you think so.
Quick question: what does “tl;dr” mean? Was that a typo, or some blogphrase I haven’t heard yet?
That question is subjective, but not the question I was asking. I think you over-focused on the word “beautiful” which means you’re right that it was probably unnecessary.
Are you saying the planet would not be “objectively better” without humans? If so, I disagree. The larger point I was going for there was that most humans – whether naturalist, theist, or something else – tend to interpret life – specifically human life – as some sort of supreme fact. We interpret natural disasters like Haiti as “bad” because they cause pain. Yet, not all that pains can be rightly called bad.
I disagree. If theism is true, objective reasons to embrace sympathy exist: God created humans for life not death, so death becomes an unnecessary tragedy. If naturalism is true, objective reasons to embrace indifference exist: we’re just matter that comes together for a moment and then disperses forever, so death becomes just another necessary step in the ebb and flow of matter. We’re inherently nothing more than a dust-mite.
It sounds like I’m either expressing myself rather poorly. As far as this post goes, what I assert a naturalist must necessarily believe to be consistent is that we’re no more worthy of life than a dust-mite, hence all this fluff and concern over loss of human life is inconsistent. I’m not saying a naturalist is inconsistent to be sad if their mom dies. I’m not saying naturalists are inconsistent to feel things. I’m not saying a naturalist is inconsistent if they complain about burning their hand.
We agree there, Brad. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: feelings are neither justified or unjustified; they do not require justification. It seems you, Dominic, MS and myself are all in agreement there.
So then, why do I argue that the naturalist cannot have justified moral outrage? I think I just picked a less-than-best phrase to work with! What I’m cricizing here is actually not so much the initial feeling, but the belief that widescale loss of life is “bad” or “undesirable,” and that measures should be taken to prevent or offset it. Earth would clearly be better off with less people, so who’s to say widescale loss of life is bad or undesirable, except of course from our own selfish vantage point of thinking humanity some sort of privileged existence? That’s the “idealogical middle ground” I allude to, and claim as inconsistent with naturalism.
Your life isn’t meaningless unless you’ve never had a thought. If naturalism is true, all life is ultimately meaningless.
It is exactly what you describe: hubbub. I’ve not said here or anywhere else that atheists cannot live meaningful lives. I have said here and elsewhere that if atheism is true, all life is meaningless. I hope that distinction is clear.
cl
says...Dominic,
I agree, and apologize for using less-than-best language to express myself.
Yet, all sentient beings experience hot and cold. OTOH, psychopaths feel the latter, but not the former, so can you really equate the two?
I’d say it depends what we mean by nihilism. There is no logical necessity for individual naturalists to lead meaningless lives. OTOH, the conclusion that life itself is ultimately meaningless is a logical necessity of naturalism. Moreover, the naturalist who assigns meaning to their life has no justification for judging the person who does not. If there’s no objective reason that life should be valued, it all becomes a matter of taste. It’s not wrong to kill, it’s natural. People either do it, or not.
Nah. Not even close.
I know, that’s what bummed me out. That’s the only thing that caught anyone’s eye. Every other day, it’s all about evidence and scientists and published papers. So I bring just a taste, and nobody even tried to tackle it squarely, yet there they all are, still carrying on about how “there’s absolutely no evidence that consciousness transcends death.” If nothing else, reporting Marianne’s story really showed me how many atheists are just in flat-out denial of anything that contradicts their worldviews.
I’m not snarking at you there, either, but those I describe as Team Scarlet A. I appreciate your input Dominic; I was just looking for something more in that instance because I know your capabilities.
Dominic Saltarelli
says...How about you believe it because that’s what you feel?
I mean, most all of us would feel bad seeing someone kick a puppy or throw a hamster into a wood-chipper too. Or maybe put a puppy and a hamster into a sack and kick the sack into a wood-chipper. That’d be somethin’.
I, Dominic Saltarelli, believe throwing sacks of puppies and hamsters into wood-chippers is wrong.
Anonymous
says...cl
Why? Isn’t that just your opinion? If yes, and you can grant that throwing sacks of puppies and hamsters into wood-chippers can be right for me, then I’d don’t really see too much inconsistency there. OTOH, if you’re trying to tell me that my animal cruelty is wrong, then you need to justify that, because it’s more than a feeling when you hold someone else accountable to it.
Also, side question: do you post as Dominic on that forum Why Won’t God Heal Amputees?
Dominic Saltarelli
says...Of course its my opinion, that was the whole point. And if you feel that its right for you, then its also my opinion that you’re wrong.
And if I am in a position to enforce my opinion, I may do so. Further, put enough people together who happen to share the same opinions about how puppies, hamsters, and sacks should be treated, and you’ll see the rise of the illusion of an objective standard regarding how *everyone* should treat animals. Sort of like picking toothpaste, you don’t just go with any old toothpaste, the right one is the one that 9 out of 10 dentists think you should use.
The one tragedy out of this is that when people look behind the curtain and see the social contract for what it is (basically mob rule based on evolved emotional responses that are just common enough across the spectrum), they almost always think that they are in a position to re-write it, or worse, that it doesn’t apply to them anymore just because they’re aware of it, which almost invariably leads to disaster.
It’s like a dangerous idea. True, but makes people do enormously stupid things nonetheless.
A bit OT, but sometimes I imagine that a lot of the people online who put up the best arguments in favor of traditional dogmatic theism are themselves atheists who have looked far enough ahead and realized that some truths humanity at large just can’t cope with, and thus decided that the illusions of religion best suit the ignorant masses. Simple rules with simple rewards and simple punishments.
Ever see that movie, “The Watchmen”. I liked Rorschach. He was my dawg.
Dominic Saltarelli
says...Nope. Though now I’m intrigued.
Brad
says...tl;dr = too long + didn’t read
It initially was used on certain forums and boards to mean that an original post was too verbose and therefore not worth reading. As with all expressions, it is now a little more flexible. In the instance I used it, it is a noun that means “the short version” or “the gist of it.”
I am, in fact, claiming the planet would not be objectively better without humans. Necessarily, objectivity voids all leaning and preferences, thus precluding any “better than X” comparison. Nothing is objectively better than anything else, as per the prerequisite removal of feelings and values that imbue our thoughts.
On this count I definitely agree, if I am interpreting you correctly. Most humans – perhaps naturally, perhaps through culture and learning – feel that their ethical sentiments belong to some sort of objective, absolute, transcendental standard, and I don’t buy this. In other words, human POVs aren’t the only POVs possible.
I think this does speak to a need for a more nuanced grasp of life and spirituality. However, can we agree a life of opportunity is preferable to a life of despair, all else equal? (Although honestly I’m not sure how I can get away with the all-else-equal condition in this case..)
Whether or not our lives are finite and what exactly was intended for us, if anything, would count as objective facts, I’ll agree that far in. However, for this to translate into feelings that can establish a motivation, a subjective reaction to these facts must be tailored. Motivations are not objective just as the feelings that effect them are not objective.
Once again, this is subjective if you’re speaking to our value as people. If I value people, people have value to me. If I don’t value people, people don’t have value to me. It is that simple.
And what, exactly, within naturalism’s tenets precludes the ascription of value or worth to things? You have been silent on this point, a point I think is crucial to your statements expressed in this thread.
If a person is sad when their mom died, that person valued their mother. You say it’s not inconsistent to feel sad, but you say it’s inconsistent to value, which makes no sense whatsoever to me, because these are one and the same thing.
If you don’t desire the widescale loss of life, then it is undesirable to you.
You ask who can say X is undesirable, and then you tacitly agree that we are legitimate candidates to do so! But if you already agree we are A-Okay to say X is undesirable, then where’s the issue?
But you haven’t shown any inconsistency. Borrowing from one of your earlier posts, “a contradiction can be represented by the following formula: x + (-x) = contradiction.” Perhaps the challenge on the table should be to logically derive something of this form from naturalism.
Here’s what I think this all slims down to. If naturalism states that humans should not feel or operate on these feelings, then it is inconsistent for a naturalist to value. However, if naturalism only states objectivity is necessary in merely explaining the state and evolution of affairs, and speaks nothing to anything else, then it is okay to feel certain ways about certain facts and then operate on the basis of these feelings. To me, it appears you keep forcing the former definition onto naturalism, when it’s the latter that is the more faithful representation.
Or, perhaps, you keep thinking naturalists must assume how they value things corresponds to “intrinsic” values of things, but this is not necessary for naturalists to do. Naturalists are allowed to distinguish between subjective and objective, and need not believe their feelings align with a cosmic metric.
MS Quixote
says...Hey Brad,
Great to hear from you again, sincerely. I hope everything is good with you and yours.
“Perhaps the challenge on the table should be to logically derive something of this form from naturalism.”
Let me restate that naturalists discern and make moral choices and find and experience meaning and purpose in life. That’s exactly what I would predict, given my views. So, don’t let this devolve into that type of discussion.
The logical form of this argument, given naturalism, should be something along these lines, from the theist:
Ultimate, objective moral values, duties, and meaning exist if, and only if, God exists and man is immortal.
Given Naturalism, God does not exist and man is mortal.
Therefore, given Naturalism, ultimate, objective moral values, duties, and meaning do not exist.
Brad
says...MS Quixote:
Yeah I’m fine. From what I was reading into all of this, there was supposed to be some kind of inconsistency within naturalism itself. Apparently, though, it was really about holding to naturalism and the idea of objective values simultaneously. I would certainly agree that this is inconsistent, but not on the fault of naturalism. How could there be objective values – even given God and the falsehood of naturalism – when objectivity must, by definition, preclude valuing anything? Aren’t the words “objective” and “values” an immediate contradiction in terms?
It seems to me any argument for or based on objective values is fundamentally a semantic equivocation. Likewise, duties, obligations, and responsibilities also seem outside the realm of objectivity, because they are expectations and intentions based upon desires and feelings. They are all basically illocutionary constructs.
The objectivity of meaning, though, I believe is a bit different. Certainly there exist ideas and thoughts which are objective, such as the Pythagorean Theorem or Quadratic Formula. The idea that electricity is a current of electrons is objective. On the other hand, the idea that your mate is wonderful is subjective, based on the feeling of wonder.
MS
says...“Aren’t the words “objective” and “values” an immediate contradiction in terms?”
Well, perhaps, but not the way I am using them. Moral values would be equivalent to good and evil, whereas duties would be the right and wrong corresponding to the objective moral values. This, then, should remove the equivocation you’re detecting with regard to value, or valuing something objective.
“Likewise, duties, obligations, and responsibilities also seem outside the realm of objectivity,because they are expectations and intentions based upon desires and feelings. They are all basically illocutionary constructs.”
Which would render them groundless in that view, and under such views, say “desirism,” I agree, which is a roundabout way of saying that, for me, you’ve given acceptable, and rather eloquent, rationale for what I’ve been saying all along. For many Christian theists, however, and as you know, objective duties would proceed from Divine commands, which though they could conceivably be construed as illocutionary, would find grounding in the nature of God through objecive moral values.
“Certainly there exist ideas and thoughts which are objective, such as the Pythagorean Theorem or Quadratic Formula.”
Right, I get you, but keep in mind that when theists use the word objective, they’re typically trying to get at a deeper level of objectivity than offered by the phrase “can be demonstrated to all independently” or the like. As I understand it, the Pythagorean theorem is mathematically certain, and in that sense objective, much like a self-evident truth. I see the distinction you’re getting at, and I’d be happy to think of the meaning portion of the above as simply ultimate, as in what real meaning does an event have if it’s consigned to nothingness in the future.
Dominic Saltarelli
says...There is simply no argument here whenever theists agree that fundamentally, “might makes right”. God’s will, him being the most puissant individual possible, is therefore by definition “good”, accordingly.
I tend to argue this because theists, by and large, seem to have a problem with this idea, as though objective good is somehow independent of the fact that God is in the supreme position of enforcing his will.
(…if I had to guess, I’d say this is primarily due to the fact such a dogma suppresses the rise of monsters like Mao Tse Tung, Mr. “power grows from the barrel of a gun”, social evolution in action)
Brad
says...Hm. Sounds like we mean moral “charge” a la electromagnetism instead of the values people ascribe to things. But then what do the words “good” and “evil” mean in our conversations? What is the basic idea assigned to these words from which we derive further ideas about?
Perhaps good is a word the refers to those things which one personally likes, but then that is subjective, regardless of whether the person has magic powers or not. (Unless we go down the path of magic -> married bachelors.) Perhaps good is what makes the greatest number of people the most happy – if mathematically dilineated without ambiguity, assuming feelings can be quantized, of course, then this would define objective moral charges. Or, you could say “preferences exist” is an objective statement, but that’s hardly the cog used in an argument based on said preferences.
Evil, likewise, could be described as that which is hurtful to one person but intentionally put in place by another for the purpose of hurting – this would be an objective description of an event or circumstance, hence an objective moral charge. Hitler’s actions caused physical and mental harm to a set of people, Adolf knew the consequences of his actions on roughly this set of people, therefore his actions were evil. QED
But then, each of these definitions can be incorporated into a naturalistic frame of reference. These descriptions can be used upon things without equivocating in naturalism. How can one believe the first axiom in your argument, objective moral charges exist iff God exists, when the definitions have straightforward applicability in the real world with no tetherings to inexplicable magic “ground”?
If theists have a nonstandard definition of objectivity, I’d like to at least know what it is in order to assess claims and arguments that depend on it.
Is there a temporal requirement to meaning? Just because my family’s owning a cat was in the past, it doesn’t mean it wasn’t a real occurence. Likewise, just because we move on from emotional investments, die, and forget things, it doesn’t imply that the meanings that events and such had to us didn’t exist or weren’t real.
Perhaps we all experience wishful thinking that the meaning in our lives that makes it all worthwhile, that defines everything about us and everything we know, will endure past the trivialties of biological death and eventual thermodynamic death of the universe. If we are immortal or if we get an afterlife, then this is true, but otherwise not. In any case, it is not logically necessary for the existene of “real” meaning, unless by “real” you mean that which you can fully trust, and you will only fully trust what is eternal – but then that, again, is introducing subjectivity.
MS
says...“There is simply no argument here whenever theists agree that fundamentally, “might makes right”. God’s will, him being the most puissant individual possible, is therefore by definition “good”, accordingly.”
I agree, Dominic, but you’ll notice that’s not what I’ve clearly stated. Objective Moral values derive from God’s nature, not from His might. When, you switch over to objective moral duties, he certainly has the might to enforce them, if He so chooses. It seems to me that only by conflating the two can you create the kind of inconsistency you’re aiming for.
“as though objective good is somehow independent of the fact that God is in the supreme position of enforcing his will.”
That’s precisely what I’m saying. The Good derives from God’s nature, which is distinct from His ability to enforce it. This is not the same as the Good being independent.
How would you ground goodness, btw? Or would you?
MS
says...“But then what do the words “good” and “evil” mean in our conversations? What is the basic idea assigned to these words from which we derive further ideas about?”
We’ve pretty much previously agreed that naturalist and theist alike more or less apprehend a great swath of the good and evil we encounter in our daily lives. Are you now suggesting these intuitions, feelings, or observations are unsound or unreliable?
“But then, each of these definitions can be incorporated into a naturalistic frame of reference. These descriptions can be used upon things without equivocating in naturalism.”
I concur, and have always maintained that objective, in the sense you are employing the word, moral systems may be constructed by naturalists. Unfortunately, they’re non-binding and devoid of grounding, and thus non-objective. Maybe this treatment of your example might help clarify:
“Evil, likewise, could be described as that which is hurtful to one person but intentionally put in place by another for the purpose of hurting – this would be an objective description of an event or circumstance, hence an objective moral charge. Hitler’s actions caused physical and mental harm to a set of people, Adolf knew the consequences of his actions on roughly this set of people, therefore his actions were evil. QED”
Yes, you and I could define it as such, and between us it would be an objective standard between us alone based on our agreement; however, it fails to reach what I would term objective. For instance, Hitler might define good as that which is hurtful to one person outside his race but intentionally put in place by his own race for the purpose of hurting the other and aiding his own. Hitler’s actions caused physical and mental harm to a set of people not his own, Adolf knew the consequences of his actions on roughly this set of people, therefore his actions were good.
Now, consider that he had actually been successful in eradicating everyone that disagreed with him. Would the good now be his definition because only those who believe it remain? Under your proffered system, it seems demonstrably so, hence, the system is non-objective. QED.
Thus, I would define objective moral values as those that are true whether anyone believes them or not, and, most likely, if there were no humans around to apprehend them at all.
“How can one believe the first axiom in your argument, objective moral charges exist iff God exists, when the definitions have straightforward applicability in the real world with no tetherings to inexplicable magic “ground”?”
The definitions you’ve offered are simply not objective in the sense that I am using, as demonstrated. However, I would certainly not classify God’s grounding of the good as inexplicable, nor magic. These are loaded terms that assume naturalism at the outset.
Nevertheless, goodness grounded in the nature of God appears to be the most reasonable locus of the good, if there is one. He’s conceived as self-existent and omnibenevolent. What other suitable locus of the good could there be that provides a basis for an objective standard? It’s certainly not found in contingencies such as human desires, attitudes, pragmatisms, utilitarianisms, etc. If you apply Euthyphro consistently to naturalistic grounding candidates, it might help to flesh this out: http://www.marcschooley.com/blog/?p=39
Furthermore, these systems do not provide a basis for our obligation to moral values. Thus, even if you were to posit a natural charge equivalent to an objective moral value, or an abstract object such as goodness, there would be no reason for us to consider it morally binding, not to mention the incomprehensible coincidence of our evolving to apprehend it under naturalism.
“Just because my family’s owning a cat was in the past, it doesn’t mean it wasn’t a real occurrence”
I concur. Not to lessen the truth of your statement, an occurrence, through its genuine occurring, does not provide ultimate meaning. How much of the meaning of this past event is dependent upon your recollection of it now?
“Likewise, just because we move on from emotional investments, die, and forget things, it doesn’t imply that the meanings that events and such had to us didn’t exist or weren’t real.”
Sure, the events happened, but why or how could we ascribe any lasting meaning to them? I agree there may be a relative temporal meaning at the time, but once you’re gone, what meaning is left? Initially, then, there’s the grounding problem again for the naturalist. The meaning of your past is located within the contingency of the configuration of atoms that compose your memory, or the configuration of another physical entity such as a photograph or digital file. When these particular configurations have passed from existence, the memory is in a very real sense dissipated. It no longer exists, and is therefore become meaningless, unless of course, you’re claiming that non-existence has the ability to contain or preserve meaning.
Generally, the response is that the meaning was real at the time, therefore it was real meaning. But is it? I don’t see it. What difference in meaning could remain in eternity between you loving your cat or dousing it with gasoline and setting it on fire? An event that ceases to have meaning was meaningless to begin with in any ultimate sense.
“In any case, it is not logically necessary for the existene of “real” meaning, unless by “real” you mean that which you can fully trust, and you will only fully trust what is eternal – but then that, again, is introducing subjectivity.”
Pursuant to my definition of objectivity, whether I trust it or not has nothing to do with it.
Offered with respect…
Dominic Saltarelli
says...I wouldn’t. Goodness, from a theistic standpoint, is entirely arbitrary. Goodness from a naturalistic standpoint is dependent on conditions for survival, and subject to change accordingly.
Brad
says...Well, yes, we’re agreed that we all feel things repeatedly during our daily lives. But if you’re trying to say we apprehend the moral valence of events according to some objective standard, I am in disagreement still. Even if I believed there were such an objective standard, I would say our feelings and intuitions are unsound and unreliable. (1) Significantly large sets of people have conflicting feelings about ideas and decisions, (2) if feelings were correct and reliable there would not be widespread emotional dissonance, ergo (modus tollens) feelings are unsound and unreliable.
Obvious strawman. That’s not my system; it’s the imaginary system you devised for Hitler. Each system is objective but they are also each using a word differently, hence what they have to say about the world can be non-opposing when the distinct meanings of the word are taken into account. Under the language I offered, saying Hitler’s actions are “evil” means “intentionally harmful”; under the language you devised for Hitler, saying Hitler’s actions were “good” means they lead to death outside his race; these meanings do not contradict. If you take into account the meaning of words, no contradiction arises between objective systems. I shall illustrate my message more clearly with two examples and subsequent elaboration.
Example One: I am a rebellious teenager with a taste for clever puns. Therefore I define the length equal to one “foot” to be the length of my foot. Me and my teacher therefore disagree about many of my answers on a quiz. This is inevitable because words can have any meaning we put to them: therefore whether or not my computer monitor is one foot in height is not an objective question.
Example Two: I define the numeral ‘2’ to mean what is normally thought of as two-and-a-half. Hence 2 + 2 = 5. This is inevitable because symbols can take on whatever meaning we give them: therefore whether or not 2 + 2 = 5 is not an objective question.
As you can see, so long as a query is (what mathematicians often call) well-defined, the query can be objective. Whether or not Hitler’s actions were good or evil depend on what we mean by the words. Once we have a solidified meaning (which is not tied to leaning or preference), there will be an objectively correct answer.
Of course, I’ve believed from the get-go that objective moral statements must be descriptions and therefore non-binding. Prescriptions just don’t have any objectivity to them, for the reason I shall now explain.
This is incoherent, just as the sentence “colorless green ideas sleep furiously” is incoherent. The truth of a pattern is a measure of its representativeness. If a statement (which must be a pattern consisting of symbols, gestures, pronunciations, or in the medium of art, colors or figures or shapes or whatnot) corresponds accurately to what it sets out to portray, then it has a proportional measure of truth.
(Unless you go by either the pragmatic theory of truth or the coherence theory of truth: in either case, your definition of objectivity becomes useless for your argument.)
So then what does the sentence “You should not kill” correspond to? What is it trying to represent? I don’t think there really is something it can correspond to. It can’t correspond to a state of affairs, nor a possible state of affairs, so what is it even saying? The query as to whether this proposition is true (even if isolated to specific circumstance) is only objective if it is well-defined and independent of feelings. The only definition independent of feelings I can see is “it is in my best interests not to kill.” Whether or not it is in my best interests has an answer independent of feelings, even if people with differing data about a circumstance make different conclusions.
Also notice that your definition of objectivity subsumes what I’ve presented so far rather than revises upon it. (1) Humans can have opposing feelings about ideas and decisions, (2) if a proposition is tied to feelings it is not necessarily true for all people, ergo (modus ponens) propositions tied to feelings are not objective.
“>http://www.marcschooley.com/blog/?p=39
That article is just another semantic cop-out, even despite its (what I honestly think of as humorous) attempts to throw off that impression. Either good refers to a quality and God instantiates this quality, or it refers to God’s nature whatever God’s nature be. Using both meanings at the same time is elementary equivocation. And that is how the Law of the Excluded Middle is broken on the ED’s horns.
Hopefully you’re not scared that I’m upset or offended about this dialogue! That’s hardly the vibe I want to be seen from my posts.
cl
says...In general, I would be more prone to believe in naturalism if humans reacted to their own mortality the same way animals do. Sure, elephants are known to mourn the loss of their own, just like humans are known to mourn the loss of theirs. This is the emotional / instinctual feeling which I say needs no justification, and if that’s where it stopped I’d be more prone to accept the naturalist’s larger argument, but that’s not where it stops. The human reaction to death is not analogous to that of other mammals. One might argue that our reaction is only better articulated via evolved mechanisms of communication other mammals do not share, but I doubt such people can responsibly deny the discrepancy between the way humans handle death vs. other mammals.
However, as distinct from mourning the loss of our own, many humans – dare I say most – display what appears to be an inherent repulsion to death per se, exemplified the apparent universality of our white-knuckle efforts to conserve human life at all costs (literally, just ask Obama). Many – dare I say most of us, naturalists and theists alike – cling to “preservation of human life” as some sort of ultimate standard. That’s the “ideological middle ground” I refer to.
Theists who believe God created humans for eternal life are acting consistently with their beliefs when they express the “repulsion to death” I allude to. OTOH, if I were a naturalist, I would find our fixation on life strange, narcissistic even.
Naturalists who express the “repulsion to death” I’ve alluded to seem to have embraced the idea that a life free of despair is to be preferred, yet cannot offer anything besides “because I say so” as a justification.
Here are my thoughts on some specific comments:
When I say Earth would be objectively “better” without humans, by “better” I mean something like “more conducive to equilibrium between species.” In that context, I see it as undeniable that Earth would be objectively “better” without humans. In making that statement, I’m alluding to an objective standard which declares equilibrium between species preferable to that which thwarts equilibrium between species. If the God I believe in exists and created the universe for purposes facilitated by equilibrium between species, then I am justified to say something like, “preserving life and alleviating suffering is the right thing to do.”
Why?
Because “preserving life and alleviating suffering” becomes what we were created for. If a programmer writes an if statement, we say it’s working “right” or “correctly” when it executes the statement(s) in brackets if the statement in parentheses evaluates to true. Similarly, if God created human life for X, then humans are working “right” or “correctly” when in pursuit of X.
Why don’t you buy such a concept?
I will agree that most people prefer a life of opportunity to a life of despair – period. It might just be semantics, but I honestly see an issue with you calling a “life of opportunity” anything like “preferable” because it implies exactly the type of objective standard you’re denying. If all you mean to say is that you personally find a life free of despair to be preferable, or that most people find lives free of despair preferable, then we’re in agreement. If you meant to say that anyone besides yourself should find life preferable I’d like to understand the justification for that statement. If naturalism is true and God did not create humans for some specific purpose, what premise are you standing on when you say “a life of opportunity is preferable to a life of despair”? I might buy it if I can see it, but so far I can’t. Some people – for whatever reason – apparently prefer lives of despair. Who are we to question them if there’s no objective standard?
I get that; what I’m saying is that if naturalism is true, our lives have no objective importance, none more than a dust-mite. You might live your life meaningfully, but ultimately it has no meaning. With theism – particularly variants of monotheism – it’s a whole different story. Whether you live meaningfully or not, your life has an objective meaning outside the opinions you assign to it.
No tenet of naturalism that I’m aware of precludes the ascription of personal value or personal worth to things. As far as I understand it, naturalism proplerly extrapolated cannot sustain arguments for objective value or worth to things. Under naturalism, if you believe killing is right and you kill, that you believe and act on such is not ethically different than me believing butterscotch pie is good and eating some. Yet, very few humans really believe that no ethical difference exists between those two acts.
I’d disagree there. I’d say those things are consistent, or that they are not influenced by subjectivity, but to me those attributes do not count as objective per se. When I say “objective” or “that which exists objectively,” I refer to all that would exist or occur outside of human consciousness. Without at least a single instance of human consciousness, there can be no trigonometry. Only subjects can discern the “objectivity” of nature.
I would say that idea is subjective because if we took away human consciousness that idea would not exist. However, I would say the electrons were objective, because they would still exist even if all humans disappeared in the next ten seconds, but even the objectivity of the electron doesn’t seem to hold all the way down (cf. quantum mechanics).
cl
says...Brad,
If God exists and has declared such, that sentence means a God capable of creating life has declared that we should value it. If God does not exist, that sentence means some person more or less equivalent to myself declared that we should value life. If God exists and created life for some purpose, I’d say the decree “you should not kill” becomes an objective decree in the sense that it would exist or occur irrespective of human consciousness.
OTOH, if no God exists, “you should not kill” becomes morally equivalent to “you should not eat butterscotch pie.” It becomes yet another opinion that does not necessarily reflect any referent in reality.
Further, a truly objective standard becomes incapable of existing under naturalism – unless we wish to argue some sort of “moral plane” that exists regardless of human pronouncements, which is actually an idea I’ve been open to for some time now – but it seems you already agree there.
MS
says...“Well, yes, we’re agreed that we all feel things repeatedly during our daily lives.”
I thought we were agreed that both the naturalist’s and the theist’s apprehension of evil was sound in the case of the Haitian earthquake, that both groups saw it for what it is. When I saw the following phrase, then, it appeared as a retreat from the agreed notion that we alike recognize evil, and good, when we see it, regardless of any supposed objectivity and despite any quibbling around the fringes of the perception or the fact that we at times disagree:
“But then what do the words “good” and “evil” mean in our conversations?”
So, what do the words mean? I contend that when you see evil you see evil. Is this not the case? Are you suggesting it’s genuinely or potentially something else, dependent upon your perception and the attendant categorization in your mind and perhaps based on your learned experience, or the social contract you adhere to? If any of these are remotely the case, or something very much like them, and such is what I’m understanding from you, then I think the distinction between our views is made clear.
“Obvious strawman…If you take into account the meaning of words, no contradiction arises between objective systems. I shall illustrate my message more clearly with two examples and subsequent elaboration.”
No straw to be found, my friend, unless you’re referring to my “your system” phrase, which I’ll happily retract. Otherwise, I think you’ve missed my aim here. The aim was not to produce a contradiction, but rather illustrate from within your own example its lack of objectivity as I’ve defined it. As I stated, by your definition its perfectly objective, by mine, it’s not.
But what of the unanswered question: If Hitler had been successful in eradicating all but those who believed as he did, would it not then necessarily be the case that good would be defined as Hitler believed, even, especially actually, under your proffered objective framework?
“therefore whether or not my computer monitor is one foot in height is not an objective question.
And thus your conclusion self refutes, as I as a rebellious blog commenter can ascribe any meaning I want to the words and symbols. Welcome to continental philosophy, my friend. I adore it, and were I an atheist or agnostic I would embrace it in its full rigor, not just stick my toe in it :)
“As you can see, so long as a query is (what mathematicians often call) well-defined, the query can be objective. Whether or not Hitler’s actions were good or evil depend on what we mean by the words. Once we have a solidified meaning (which is not tied to leaning or preference), there will be an objectively correct answer.”
I see you’re back to non-continentalism. I’ve agreed this entire time with your assertion that naturalism can produce objectivity as you define it above. Why are you repeating it?
“Of course, I’ve believed from the get-go that objective moral statements must be descriptions and therefore non-binding. Prescriptions just don’t have any objectivity to them, for the reason I shall now explain.”
Good. We’re agreed then.
“corresponds accurately to what it sets out to portray, then it has a proportional measure of truth.”
I’m pleased to work under the correspondence theory…
“The only definition independent of feelings I can see is “it is in my best interests not to kill.”
You saw the one I offered previously, correct? It corresponds to the Divine command “Thou shalt not murder,” which is itself an expression derived from the nature of God. This correspondence, if God actually exists and delivers Divine commands, yields both genuine objective moral values and objective moral duties.
“(1) Humans can have opposing feelings about ideas and decisions, (2) if a proposition is tied to feelings it is not necessarily true for all people, ergo (modus ponens) propositions tied to feelings are not objective.”
No problem with this that I can tell.
“Either good refers to a quality and God instantiates this quality, or it refers to God’s nature whatever God’s nature be. Using both meanings at the same time is elementary equivocation.”
You did mention strawmen, right? Secondly, I noticed you sidestepped the very reason I pointed you to the article in the first place: how does your system of objectivity fare when Euthyphro is consistently applied to it?
“Hopefully you’re not scared that I’m upset or offended about this dialogue! That’s hardly the vibe I want to be seen from my posts.”
Not at all, Brad. It was a sincere phrase I used. I recall once upon a time you speaking out in a room full of fellow skeptics to ensure that I as the lone theist was not being marginalized. It’s a rare trait, that, and I’ll not forget it. Hence, offered with respect…
Brad
says...Gah! :O
You two should see my face, sculpted of absolute pure horror, with how far language has been unspeakably maimed in its employment here! Particularly in cl’s use. Time to beat around the bush a third time, seeing if there has been any branch unbruised by the first two passes over.
cl:
This is completely unsurprising given our significantly greater neurological capacity to comprehend the plights of other feeling beings and to experience much much richer and complex inner lives than the vast majority of other creatures. Plus, when did “repulsion” become an ideology (lol)? Has it suddenly become inconsistent to act and behave on the basis of one’s feelings and attachments? Like I’ve said, people tend to view their feelings as belonging to an ultimate standard, and I don’t buy it (because it doesn’t make any sense), but that’s not part of the definition of naturalism, so essentially you’re attempting to score a point against naturalism using illegitimate ammo.
Also, you spent two paragraphs making sure no one would contest the discrepancy between the responses to death by humans and other creatures, but you forgot to get around to the part where you explain why you would be more prone to believe naturalism if the responses were similar. Why should one be more prone to believe if they’re similar?
To put it bluntly, your feelings and subjective impressions don’t implicate naturalism of jack squat. I could play this ball game and bunt by listing off the standard canned atheist responses of how one may find a theist’s fixation on God and whatnot strange and mindless even, perhaps for extra effect I should add in: toolish, narrowminded, weak-willed, subservient, hollowed, empty, programmed, bland, dazzlingly ignorant, swimmingly gullible, you know, a good plethora of canonized adjectives. Fight fire with fire, right? But what is this tactic good for, really?
In any case, I think the narcissism of a species is completely unsurprising. Survival of the fittest, amiright?
Sigh. You’re trying to frame preferences as a claims. I like strawberry milkshakes more than chocolate ones; what exactly am I claiming and do I need justification for it?
And we’ll need to fast forward for a moment to get something out of the way…
Nooooo, no, no, no. My fault; I didn’t elaborate on the import of my words. I was saying the preference was more or less universal, hence why the Haiti incident can be felt as bad by so many of us, even if we agree that “not all that causes pain is bad.”
I agree that without humans Earth would exhibit a greater equilibrium of species. But wait, I can bend the word “objective” to my agenda just like you, watch: When I say strawberry is objectively better than chocolate, by “better” I mean something like “more fruity in flavor.” In making that statement, I’m alluding to an objective standard which declares (!) fruitiness preferable to non-fruitiness.
See what I did there? I tacitly claimed there was some kind of objective standard “declaring” X to be preferable to Y. If you can do it, why can’t I? Through this technique you have relinquished the meaning of the word “objective” as it is most commonly understood and replaced it with something that supported your conclusion. In other words, you have equivocated.
Kudos, I couldn’t have devised a more artfully misleading analogy if I brainstormed for an entire hour. Mentioning Boolean truth value is particularly crafty! (I know a bit of BASIC so I am in fact somewhat familiar with programming.) Under this definition of “correct,” states of affairs are correct when they go according to plan. This standard is relative, not absolute (and hence cannot be objective).
If a member of a terrorist organization tries to upload a memo, but it is thwarted by a white-hat hacker, then events panned out (1) not in accordance with the terrorist’s plan, but (2) in accordance with the hacker’s plan. Thus whatever the computer did was both correct and incorrect from your definition, taking into account two different perspectives.
And that’s where the fault of your analogy lies: a program doesn’t have a perspective, it doesn’t have intentions or preferences or whatnot. It’s easy to call the function of a program “correct” or “incorrect” when there’s only one POV in one’s hypothetical, but what if there are more?
Example 1. I’ve bred and groomed my pit bull for viciously attacking other dogs in the ring. But when I get my friends over and we pit our creatures against each other, mine runs away like a pussy. Is what the dog did “objectively wrong” because it didn’t do what its master and creator wanted it to do?
Example 2. I am a conniving and remorseless man with a sexual appetite for supple young children. I marry a woman and obtain offspring with her: after that, I lock my wife and child in my secret dungeon, completely soundproof. And use them for my pleasure every day. The child finally escapes, in disobedience to my intentions for her existence and vigorous commands to her. Is what she did “objectively wrong”?
And I’m back to this again:
I speculate people who “prefer lives of despair” are really just people who are self-aware enough to see that canonical modes of generating meaning in one’s life do not obtain with them. Life has lost its mystery and excitement, regardless if one exerts energy in one effort or another. In other words, people only prefer despair when they either see everything as despair (and hence do not feel the motivation to do anything), or they see all other alternatives as anguishing and thus worth avoiding.
Questioning them, for one who doesn’t believe in an objective standard, would be questioning these views: are they sure there is no meaning for them to be had, or are they deluding themselves? How certain can they be that there is nothing for them, no opportunity? The reason someone would initiate such a questioning is out of a desire for a person to leave despair behind, by the way.
Contradiction. Why? Because, ultimately having no meaning =/= having no ultimate meaning.
You and MS have already distinguished between meaning and what you two call “ultimate” meaning. (I read “ultimate” like a wrestling match narrator with a deep husky voice: ultimate!) I think you’ve both agreed life has meaning, which means it has meaning, which means it has meaning, which means it has meaning, which, ultimately, means it has meaning. Repetition for effect. If someone is unsatisfied with anything less than an infinitude and eternity of meaning, then so be it, but that doesn’t mean anything finite equals zero.
[ If someone makes a pun off of Big-O notation here, so help me God… ;) ]
Man, it must have been fun being a caveman, what with there being no laws of physics back then to bind us down to the planet. I could shoot lightning bolts out of my hands because I couldn’t discern electromagnetism!
Enjoy your solipsism then…
I say every single idea and question there was, is, and ever will be or might be is subjective (including whether or not God exists or if naturalism is inconsistent) because if there were no one to ponder them they would not exist. Okay, not really, I don’t say that. Whether an idea is objective or not doesn’t depend on whether there is anybody in existence holding to that idea, it depends on the form of the idea itself (which is independent of its manifestation or lack thereof within an existing mind).
Seriously, I get the impression you’re just toying with words over and over again
to get your way, and I’m not too happy about it.
I’ll do Quixote’s comment later. Out of time for now.
cl
says...Damn, it’s unfortunate we’re having such a disconnect on this one, but you sure did grow quite the mouth during your time away.
Seriously, at the end of the day I don’t care what you’re happy or unhappy about. To hoist you by your own petard here, “..your feelings and subjective impressions don’t implicate [myself] of jack squat… so what is this tactic good for, really?”
We’ll get to “unspeakably maimed” soon enough. As for now, suffice it to say that I politely admitted my overstep(s) when and where I felt you and Dominic had sufficiently established them. If it turns out I’ve overstepped more than I previously realized, I have no problem conceding that, either. Call that what you want; I call it intellectual honesty.
Let’s skip ahead to your remarks about Boolean logic:
My point was that we are justified to say an if statement is working correctly when the statement in parentheses evaluates to true and the bracketed statement is subsequently executed. I’ll assume you agree there. Now, why are we justified to say such a statement is working correctly? Because bracketed statements are always executed in response to a referent in reality: the truth value of the statement in parentheses. If that referent does not exist — that is, if no programmer has defined the statement in parentheses — we lack any objective standard upon which to judge non-execution of the statement in brackets as incorrect. We can’t say an if statement is working incorrectly if it was never instructed to act correctly.
Now, let’s get back to this:
Exactly. That’s exactly what I’m saying, and he can correct me if I’m wrong, but as far as I can tell, that’s also exactly what MS Quixote is saying. So then, to repeat: “if the God [we] believe in exists and created the universe for purposes facilitated by equilibrium between species, then [we are] justified to say something like, ‘preserving life and alleviating suffering is the correct thing to do.'” In effect, “God created us and instructed us to preserve life and alleviate suffering” becomes the statement in parentheses: if that evaluates to true, then the statement, “humans should preserve life and alleviate suffering” has a referent in reality; it has objective correspondence.
A species? We’re the species that has it. I would find human narcissism completely unsurprising if it had correspondence in the lower animal kingdom. Lack of such correspondence — in conjunction with the the near-universality of both the aforementioned preference and our enforcement of it — leads me to question the assertion of naturalism as the correct explanation for the state of human affairs we currently observe. Note that I said correct and that I explicitly intend that to be interpreted in non-subjective, Boolean terms: the question of whether humans are the products of blind naturalism or some variant of purposeful theism is Boolean; it’s an either-or, mutually-exclusive question. We’re either products of blind naturalism or of some purposeful creation.
What, a Geico commercial came on while you replying or something? Since when do you enjoy being such a smart-ass? Besides, solipsism is the philosophical view that the existence of one’s mind is all that can be reliably accepted. Perhaps you meant to accuse me of sophistry? Problem is, I’m not saying the length of a slope of a triangle != twice the length of its base if humans don’t exist.
Why even imply the option in the first place? All ideas are subjective because only subjects can have ideas. If your claim holds water here, you should be able to show me an idea that can exist even if nobody in existence holds to it. If you can in fact cite such an idea, you unfortunately undermine your own claim. Rethink what you’re trying to tell me here. If you mean only to say that what’s real is real whether humans apprehend it or not, I agree, and would inquire as to the import of that agreement to the larger discussion.
No. Have you suddenly become obtuse and somehow missed my previous three statements that, “I’m not saying a naturalist is inconsistent to be sad if their mom dies,” “I’m not saying naturalists are inconsistent to feel things,” and “I’m not saying a naturalist is inconsistent if they complain about burning their hand?” If yes, you need to read more carefully. If no, why are you asking rhetorical questions or possibly being disingenuous while speculating about my motives all the while? Really, that’s some nerve.
You spent more than two paragraphs and forgot or ignored the point: to either challenge the discrepancy or plausibly explain its existence in a naturalist framework. I can’t speak generically for “one,” but I can tell you why I’m not persuaded, and not to be rude, but I assumed the point would be self-evident to someone of your intelligence: if humans were just another shade of evolutionary green — and by that I mean that if homo sapiens are just animals containing nothing analogous to a divine imperative from God that prompts them to near-universally express the aforementioned preference — then there’s no reason for humans to react differently to death than say, a black bear or shark. If naturalism is correct, death and life become equally neutral. No foundation exists other than personal taste for enforcing a preference for one over the other.
I don’t have an opinion as to whether the dog acted “objectively wrong” because that hints of moral evaluation which is beyond the scope of this discussion. The salient point for my position would be that the dog defied an objective standard imposed from without, as opposed to a subjective standard imposed from within.
Such a question cannot be meaningfully answered outside the parameters of an objective criteria. It seems you wish to demonstrate the perceived absurdity of my position through this analogy, but you actually testify to the inconsistency of your own: you very obviously imply that the child who escapes does the right thing, but in order to sustain that implication, you have to invoke the aforementioned near-universal preference. To you — Brad the commenter on cl’s blog — the child who escapes acted in the right, precisely because you think imprisoning and using her for your own pleasure is wrong. To you — Brad the hypthetical sadist who’s imprisoned his wife and child — the child who escaped acted in the wrong, precisely because you think you’re entitled to imprison and use her for your own pleasre. What I want to know is how either Brad can justify his position without appealing to a standard outside himself.
Again, my argument is not that “following any plan is always objectively correct.” You overlook the whole question we’re discussing: if we were created by God for purposes of preserving life, then all behaviors towards that purpose can justifiedly be called “correct” in that they correspond to a standard that exists in actuality, outside mere human fancy.
Yes, according to naturalism you are, and that’s one of a few reasons I’m convinced you’re a theist at heart. Whether they expicitly accept evolution or not, the vast majority of humans don’t adhere to “survival of the fittest” in the same way the animal kingdom does.
One bear doesn’t even have to breach another bear’s threshhold to get eviscerated, and no bear would feel even the least bit guilty about eviscerating another bear. There are no such things as “psychopathic bears;” they all display complete lack of empathy for whomever they deem threatening at the moment. I would be more prone to accept naturalism as correct if this were not the case, if humans were more like bears or if bears were more like humans. The “more or less universal” prefence for the preservation of human life at all costs is antithetical to the “survival of the fittest” mentality the lower animals display.
Call me arrogant, but I think you’ve underestimated the strength of my argument, and your milkshake analogy is not meaningful to this discussion. First, the near-universal preference for the preservation of human life at all costs is not even remotely comparable to the hardly-universal preference for strawberry milkshakes over chocolate. Second, we don’t have complex systems of law and punishment that force other people to adopt a preference for strawberry over chocolate milkshakes. Third, if those who say “I prefer preserving human life at all costs” treated those who preferred otherwise just as those prefer strawberry milkshakes treat those who prefer chocolate, I’d agree with you that no justification was needed and accept your analogy, but that’s simply not the case and I hope you can see that.
Baume du tigre
says...Hi Good Day to You, I just browsing the information for discovering an idea or else an attractive information. Cool blog, be grateful for sharing. Michel
loan options for bad credit
says...Thank you, I have just been searching for information about this topic for a long time and yours is the greatest I’ve found out so far. However, what about the conclusion? Are you positive in regards to the supply?|