12 Objections To Desirism
Posted in Desirism, Ethics, Morality, Philosophy on | 1 minute | 2 Comments →
According to desirism, there is no such thing as intrinsic moral value. Rather, moral values of good, bad and permissible are determined by a desire’s relation to other desires [which I find odd in itself, as desires don’t affect people unless acted upon, but let’s leave that aside for the moment]. If this is the case, then isn’t it possible to have a state of affairs where racist and sexist desires are morally good? [cf. Cartesian’s Nazi example] On the other hand, if under all circumstances we deny the existence of a state of affairs in which racist and sexist desires can be morally good, isn’t the only valid conclusion that racist and sexist desires are examples of intrinsic moral wrongs? When are racism and sexism morally good? According to desirism, there is no such thing as intrinsic wrong. Rather, moral wrongness is determined by one desire’s relation to other desires. If this is the case, then there must be a state of affairs in which racism and sexism are morally good. If we deny the existence of a state of affairs in which racism and sexism are morally good, then we seemingly accept the notion of intrinsic right / wrong.
Eli
says...“…if under all circumstances we deny the existence of a state of affairs in which racist and sexist desires can be morally good, isn’t the only valid conclusion that racist and sexist desires are examples of intrinsic moral wrongs?”
Well, no – just given that setup, we could say that such desires are at best morally neutral. That won’t hold up once we bring in other considerations, of course, but the negation of “morally good” is not “morally bad.”
cl
says...I agree, and typically say “permissible or perhaps even morally good” when I run the argument. If desirism is true, desires lack ethical status except by relation to other desires. This means any desire can be good, permissible, or bad – given the setup, as you mention.