Response To Morality In The Real World, Episode 10

Posted in Common Sense Atheism, Desirism, Philosophy on  | 6 minutes | 13 Comments →

Continuing to explore the concept of intrinsic value, Luke Muehlhauser of Common Sense Atheism writes,

LUKE: Okay, Alonzo. Enough, now. Anyway, one of our commenters, Kip, pointed out that another meaning of the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ is ‘value as an end’, whereas ‘instrumental value’ would be ‘value as a means.’ For example, money has value to me, not because I care about money itself, but because money is a means toward getting things I really do care about: sex, for example. So we might say that money has ‘value as a means’ for me, but sex has ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘value as an end’ for me.

I advise against that, on the grounds that they’re likely to introduce more confusion over an already-confused and equivocated-upon term: intrinsic value. Why not just drop “intrinsic value” entirely and use “desire-as-ends” or “desire-as-means” wherever appropriate? Personally, I find those terms much clearer and easier to work with. I have difficulty following along when Luke and Alonzo use different definitions of “intrinsic value” in different podcasts.

For example, in Episode 6, Alonzo defined intrinsic value thus:

… [intrinsic value] is something that everybody should aim for whether they want to or not.

Yet, in Episode 7, Alonzo defines intrinsic value thus:

Intrinsic value is a reason for action that is built into the very essence of something – it is intrinsic to that thing.

While the two definitions are not mutually exclusive, they differ substantially enough that the same claim can be true or false depending upon which definition we’re using. Luke and Alonzo open themselves up to legitimate charges of equivocation with this strategy, even though there is probably no ill motive whatsoever. Even worse, they encourage confusion amongst readers who are already pretty damn confused about the theory.

LUKE: Yeah. So in this podcast, I think we will continue to use the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ to mean ‘value that exists as a property intrinsic to that which is being evaluated.’ It doesn’t depend on anything outside of itself. And, as it happens, we don’t think anything has that kind of intrinsic value.

Amongst the contributors to our meta-discussion, who does argue that something can have that kind of intrinsic value, i.e. value without a valuer? If no substantial objections to desirism are predicated upon this definition of intrinsic value, is there any good reason to continue using it?

Further alluding to Episode 7,

ALONZO: On this subject, I got a question through email that said:

“If something has ‘no value’, then it is valueless. Right? Is ‘valueless’ the same as ‘worthless’? I’m sure that isn’t what you mean but you could come across that way.”

This question came in response to our assertions that in the universe where Alph only wanted the moon Pandora to continue to exist, Alph’s own continued existence had no value. Alph’s well-being had no value.

LUKE: It sounds like you are saying that, in Alph’s universe, Alph’s well-being is worthless.

ALONZO: Well, yes it is, in Alph’s world. Our well-being is worth quite a bit to us. But Alph has no reason to assign any worth to his well-being. The only thing in Alph’s universe that is worth anything is the continued existence of Pandora.

LUKE: Because that’s the only thing that is desired in that universe.

Well sure, but that’s a make-believe universe! I’ve been thinking about this for a while now, and I honestly believe that in the real world, people do not have intentional desires unless they aim to increase well-being, happiness, pleasure, etc. either for the agent and/or other agents. As noted before, Luke and Alonzo can falsify this by demonstrating a single example of a real-world desire that does not aim to increase well-being, happiness, pleasure, etc. either for the agent and/or other agents. As Luke says:

LUKE: What I’m really asking for is a goal-reason. What was your goal? Your aim? Your purpose? What was your objective?

Exactly. IOW, why does Alph desire the continued existence of Pandora? What is Alph’s goal? Intentional desires do not exist outside the aforementioned parameters, which is why we should be skeptical of Alph’s desire that Pandora continue to exist. It’s an implausible desire and certainly does not put a crimp in any competing utilitarian theory as Luke claims to be foreshadowing.

ALONZO: Speaking about the failure of other moral theories, in episode 7 and elsewhere, several people haven’t liked our occasional suggestions as to why other moral theories fail. They think that our dismissal has been too quick and not entirely fair.

It’s much worse than that. In Episode 7, their dismissal was founded on an implausible desire from a hypothetical agent in a make-believe universe, with literally zero reference to any real-world evidence, whatsoever. That is so out of line with everything else they write about epistemological responsibility that I don’t know what else to say.

ALONZO: Yes. Absolutely. Every once in a while I get accused of claiming that desires directly create reasons for people who do not have the desire. That’s not true at all. Just to be explicit, my desires are my reasons for my action, your desires are your reasons for your action, Tmp’s desires are Tmp’s reasons for Tmp’s actions.

I agree, which is why I’m left wondering: if Alonzo really believes that, then how on Earth can he justify showering condemnation on everything from smoking to spectator sports? Should we conclude that its okay to condemn whatever we don’t like, just because we have reason to do so? Where’s the empirical evidence that would justify Alonzo’s use of condemnation in these instances? If none can be presented, is it not reasonable to at least tentatively conclude that Alonzo is basing his claims on something besides empirical evidence?

Obviously referring to either this comment or some variant thereof, and apparently still unwilling to accept any responsibility for reader confusion, Alonzo writes,

ALONZO: I know. I could go back and hunt down everything I have written in the past, but I’m having a hard enough time keeping up with my workload as it is. People just have to realize that if it is something that I wrote 5 years ago, it just might be 5 years out of date.

How on Earth is an unassuming querant supposed to make that distinction when the article in question isn’t even dated? Alonzo acts like we should just somehow know when it is in fact his responsibility to provide that information. This is why I suggested that Alonzo and/or Luke simply take five minutes to write up a disclaimer that would clarify these things. To date, they haven’t.

I don’t know about you, but I just cannot take that seriously. It comes across as, “Who cares if people are getting misinformed from undated articles that say the exact opposite of what we’re saying in the podcast?”


13 comments

  1. While the two definitions are not mutually exclusive, they differ substantially enough that the same claim can be true or false depending upon which definition we’re using.

    Could you give one?

  2. cl

     says...

    Sure. Take the claim, intrinsic value does not exist.

    Using the definition in Episode 6, we get: [something that everybody should aim for whether they want to or not] does not exist.

    Using the definition in Episode 7, we get: [a reason for action that is built into the very essence of something] does not exist.

    Do you believe that everybody should aim for a greener, more peaceful planet? I do, so I would interpret the former as false. If you don’t, I’m willing to try a different claim.

    Do you believe that value can exist without a valuer? I don’t, and as such would interpret the latter as true. If you do, again, I’m willing to try a different claim.

  3. I haven’t read much of Fyfe’s stuff, mainly due to lack of time and interest, but most meta-ethical theories, while their nuances may require pages of explaining, can have their general properties expounded fairly simply. Why is it that you can’t find a quick explanation to desirism?

    From what I understand, it is a utilitarian theory that focuses on desires, as we know that we ourselves at least have desires and then can infer that others do as well. But I still don’t see how this is supposed to make this an objective morality where these moral values and duties are real and binding in any situation. It seems to me they’re only as real as the individuals that have the desire. But that sounds like subjective morality. Things aren’t right or wrong no matter what, they are right or wrong depending on what a bunch of people desire. That is subjective, not objective; and really it’s extremely arbitrary. Not to mention the epistemic block we have in knowing what everyone desires when we make a moral decision, and what the long term consequences as it applies to the fulfillment of these desires will be.

    Is my assessment close, or am I way off?

  4. Do you believe that everybody should aim for a greener, more peaceful planet? I do, so I would interpret the former as false. If you don’t, I’m willing to try a different claim.

    I think there is an easy fix to that. I think everybody should aim for a greener more peaceful planet, but that’s because it so happens that a greener more peaceful planet is beneficial for us. It might have been the case that we were much better off with vast deserts instead. Whether or not a greener more peaceful planet is good depends on whether it is good for us. That is, in some sense, related to the “wants” of people.

    So, I do want a greener more peaceful planet, yet I think the former is possibly true.

    Do you believe that value can exist without a valuer? I don’t, and as such would interpret the latter as true. If you do, again, I’m willing to try a different claim.

    I don’t either, and I would also interpret the latter as true.

    The hitch will be whether you think my interpretation of the Episode 6 definition (#6) is workable and compatible with #7. It is not clear to me that the logical space for one of the definitions stretches into space not also covered by the other.

  5. bossmanham,

    Don’t subjects exist? If they are real, and their desires are real, then they too exist out there in that 3rd person space we commonly call objective reality.

  6. cl

     says...

    bossmanham,

    …most meta-ethical theories, while their nuances may require pages of explaining, can have their general properties expounded fairly simply.

    I agree. Take, for instance, the command from Jesus Christ to “love thy neighbor as thyself.” Who intentionally thwarts their own desires? Likewise, the person who follows Jesus Christ’s command will fulfill Alonzo’s theory in its entirety. Yet, think of the simplicity: Jesus Christ reduced Alonzo’s entire theory to five words, whereas Alonzo requires thousands upon thousands upon thousands of words – often vague and even entirely contradictory words – to expound his theory.

    Why is it that you can’t find a quick explanation to desirism?

    I have my own answers to that question, but Alonzo argues that moral issues are extremely complicated, that any theory which claims to have quick easy answers is false, yada yada yada. Yet, to me, “love thy neighbor as thyself” is as simple, clear and correct as can be.

    From what I understand, it is a utilitarian theory that focuses on desires, as we know that we ourselves at least have desires and then can infer that others do as well. But I still don’t see how this is supposed to make this an objective morality where these moral values and duties are real and binding in any situation.

    I’m not even sure it’s fair to call it a utilitarian theory. I haven’t yet seen a coherent response from Alonzo in that regard. Regardless, I agree: no demonstration of objectivity appears to be forthcoming, despite the promises. Alas, just like the pastor who promises to justify his claims “another Sunday,” Luke and Alonzo can – and do – keep saying, “We’ll get to that in another podcast.” So, maybe they will, we’ll see.

    Things aren’t right or wrong no matter what, they are right or wrong depending on what a bunch of people desire. That is subjective, not objective; and really it’s extremely arbitrary.

    I wholeheartedly agree, and, as of yet, there is no justification for this extremely arbitrary subjective theory. Meanwhile, Alonzo does not hesitate to shower condemnation on spectator sports, trash TV, the parents of obese children, etc.

    Not to mention the epistemic block we have in knowing what everyone desires when we make a moral decision, and what the long term consequences as it applies to the fulfillment of these desires will be.

    Well, there are two angles to consider there: prole, and archangel. Are we to consider the effect of our desires on all desires that exist? Or, only on the pool of affected desires? Both seem problematic, but the former moreso than the latter.

    But yeah, IMO, that right there makes any practical application of desirism pretty much a dead duck. However, consider that an omniscient God could actually make such calculations, and things get interesting.

    Is my assessment close, or am I way off?

    I think you’re on point entirely, but, if Luke and Alonzo are to be believed, I’m just a “shotgun philosopher” and “sophist” who “isn’t even listening,” so you might want to take my agreement with a grain of salt :)

  7. cl

     says...

    josef johann,

    I think everybody should aim for a greener more peaceful planet…

    If that’s the case, then you seem to agree that there are things everybody should aim for whether they want to or not. Granted, you imply that the Episode 6 intrinsic value claim is “possibly true” because it is connected “in some sense to the wants of the people,” and I agree that such a connection exists. However, the Episode 6 intrinsic value question is whether anything exists that everybody should aim for, whether they want to or not. Therefore, that everybody should aim for a greener more peaceful planet because it would be beneficial and is thus connected to their wants becomes a moot point. There is still, at the end of the day, something everybody should aim for, whether they want to or not.

    So, I do want a greener more peaceful planet, yet I think the former is possibly true.

    To me, the question is Boolean: either, yes, something everybody should aim for whether they want to or not does exist; or, no, something everybody should aim for whether they want to or not does not exist. If yes, the Episode 6 intrinsic value claim is false. If no, the Episode 6 intrinsic value claim is true.

    That’s how it seems to me, at least.

    Don’t subjects exist? If they are real, and their desires are real, then they too exist out there in that 3rd person space we commonly call objective reality.

    I realize that was to bossmanham, but I feel compelled to give my own answer: yes, subjects exist. They are real, their desires are real, and this does put them squarely in that 3rd person space we commonly call objective reality, as you rather eloquently described it. However, I believe that the person who uses the phrase “objective theory” means that the theory corresponds to observable real-world facts.

    Sure, desires exist, but so do lollipops. Then, why can’t morality be about who can amass the most lollipops?

    What real-world facts justify using desire fulfillment as the sole criterion of moral goodness?

  8. Josef,

    Yes the desire that person has would exist as an objective reality, but the specific desire is subject to the individual.

  9. I think you’re on point entirely, but, if Luke and Alonzo are to be believed, I’m just a “shotgun philosopher” and “sophist” who “isn’t even listening,” so you might want to take my agreement with a grain of salt :)

    Well if my opinion means anything, I think you’re very careful and thorough in your analysis. I’m not sure where Luke gets off calling anyone a “shotgun philosopher” when he has no formal training himself. Anyone who thinks hard and has a grasp of basic logic can think philosophically. I’m not sure if that makes you a philosopher, but whatever. It’s ad hominem, and they ought to be ashamed for saying it, especially when Luke puts himself forward as such a voice of reason or whatever.

  10. Cyril

     says...

    “What real-world facts justify using desire fulfillment as the sole criterion of moral goodness?”

    I’m not sure about Alonzo, but Luke has said at least once that there could be multiple working ethical theories. It’s just that a lot of the ones that we have he would define as non-working because they refer to things that don’t exist.

  11. ^I don’t know about you, but I just cannot take that seriously. It comes across as, “Who cares if people are getting misinformed from undated articles that say the exact opposite of what we’re saying in the podcast?”^

    true dat. i pretty much wrote that dude off as a hypocrite right then. i was one of the people who went to that article and was like ^what the fuck?^ then a few days later dude was like ^oh negligence is bad^

    i don’t agree with all your argumets but i like seeing you go at it with those guys because you ask tough questions and a lot of atheism is like church in reverse. what can i say i’m a sucker for the underdog

  12. Reidish

     says...

    I think desirism has jumped the shark. It was hailed by a few as a naturalist-based, yet still objective moral theory, so it was enticing for a while. But I think most commentators now see it for what it is: utilitarianism directed at something other than “happiness”.

    Desirism features a key piece of evidence for morality, but that’s a far cry from sufficiently explaining what morality is.

  13. Look at Book Value Per Share, and compare it with Market Share PriceYou can get Book Value Per Share itmorfanion from any financial website

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