Response To “In Defense of Radical Value Pluralism”

Posted in Common Sense Atheism, Morality, Philosophy, Responses on  | 7 minutes | 11 Comments →

In his post In Defense of Radical Value Pluralism, Luke Muehlhauser attempts to falsify value monism. Before addressing his claims, I’d like to comment on a few lesser issues and get them out of the way. On value, Luke writes,

A cup of coffee has value when I desire it. Sunshine has value when I desire it. Sex has value because you desire it.

Come from someone who emphatically denies intrinsic value, I think imprecision with language invites confusion here. Luke’s language lends all too easily to the idea that coffee, sunshine and sex can “have” or possess value, as if value is some sort of object that can be possessed. He writes as if value were a noun, but the only way value can be a noun is if it’s a person, place or thing. Many will see this as trivial, semantic, or nitpicking, perhaps because they feel the language is accurate enough to get the point across. I agree the language is accurate enough to get the point across, but that’s too low of a standard for rigorous philosophy. I think using value as a verb would allow Luke to make his arguments with more clarity and less amenability to confusion. Nothing has value, ever: people value.

Luke defines a desire thus:

A desire is what philosophers call a “propositional attitude.” It is an attitude toward a proposition. In particular, a desire is an attitude that a proposition be made or kept true.

I’m not so sure we can affirm that last sentence because people can have desires that are not propositions they wish to be made or kept true. Consider the fantasies of your average married man. He certainly desires the beautiful women that are not his wife, but – if he is prudent – his attitude is not one that the proposition be made or kept true.

Nonetheless, these are tangential concerns, and now that I’ve gotten them out of the way, I can focus on the post itself.

Exploring various arguments against value monism, Luke continues,

One argument is that moral value must come from intrinsic value, and only one thing (happiness, perhaps) has intrinsic value, and all other things do not. But whenever I ask for evidence of this claim, people can only point to their own intuitions.

What does Luke expect? Do scientists have a “morality tester” that can identify the “one true morality” outside of human intuition? It would seem that was only possible if the type of intrinsic value that Luke denies actually did exist. As opposed to, say, the behavior of non-conscious objects bound by the laws of physics, isn’t morality inextricably intertwined to human intuitions? Don’t our feelings guide our desires? I wonder what type of evidence Luke or anyone else making his claim might be persuaded by.

Luke continues,

Another argument for value monism comes from the notion that that morality is (by definition) action-guiding. Morality must have a definitive answer for “what should I do?” But if many things have value, there might not always be a definitive moral answer to that question, so value monism must be true. I resist this argument because (1) I don’t think that morality must always have an answer to the “what should I do?” question; there are genuine moral dilemmas, and (2) even if many things have value, there may still be a way to weigh them against each other.

The reason I resist that argument is because the fact that people value many things doesn’t preclude definitive moral answers to any or all “what should I do” type questions. As Luke says, there might still be a way to weigh things. However, here’s something to consider in response to (1). If we are to say that a true science of morality is possible, then, shouldn’t there be – at least in theory – an answer to every “what should I do” question? Given an authentic science of morality, why should it be the case that some “what should I do” questions might not be answerable?

Criticizing Richard Carrier’s value monist theory, Luke continues,

The claim is that the only thing that is valued is happiness, and all other things are valued instrumentally: they are valued because they contribute to happiness.

I think that claim is false.

That claim misunderstands how valuing happens, at least in humans… Here, the (happiness) value monist wants to claim that the only proposition to which my desire can be attached is the proposition “Luke is happy.” But this is false. I can desire that pretty much any proposition be made or kept true. I can have an attitude that “The sun exists” be made or kept true. I can have an attitude that “I am running through flowers” be made or kept true. I can even have an attitude that “My future child is compassionate” be made or kept true.

Although I understand the spirit of the objection, I disagree with Luke that Carrier misunderstands how valuing happens, and I would actually like to hear Carrier respond. I also disagree with Luke that Carrier’s claim is false. In fact, Luke’s “objection” to Carrier seems to affirm value monism if you ask me: Why would Luke desire to run through flowers, unless of course running through flowers was instrumental in making him or somebody else happy? Why would Luke desire to have a compassionate child, unless of course it was instrumental in contributing to his child’s happiness, or the happiness of other sentient creatures? Luke seems to affirm Carrier’s value monism.

To falsify Carrier’s claim, Luke would need to identify an instance of an act that was not preceded by either the agent’s desire to be happy, or the agent’s desire for someone else to be happy. Can you think of such an act? Consider the enactment of a law that prohibits crossing the street on a red light. One might be tempted to think such a law is motivated by the desire for safety, then argue that safety and happiness are two different things. Well, technically, they are two different things, but why would a legislative body desire that citizens be as safe as possible? Is it not because the absence of calamity is conducive to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?

Consider Sam Harris’ claim that morality ought to be concerned with the well-being of sentient creatures, which Luke criticized here. I agree that we can identify instances where people deliberately act in ways that do not directly maximize their own well-being. However, when they do so, I feel safe to say it’s always in sacrifice to the well-being of others. It would certainly increase my well-being to be a successful criminal, but I sacrifice that to the well-being of others. Can you think of an intentional act that does not aim to increase either the well-being of the agent, the well-being of other sentient creatures, or both?

We can only split a hair so thin. Whenever I hear people like Luke and Alonzo Fyfe emphatically declare that other theories of morality are false, I can’t help but to chuckle. I think they ought to hoist themselves by their own petards and take a closer look at desirism.


11 comments

  1. woodchuck64

     says...

    To falsify Carrier’s claim, Luke would need to identify an instance of an act that was not preceded by either the agent’s desire to be happy, or the agent’s desire for someone else to be happy.

    Is value monism both the agent’s desire to be happy and the agent’s desire for someone else to be happy, or just the former? I’m reading Luke as saying it’s just the former, the agent’s desire for someone else to be happy is merely instrumental in that it contributes to the agent’s happiness.

    For the claim that happiness is all that matters, and everything else is instrumental, Fyfe’s kidnapping example seems to be a good refutation.

  2. cl

     says...

    Are you alluding to the kidnapping example in the post of Luke’s I cited here? If not, what kidnapping example are you alluding to?

  3. woodchuck64

     says...

    Are you alluding to the kidnapping example in the post of Luke’s I cited here? If not, what kidnapping example are you alluding to

    Yes, the example in Luke’s post. If the agent’s happiness is all that matters (as I assumed value monism states), it seems hard to explain why Option 1 would be so easily rejected.

  4. cl

     says...

    That’s what I thought, but I didn’t want to assume. That said, I see several problems with that example.

    Regarding whether or not there is “one true monist interpretation,” I don’t know, but I can make my argument either way.

    If the agent’s happiness is all that matters (as I assumed value monism states), it seems hard to explain why Option 1 would be so easily rejected.

    Making others happy can contribute to the agent’s happiness, though. For example, many people endure jobs that do not necessarily make them happy at the end of the workday, but the benefits from their job increase their happiness overall, perhaps because they receive health insurance or are able to put food on their child’s table. So, in such a case – and in Alonzo’s example – it’s entirely consistent to say,

    1) The agent’s happiness is all that matters;

    2) The happiness of the agent’s child makes the agent very happy;

    3) Therefore the agent will pick 2, even though the agent herself might be more happy with 1.

    The other problem I see with Alonzo’s example – the problem I tried to explain to Luke which he said he didn’t understand – was that – at least in that example – Alonzo uses nothing other than the intuitive preferences of the parents to support his conclusion that “happiness theory is wrong.”

    Don’t you think that is at least a little inconsistent with everything else he and Luke write about rejecting intuition?

    It really does come across as special pleading to somebody who’s not already sold on Alonzo’s arguments.

  5. woodchuck64

     says...

    cl,

    For example, many people endure jobs that do not necessarily make them happy at the end of the workday, but the benefits from their job increase their happiness overall, perhaps because they receive health insurance or are able to put food on their child’s table.

    Yes, people may act based on the value of future happiness, that seems consistent with a value monism of happiness.

    1) The agent’s happiness is all that matters;

    2) The happiness of the agent’s child makes the agent very happy;

    3) Therefore the agent will pick 2, even though the agent herself might be more happy with 1.

    But I don’t know how to resolve 1 and 3. If happiness is all that matters, choosing the less happy option seems contradictory. In Fyfe’s example, I think we would all say that our future happiness is actually irrelevant to our decision, and if so, it seems difficult to say that our happiness (present or future) is the only thing with value.

    Alonzo uses nothing other than the intuitive preferences of the parents to support his conclusion that “happiness theory is wrong.”

    Don’t you think that is at least a little inconsistent with everything else he and Luke write about rejecting intuition?

    Well, he’s saying that value monism says that people’s moral intuitions are solely guided by valuing happiness, so if it isn’t, there’s a problem with value monism (or the definition).

    But I also know what you mean by using intuition to gloss over the details of a desirist moral case study while not calling it out as such. But there’s two kinds of intuition in play, though, moral intuition pushing us towards a right/wrong conclusion, and mathematical/social/other intuition which are quick and dirty heuristics that push us in favor of one conclusion over another without employing any formality or rigor. I think Alonzo uses more of the latter kind than the former in his arguments, he seems to me to try to avoid relying on our moral preconceptions and jumps right to figuring out desire and balances of desires. But with any desire calculation we are of course forced to rely on mathematical/social intuition because we really can’t work it out formally or rigorously. I don’t think Alonzo/Luke really talk about the evils of intuition in general; rather I think they preach about the evils of moral intuition. But, yes, on something as serious as morality, you need more than just simple heuristics.

  6. cl

     says...

    But I don’t know how to resolve 1 and 3. If happiness is all that matters, choosing the less happy option seems contradictory.

    It’s not the “less happy” option. It’s the “more happy” option: the agent would be more happy that her child is okay, even if it means less “lesser” happiness for the agent.

    Well, he’s saying that value monism says that people’s moral intuitions are solely guided by valuing happiness, so if it isn’t, there’s a problem with value monism (or the definition).

    While I think happiness isn’t the most precise word, nonetheless, it’s true that our desires – as opposed to moral intuitions – are solely guided by something like, “pursuit of the best,” where the best reduces to happiness, desire-fulfillment, well-being, etc. Those are all components of one entity, yet, Fyfe treats them as different entities, to the point that he claims – quite overconfidently, I think – that all monist theories are false.

    I think Alonzo uses more of the latter kind than the former in his arguments, he seems to me to try to avoid relying on our moral preconceptions and jumps right to figuring out desire and balances of desires.

    I disagree strongly, on at least three levels: the argument in question, Fyfe’s own moral judgments, and, on a broader level, the entire basis of Fyfe’s theory.

    1) In the argument in question, Fyfe uses the intuitions of the parents – that is, intuitions of the former type – their moral intuitions pushing them towards option 2 – to justify his conclusion;

    2) Fyfe declares without any further specificity that “smoking is an irrational desire,” but this judgment assumes the preconception that everybody is – or ought to be – concerned with maximizing their health, when in fact some people desire to avoid old age and die young;

    3) On a broader level, consider the fact that desires themselves – the very basis of Fyfe’s theory – arise intuitively in agents. Desires are ultimately intuitions. One person sees somebody giving to the poor and says, “Now that’s what I desire to do.” Another person sees somebody beating up a homeless person and says, “Now that’s what I desire to do.” Fyfe’s whole theory is based on granting the correctness of pre-existing intuitions in that regard, then saying something that essentially reduces to, “intuitions which tend to fulfill other intuitions are good.” Yet – as I’ve tried to explain numerous times – his definition of good is circular, thus self-defeating. It remains forever vulnerable to the problem of corruption. What if a state of affairs arises where the balance of desires leans overwhelmingly towards “bad” or “evil” desires? Then, a desire that tends to fulfill other desires – what Fyfe would normally call a “good desire” – becomes a desire that would tend to fulfill bad desires.

    In conclusion, desire-fulfillment cannot be the gauge of morality, because any desire can tend to fulfill other desires. It all depends on the pre-existing balance of desires we have to work with.

  7. woodchuck64

     says...

    cl,

    While I think happiness isn’t the most precise word, nonetheless, it’s true that our desires – as opposed to moral intuitions – are solely guided by something like, “pursuit of the best,” where the best reduces to happiness, desire-fulfillment, well-being, etc. Those are all components of one entity, yet, Fyfe treats them as different entities, to the point that he claims – quite overconfidently, I think – that all monist theories are false.

    Yes, what I take away from Fyfe’s argument is exactly that: happiness isn’t the most precise word. And while I think desire-fulfillment is a much better term, I also know that Fyfe specifically rejects desire-fulfillment value monism, but for different reasons than presented in Luke’s OP.

    1) In the argument in question, Fyfe uses the intuitions of the parents – that is, intuitions of the former type – their moral intuitions pushing them towards option 2 – to justify his conclusion;

    (I wrote that I think Fyfe tries to avoid relying on our moral intuition rather than logic/reason/evidence to make his arguments, but that he clearly relies on other forms of intuition; you disagree strongly).

    In the original argument, yes, Fyfe focuses on the parent’s moral intuition.
    But if happiness value monism indeed says that people’s moral intuitions are solely guided by valuing happiness, and if, however, instances can be found of people’s moral intuition not being in tune with valuing happiness, then that’s a problem for happiness value monism. To pursue that sort of disproof, we have to look at people’s moral intuitions.

    2) Fyfe declares without any further specificity that “smoking is an irrational desire,” but this judgment assumes the preconception that everybody is – or ought to be – concerned with maximizing their health, when in fact some people desire to avoid old age and die young;

    (http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2010_02_01_archive.html). Fyfe relies on our intuition that people tend to want to maximize health. I would say this is not moral intuition, though, but just our general experience with people around us — a sort of social intuition. And the conclusion seems fine to me since desirism is not saying that people who desire to die young don’t exist, but rather that they’re in the minority. Desirism is concerned with actions that tend to thwart/fulfill other desires, and, intuitively, smoking does tend to thwart the smoker’s desires, all smokers considered.

    So I would interpret Fyfe as meaning that desirism says smoking is irrational, not that smoking is irrational under any moral system.

    3) On a broader level, consider the fact that desires themselves – the very basis of Fyfe’s theory – arise intuitively in agents. Desires are ultimately intuitions. One person sees somebody giving to the poor and says, “Now that’s what I desire to do.” Another person sees somebody beating up a homeless person and says, “Now that’s what I desire to do.” Fyfe’s whole theory is based on granting the correctness of pre-existing intuitions in that regard, then saying something that essentially reduces to, “intuitions which tend to fulfill other intuitions are good.” Yet – as I’ve tried to explain numerous times – his definition of good is circular, thus self-defeating. It remains forever vulnerable to the problem of corruption. What if a state of affairs arises where the balance of desires leans overwhelmingly towards “bad” or “evil” desires? Then, a desire that tends to fulfill other desires – what Fyfe would normally call a “good desire” – becomes a desire that would tend to fulfill bad desires.

    Hmm.. I’m not quite getting this objection. I don’t see the direct connection between intuitions and desires. An intuition is a quick internal calculation of the truth of falseness of a proposition. A desire is a need the agent seeks to fill. How are they the same? Do you mean that they both arise seemingly randomly or causelessly? If desires are random, it might be possible to find many combinations of desires that if fulfilled would lead to extinction of the race in a few generations, is that the concern? Do you have an example in mind? I know you’ve written a lot, apologies if I missed this argument detailed elsewhere.

  8. cl

     says...

    woodchuck64,

    …Fyfe specifically rejects desire-fulfillment value monism…

    Despite the protestations of my accusers, I understand that. What I question is, does Fyfe reject “states of affairs in which P is true” -value monism? To paraphrase, Fyfe argues that, “For an agent with a desire that P, states of affairs where P is true have value.” It seems to me that’s just a different form of value monism. I know what Luke and Fyfe say on the matter: that any proposition can be the object of a desire that P. Yet, the same is true of happiness theory, or well-being theory. Any proposition that makes an agent happier can be the object of a desire that P.

    In the original argument, yes, Fyfe focuses on the parent’s moral intuition.

    Thank you. I was starting to doubt my own sanity! I wish Luke and Fyfe could concede this as easily.

    But if happiness value monism indeed says that people’s moral intuitions are solely guided by valuing happiness, and if, however, instances can be found of people’s moral intuition not being in tune with valuing happiness, then that’s a problem for happiness value monism.

    I agree. That’s why I asked, Why would Luke desire to run through flowers, unless of course running through flowers was instrumental in making him or somebody else happy? Why would Luke desire to have a compassionate child, unless of course it was instrumental in contributing to his child’s happiness, or the happiness of other sentient creatures?

    Unfortunately, as is often the case, his reply was that he “doesn’t have time.” Maybe you can reformulate the question and slip it in there :)

    Fyfe relies on our intuition that people tend to want to maximize health. I would say this is not moral intuition, though, but just our general experience with people around us — a sort of social intuition. And the conclusion seems fine to me since desirism is not saying that people who desire to die young don’t exist, but rather that they’re in the minority.

    1) Yet, they tell us we’re not supposed to rely on intuition so don’t you think that’s a little inconsistent?

    2) If that’s the case, then Fyfe is discriminating against the minority when he makes value-laden overgeneralizations such as, “Smoking is an irrational desire.” He ought to follow his own advice and avoid overgeneralizations, don’t you think? Why shouldn’t he be precise and say, “For an agent with a desire to maximize health, smoking is an irrational desire?” That would actually be true as stated.

    …intuitively, smoking does tend to thwart the smoker’s desires, all smokers considered.

    I think that’s flat-out wrong. If I don’t care whether I live or die, if I would rather die young than old, if I don’t care whether I’m in health or illness, and – most importantly – if I am an agent that values P where P is smoking, how does smoking thwart my desires?

    So I would interpret Fyfe as meaning that desirism says smoking is irrational,

    That’s how I’ve been interpreting him. The problem is, he’s making a broad generalization and judging the minority based on the values of the majority. How is that not the doorway to prejudice at best, or flat-out fascism at worst?

    An intuition is a quick internal calculation of the truth of falseness of a proposition. A desire is a need the agent seeks to fill.

    I disagree. I don’t think those terms approximate those words at all, at least, not the “intuition” part. An intuition is something like a gut feeling that arises without any calculation whatsoever. From dictionary.com, “direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of any reasoning process; immediate apprehension.”

    A desire – although it can be a need – is not necessarily so. A desire is simply a disposition towards one state of affairs over another.

    If desires are random, it might be possible to find many combinations of desires that if fulfilled would lead to extinction of the race in a few generations, is that the concern? Do you have an example in mind?

    I’m not concerned with the “random” issue at the moment, but, yes: the current state of the world is an example in my mind. The collective desires of the human race – for oil, for consumption, for convenience, etc. – are encouraging the extinction of the race and thwarting the “desires” of many animals, too.

    To try and simplify this, I’m saying that desires can’t be the ground of morality, because desires are guided by intuitions, and they are arbitrary. A “good” desire must be something more than simply, “a desire that tends to fulfill other desires,” because, in an environment where the balance of desires is predominantly bad, a desire that tends to fulfill other desires becomes a bad desire. Or, another way, in an environment where the balance of desires is predominantly bad, a good desire would actually tend to thwart other desires.

    I really hope that makes sense, because it seems so crystal clear to me – and many others with whom I’ve discussed desirism. If not, I have no choice but to keep trying.

    Actually, that’s not true. I suppose I could always go grab a beer and say “the hell with it.” And, I just might :)

    At least for today.

  9. cl

     says...

    To further elaborate on the connection between desires and intuitions:

    I am a person with a desire to ride skateboards. Why do I have this desire? I don’t know. I honestly couldn’t tell you. I just know that when I saw a kid named Brian riding a skateboard in the neighborhood when I was young, I intuitively knew that’s what I wanted to do.

    IOW, intuition molded my desire.

  10. cl

     says...

    To even further elaborate, in the thread of the FAQ, Luke writes something akin to, “if everybody desired to carry a boombox and blast loud music, that would be moral.”

    Yet, people don’t desire to blast music on boomboxes because of scientific evidence or rational thought. They just intuitively desire to blast music on a boombox.

    Accordingly, desirism is a theory that grounds morality in intuitively molded desires.

  11. woodchuck64

     says...

    cl, wow, long discussion but very interesting.

    What I question is, does Fyfe reject “states of affairs in which P is true” -value monism? To paraphrase, Fyfe argues that, “For an agent with a desire that P, states of affairs where P is true have value.” It seems to me that’s just a different form of value monism.

    Agents value desires, but desirism is not trying to maximize that value. I see the proposition that we should maximize the states of affairs where P is true across all agents as the same as saying we should maximize desire fulfillment. But desirism would reject both, saying instead that we shouldn’t maximize desire fulfillment, but instead we should maximize desires that tend to lead to desire fulfillment. So, can the latter statement be formulated as a kind of value monism? I’m not sure.

    That’s why I asked, Why would Luke desire to run through flowers, unless of course running through flowers was instrumental in making him or somebody else happy? Why would Luke desire to have a compassionate child, unless of course it was instrumental in contributing to his child’s happiness, or the happiness of other sentient creatures?

    I think the answer would be that happiness value monism is not enough to accurately describe Luke’s desires, but desire-fulfillment value monism is. And then Luke would use a different argument to explain while desire-fulfillment value monism is wrong (which I hope they’ll go over again in a future podcast since I think that was the big first misunderstanding I had about desirism).

    Fyfe relies on our intuition that people tend to want to maximize health. I would say this is not moral intuition, though, but just our general experience with people around us — a sort of social intuition. And the conclusion seems fine to me since desirism is not saying that people who desire to die young don’t exist, but rather that they’re in the minority.

    1) Yet, they tell us we’re not supposed to rely on intuition so don’t you think that’s a little inconsistent?

    Oh, I’ve always assumed that Luke/Alonzo are saying we’re not supposed to rely on moral intuition. I think other forms of intuition are all but impossible to avoid– every argument would get bogged down trying to formally prove every statement. If they’re knocking all forms of intuition, I’m with you on calling that inconsistent.

    2) If that’s the case, then Fyfe is discriminating against the minority when he makes value-laden overgeneralizations such as, “Smoking is an irrational desire.” He ought to follow his own advice and avoid overgeneralizations, don’t you think? Why shouldn’t he be precise and say, “For an agent with a desire to maximize health, smoking is an irrational desire?” That would actually be true as stated.

    Fyfe is right by his definition of desirism, so I wouldn’t blame him personally, but I think you are right that desirism can discriminate against a minority in this sense. Desirism does say a desire to smoke is irrational as long as the conclusion that it tends to thwart desires over all is true. The question is whether a smoker who believes that his desires are not thwarted by smoking is being discriminated against. This is similar to the issue of whether a person who believes it is safer not to wear a seatbelt is discriminated against by seatbelt laws. It feels like discrimination, but it also feels like smokers and seatbelt opponents should just go with the probabilities. Personal liberty and desirism. I’ll ask if I get a chance.

    …intuitively, smoking does tend to thwart the smoker’s desires, all smokers considered.

    I think that’s flat-out wrong. If I don’t care whether I live or die, if I would rather die young than old, if I don’t care whether I’m in health or illness, and – most importantly – if I am an agent that values P where P is smoking, how does smoking thwart my desires?

    I mean that most smokers come to believe that smoking thwarted their desire’s. I believe that most smokers suffer problems as a result of smoking that tend to thwart their desires. Yes, some smokers don’t have any problems, and some smokers perhaps enjoy those problems, but I think they’re in the minority.

    To try and simplify this, I’m saying that desires can’t be the ground of morality, because desires are guided by intuitions, and they are arbitrary. A “good” desire must be something more than simply, “a desire that tends to fulfill other desires,” because, in an environment where the balance of desires is predominantly bad, a desire that tends to fulfill other desires becomes a bad desire. Or, another way, in an environment where the balance of desires is predominantly bad, a good desire would actually tend to thwart other desires.

    I’m fine with your definitions of desire/intuition. Currently my view is strongly influenced by the assumption that human beings arose because evolution hit on stable social desires. Therefore, desires that are related to society are not arbitrary but very well tuned towards social coexistence. I understand this assumption may not be shared. Let me think about it some more.

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