Something That Made Me Think Of Desirism
Posted in Desirism, Morality, Philosophy on | 7 minutes | 19 Comments →
I was crawling the interwebs tonight when I came across the following snippet, taken from this introductory article on philosophical realism. In summarizing the debate between realists and non- or anti-realists, the authors describe J.L. Mackie’s argument for moral error-theory:
We can thus construe the error-theory as follows:
Conceptual Claim: our concept of a moral fact is a concept of an objectively prescriptive fact, so that the truth of an atomic, declarative moral sentence would require the existence of objectively and categorically prescriptive facts.
Ontological Claim: There are no objectively and categorically prescriptive facts.
Conclusion: there are no moral facts; atomic, declarative moral sentences are systematically and uniformly false.
This argument is clearly valid, so the question facing those who wish to defend at least the existence dimension of realism in the case of morals is whether the premises are true. (Note that strictly speaking the conclusion of the argument is that there are no moral facts as-we-conceive-of-them. Thus, it may be possible to block the argument by advocating a revisionary approach to our moral concepts).
Mackie’s conceptual claim is that our concept of a moral requirement is the concept of an objectively, categorically prescriptive requirement. What does this mean? To say that moral requirements are prescriptive is to say that they tell us how we ought to act, to say that they give us reasons for acting. Thus, to say that something is morally good is to say that we ought to pursue it, that we have reason to pursue it. To say that something is morally bad is to say that we ought not to pursue it, that we have reason not to pursue it. To say that moral requirements are categorically prescriptive is to say that these reasons are categorical in the sense of Kant’s categorical imperatives. The reasons for action that moral requirements furnish are not contingent upon the possession of any desires or wants on the part of the agent to whom they are addressed: I cannot release myself from the requirement imposed by the claim that torturing the innocent is wrong by citing some desire or inclination that I have. This contrasts, for example, with the requirement imposed by the claim that perpetual lateness at work is likely to result in one losing one’s job: I can release myself from the requirement imposed by this claim by citing my desire to lose my job (perhaps because I find it unfulfilling, or whatever). Reasons for action which are contingent in this way on desires and inclinations are furnished by what Kant called hypothetical imperatives.
This made me realize that although my belief in God means I subscribe to some variant of DCT, I attack desirism from the assumptions of a moral error-theorist, because I would be a moral error-theorist if I were an atheist. As you may or may not know, one of my primary objections to desirism is that it has no grounds for its prescriptions [the debate about whether it actually proffers any prescriptions aside], and this is the moral error-theorist’s claim in a nutshell. Sometimes I express this position by asking Alonzo for justification regarding some claim. At the end of the day, I’m looking for him to demonstrate the existence of objectively and categorically prescriptive facts upon which he might ground his theory. I can see at least two possible responses to this request.
The first response would probably go something like, “Wait just a minute cl, desirism rejects categorical imperatives and intrinsic value, so the reason you can’t find these is because the theory does not logically entail them. You’re misunderstanding the basics of the theory.” No, I’m not. It’s true that desirism rejects intrinsic value, the hypothetical observer, categorical imperative, etc., and I have been aware of that since the outset. So, if I knew that, why am I asking Alonzo for something that I know his theory doesn’t entail?
The second response would probably go something like, “Wait just a minute cl, desirism does claim to be a moral theory based on objective facts. It claims that desires exist, and that desires are objective. You’re misunderstanding the basics of the theory.” Again, no, I’m not. I’ve been aware from the outset that desires exist, and I’ve always agreed that it’s fair to refer to them as objective. So, if I knew that, why am I asking Alonzo for an answer that I just claimed to have already read?
To answer the first question, I believe that despite appeals to the contrary, desirism does appeal to intrinsic value – if we say it is prescriptive. In the post On Prescription, I sketched my pathetically simple criteria for a prescriptive moral theory:
I think it’s fair to say that in order for a moral theory to qualify as prescriptive, it must proffer a set of should statements.
From there, I reason that in order to be called true, a prescriptive moral theory must meet the minimum requirement of grounding its set of should statements in something objective, something like what the cited article describes: “an objectively prescriptive fact, so that the truth of an atomic, declarative moral sentence would require the existence of objectively and categorically prescriptive facts.”
Since desirism rejects intrinsic value, categorical imperative, decrees of the gods, etc., what objectively prescriptive fact does it point to, such that it might ground any declarative moral sentence (i.e. prescription)? If desirism cannot be found to point to such a fact, how can any prescriptions a desirist make be anything besides arbitrary? Aren’t desires proffered as the objective facts in desirism?
They are, and that leads us to my answer to the second question: though an objective fact, the existence of desires – the very basis of Fyfe’s theory – is not an objectively prescriptive fact. That desires exist certainly gives an agent reason to perform act X, but that says nothing about whether act X ought to be performed. In fact, another tenet of Fyfe’s theory is that all intentional acts are preceded by desires. Since it seems undeniable that malevolent acts exist, how can we distinguish between desires that should be acted on and desires that should not? Where’s our moral sounding board?
At first glance, desirism appears to answer these questions straight-forwardly, usually with some variant of, “desires that tend to fulfill other desires should be praised; desires that tend to thwart other desires should be condemned.” Again, pretty straight-forward. Doesn’t this lead or at least nudge you towards the conclusion that “desire-fulfilling desires” are the thing to be maximized in desirism? After all, Fyfe calls his theory “desire utilitarianism.” Yet, that would be something like desire fulfillment act utilitarianism. More, Fyfe says that the claim, “We should have desires that tend to fulfill other desires” is “nearly always false,” and also that “desirism has nothing to say to moral agents at the time of decision” [paraphrased].
Then, why call desirism a prescriptive moral theory? Why call it a form of utilitarianism? Shouldn’t a true moral theory have something to say to an agent at the time of decision? If desirism has nothing to say, why call it a moral theory at all?
Is there something I’m missing here?
James Gray
says...It isn’t uncommon for moral anti-realist philosophers to agree with a moral theory. Hume and Hare both use utilitarianism despite not believing in intrinsic values. They think morality is something humans do and care about.
That said, God is not a good reason to reject error theory. We can assess the evidence for intrinsic value whether or not God exists. It is possible that error theory is true even if God exists, and anti-realism is plausible if there is no good reason to believe in intrinsic value.
I personally do believe in intrinsic values because I think it is pretty obvious that they exist. It is possible that I am deluded, but that doesn’t seem like a strong possibility.
woodchuck64
says...From Alonzo’s Sep. 3, 2010 comment in http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=10890
I’ve thought about this and I’ve concluded that I would say desirism DOES having something to say to a moral agent at time of decision, so I must be missing something.
My reasoning is that an individual has to have reasons to maximize self-interest in any decision to follow desirism in the first place (Alonzo seems to confirm this early in the thread above); therefore, in any moral decision, an individual can consider his/her action in terms of what desirism teaches, and, further, it would be in that individual’s self-interest to do so. As I see it, desirism tells the individual at the moment of moral (in)decision “follow my rules and you’ll be better off”.
So I must be wrong. I’ll wait to see if Alonzo clarifies this further.
cl, thanks for the highly thought-provoking discussion so far.
cl
says...James Gray,
I agree, and would say this is analogous to the way a scientific anti-realist might use any given theory. Even if we disagree that QM gives us a “true” description of reality, we might find it a useful model for interpreting reality. It’s that whole “goldfish in a round bowl” thing.
I’d say that depends on the God proffered. If we’re talking specifically about an omniscient, omnibenevolent God that created sentient beings for some purpose, then I’d say such a God is a good reason to reject error theory.
However, if we’re just talking about generic gods that don’t necessarily require the aforementioned properties, then I’d agree with you.
Yeah, I’m pretty much with you there, but you know how certain people react to those types of arguments. It was obvious that the sun actually revolved around Earth, too. I suppose one could call belief in intrinsic value “properly basic,” and argue on those grounds, but I don’t see that that would bring clashing philosophers any closer to common ground.
woodchuck64,
I think this is why we were partly talking past each other in the beginning. Even though he hadn’t explicilty stated such, I had already gotten the impression that desirism didn’t have anything to say to an agent at decision time. This is why I badgered Alonzo so hard on the issue, to see if he would declare what desirism specifically prescribes. I mean this in good faith, but it feels to me like Alonzo wants to have his cake and eat it, too – meaning that he wants the convincing power that an objectively prescriptive moral theory has, yet at the same time wants to deny the existence of that which would justify across-the-board prescriptions. Thus far, I can’t see how any claim that pertains to “what people ought to do” can be justified outside an appeal to the existence of objectively and categorically prescriptive facts. Else, how do we avoid the “all opinions are equally valid” dilemma?
This is why I say I’d be an error-theorist if I were an atheist.
That’s how I thought of it in the beginning, which is why I asked for justification of those rules. It’s always seemed to me that this only works when the agent already more or less coheres with the dominant values of the culture he or she is in. If one is a smoker, for instance, are they better off following the rules decreed by non-smokers? That’s how desirism plays out in Fyfe’s practice. He says stuff like “people generally have reason to promote an aversion to smoking,” but in that sentence, “people generally” is a loaded term. He’s really saying, “the set of people who see no value in smoking have reason to promote an aversion to smoking.”
Hey, it takes two or more to tango. Thank you for helping me towards clarity on the issues.
James Gray
says...cl,
If God is “omnibenevolent” that could mean (a) he cares for us or (b) God is all-good. If “all-good” is meant to be “good” in the realist sense, then saying God’s existence proves moral realism would beg the question.
It isn’t clear that “all good” has to be in the realist sense. Does God necessarily have intrinsic value? Being all-good could mean “perfectly virtuous” instead, which is potentially compatible with anti-realism.
It wasn’t an argument for moral realism. There are other arguments for moral realism. To argue that moral realism is false is a little like arguing that thoughts or the color green doesn’t exist. It’s “obvious’ that they do exist and arguments can back it up.
It’s possible that thoughts or the color green doesn’t exist, but very strong arguments are needed considering the evidence at hand.
cl
says...My only point was that to mention that something is “obvious” is likely to provoke criticism. As you implied, the argument from obviousness is not your only defense of moral realism.
I agree, and appreciate the analogy. It’s possible that intrinsic [moral] value doesn’t exist, but I think very strong arguments are needed considering the evidence at hand. This is not the type of evidence I see from Luke and Fyfe.
How so? Isn’t the phrase “perfectly virtuous” non-sensible given anti-realism?
James Gray
says...We can define good as “whatever promotes human interests” and a person will be perfectly virtuous who is willing and able to promote human interests the best way possible.
The word “perfect” could be a problematic word to use, but anti-realist philosophers almost unanimously agree to various moral theories. Many are attracted to Aristotelianism, and Alasdair MacIntyre is probably one of them. Bernard Williams is another anti-realist who believed in virtue ethics.
cl
says...That doesn’t fly for me, nor would it fly with the concept of God we’re discussing. To redefine “good” as “whatever promotes human interests” is the same error Fyfe makes when he defines “good” as “tends to fulfill other desires.” It just doesn’t work. Human interests are so broad – and deluded – that many “human interests” actually work against human interest.
You mention Williams. I think his observation that “contemporary moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring by not discussing moral issues at all,” seems relevant. Redefining “good” to exclude the concept of “moral right” just misses the mark entirely, IMHO.
Either moral facts exist, or they don’t. It’s either true to say “X is right” or “X is wrong,” or such statements are nonsense. Barring an omniscient, omnibenevolent God, or some kind of “moral field,” I take the latter position. That’s why I say I’d be an error-theorist if I were an atheist: because atheists don’t believe in God, and nobody’s discovered anything like a moral field.
I really don’t know what else to say. Given anti-realism, all virtue seems to reduce to opinion, don’t you think?
James Gray
says...I agree that anti-realism is flawed, but I have to respect that it has enough plausibility for many philosophers. I do think some objections to realism count for something, but I don’t think anti-realism is as likely of being true as realism based on our current information.
Philosophers who accept anti-realism have a lot to answer for. I don’t know that anti-realism can make as much sense as it should, but I might be missing something. I will study anti-realism in greater detail sometime in the future.
cl
says...Which do you think are the strongest objections to realism?
Side question: does desirism strike you more as a realist theory? Or an anti-realist theory?
James Gray
says...The argument from queerness is probably the strongest objection. If our moral experiences can be fully accounted for by anti-realism, then realism might not be necessary.
Desirism could easily be a realist theory, but Fife wants it to be anti-realist, so that’s his business. Moral theories don’t technically require realist meta-ethics, but they seem to make more sense under realism in my view.
cl
says...I don’t mean to badger, but, how is that a strong argument? I don’t see any logic to it whatsoever. Since when is one person’s perceived “strangeness” an argument against the existence of anything?
Timmons (1999) describes realism as referring to intrinsic properties or facts “that would somehow motivate us or provide us with reasons for action independent of our desires and aversions,” but then asserts that such properties and facts do not comport with philosophical naturalism (page 50).
How does Timmons know this? Why shouldn’t I view that argument as motivated by bias towards philosophical naturalism?
James Gray
says...First, being the “strongest” argument doesn’t imply it’s strong. The argument from queerness is just the only way to really dismiss moral realism.
Second, Mackie’s formulation of the argument from queerness has a premise, “There’s no reason to believe in moral realism.” If there is no reason to believe in something and it requires us to accept something ontologically ambitious, then it should be rejected. We don’t disprove the existence of things (unicorns, etc.) but we can dismiss their existence because we have no reason to believe in them.
cl
says...Well that’s what I’m getting at: to say that one perceives moral facts or properties as “strange” isn’t a “real” way to dismiss moral realism.
I’m not sure I can agree. First, whether or not there is reason to believe in something is largely a subjective criteria. Sure, Mackie might not see a reason to believe in moral facts or properties, but that is an attribute of Mackie – not of moral facts or properties. Second, whether or not something is “ontologically ambitious” suffers from the same flaw. Most of QM is rightly describable as ontologically ambitious, yet, it persists.
I find the argument from queerness wholly unpersuasive.
James Gray
says...cl,
You aren’t arguing with me. I already made it clear that I am a moral realist and don’t think his argument is unpersuasive. You want to disagree with the premise, “We have no reason to believe in moral realism.” I agree. He didn’t prove this premise to be true. You asked me what the best argument against realism is, and it’s the argument from queerness. All other arguments against realism depend on the argument from queerness to have any plausibility.
When I said, “IF there is no reason to believe in something and it requires us to accept something ontologically ambitious, then it should be rejected,” I was making it clear that we might actually have reason to believe in moral realism.
Mackie could say, “Can’t you imagine that moral realism is false? It could be.” We can reply, “No, we can’t imagine that given the facts.”
When I say that there is “no reason to believe something” I mean that there is no good justification at all. Some beliefs could be sufficiently justified without empirical evidence. That is another issue.
cl
says...I know. I’m just saying that argument is a joke. I expected something substantial.
I know. When I objected to that, I was objecting to that, not you.
I just expected something with some meat, that’s all. Hope you have a good weekend.
bossmanham
says...Great post here. This may be one of the reasons desirism hasn’t moved beyond the sphere of internet atheists who enjoy it. It falls to the same or similar objections that Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism falls to.
James Gray
says...Utilitarianism is a respectable theory that has gone far beyond the sphere of internet atheists. So, why shouldn’t desirism then be considered respectable and worthy of going beyond such a sphere?
bossmanham
says...James, that’s true. I was simply saying that as an objective moral theory goes, they both suffer from similar objections. Desirism doesn’t really say anything new that utilitarianism can’t.