Responding To faithlessgod’s Desirism

In a recent discussion at Luke's, faithlessgod defended desirism thusly:

My version of the analysis: We need to evaluate the desire to torture (or exterminate etc.) some group. We compare the presence of the desire to its absence. If it is present and fulfilled what is this causal desire’s material and physical affects on other desires? The other desires are those that are affected by making the target of the causal desire true, that is to bring about any state of affairs where the proposition expressed by the causal desire is made true. These are the affected desires. What is the affect on them? The desire not be tortured or not to feel pain or an aversion to torture or pain is directly thwarted. If this causal desire is absent, then the affected desires are not thwarted. Therefore it is a directly desire-thwarting desire.

I apologize to those eager to discuss Staume's book; I assure you that I'm eager as well. It's just that I felt my response to faithlessgod was relevant enough to merit being transplanted over here. It's pretty clear to me that his argument has non-trivial problems, but as always, let me know if you think I've missed something, or, if you think faithlessgod's desirism differs significantly from Fyfe's.

faithlessgod's verbatim argument appears in blockquotes, with my responses in between.

We need to evaluate the desire to torture (or exterminate etc.) some group. We compare the presence of the desire to its absence.

This has been understood.

If it is present and fulfilled what is this causal desire’s material and physical affects on other desires?

This has been understood. I agree this question is valid in a desirist analysis, but your language opens up a non-trivial side issue. Note that "if it is present and fulfilled" and "material and physical effects" denote attributes of an hypothetical act, not a desire existing as-is. I can have the desire to exterminate or torture whomever I wish and no harm will be done to anyone so long as I don't act on it, so the desire to exterminate / torture really isn't other-desire-thwarting at all. You [unnecessarily] belabor the DFAU/DU distinction, but here you are evaluating an [hypothetical] act! If I was misunderstanding you, certainly, I'd hope you could see why, but enough with the side issue, let's continue along with your argument.

The other desires are those that are affected by making the target of the causal desire true, that is to bring about any state of affairs where the proposition expressed by the causal desire is made true. These are the affected desires.

I agree that we are to evaluate desire(s) against the balance of [affected] desires. This has been understood.

What is the affect on them?

I agree that this is the appropriate question to ask in a desirist evaluation. However, you neglect to identify "them" such that a meaningful analysis can take place. You focus solely on the Jews' desire when you need to consider the balance of all [affected] desires that exist. This is another point you've [unnecessarily] belabored and I'm at a loss to understand why you're apparently not heeding your own advice in your own evaluation.

The desire not be tortured or not to feel pain or an aversion to torture or pain is directly thwarted. If this causal desire is absent, then the affected desires are not thwarted.

I understand the logic behind your attempt, but no: if this [causal] desire is absent, then the Jews' affected desires are not thwarted. I agree with and have understood your method of evaluation for some time now. The problem this time around is that you define "affected desires" as "the desires of those harmed" and this skews your analysis. You don't consider the Nazis' desires at all. The Nazis have feelings and desires, too! Remember, in Cartesian's original example it wasn't just the desire to exterminate; mistreatment of the Jews sustained the Nazis' entire economy and culture, such that turning the knob towards zero would thwart more desires than it fulfilled.

The problem had already been alluded to, which brings me to another side-issue, but one that's pertinent: why don't you provide clear answers to certain questions? Thomas Reid asked you three direct questions, each of which is relevant here, and instead of answering them, you simply repeated the very same analysis you told me you wouldn't repeat again. To echo Reid: Why did you consider just one affected desire in your example? Why didn’t you consider the desires it would fulfill? Why doesn’t the concept of “overall tending to thwart more than fulfill other desires” apply in your example?

Cartesian's example aside, if the desire to exterminate was all we were evaluating, then: what if the Jews succumbed to despondency and decided they no longer had the will to live? Surely, exterminating them in such a case would fulfill all tokens of everyone's desire-types, so it must be called 'good' if our only criteria for 'good' is 'such as to fulfill more than thwart other desires.'

If not, then there must be more to a desire being 'good' than the objective [mathematical] fact that it 'tends to fulfill more than thwart other desires.'