Desirism, Doughnuts & Red Curbs
Posted in Desirism, Ethics, Morality on | 4 minutes | 12 Comments →
In discussions of morality, attempts to define good can get downright maddening once one applies themselves duly to the task. Yet, it seems so simple. We all know what good means, right? The problem is, my “good” might actually be your “bad,” so how might we deal with that?
For example, let’s say you own a doughnut shop. Not just any doughnut shop, but one in a strip mall with a decent-sized parking lot such that some curbs are painted red to reserve parking for emergency vehicles. Now, let’s say I like to ride my skateboard full speed into those red curbs, like this, and that this actually causes a minor amount of damage to them. My desire to do this ranks very high on my hierarchy of desires. You, of course, don’t want me to skate the curbs, and your desire ranks equally high on your hierarchy of desires. I am primarily concerned with two things: the intense feeling of satisfaction this gives me, and freedom of physical expression regarding my style of exercise. You are primarily concerned with two things: preventing a lawsuit should I injure myself, and promoting an encouraging atmosphere for potential doughnut consumers.
In this case, my “good” is clearly your “bad,” and there are seemingly endless variables as well as ways this dilemma can be resolved. Here are just a few possibilities:
1) I can say, “screw you and your desires,” and continue skating the curbs;
2) You can threaten to call the police;
3) I can oblige your concerns and stop skating the curbs;
4) You can relent of your concerns and stop worrying;
5) We can attempt to determine who has the legal right of way;
6) We can fist fight;
7) We can search for a way to satisfy my desire without thwarting yours.
In (2), why would you threaten to call the police? Is it not because you assume–as you could quite correctly in the vast majority of cases–that my desire to grind red curbs is not as strong as my aversion to being arrested? Here is a real-world example where desirist tenets can both predict and explain human behavior.
Note that my decision to continue skating the curbs may or may not be illegal depending on the municipality we’re in. If it is legal, you have no legal grounds for (2), and I could choose (1) with no fear of punishment, which would lead to the thwarting of your desires.
The desirist would presumably prescribe (7), and because I’m a nice guy, that would be my first choice, too. However, my fondness for (7) could quickly vaporize depending on your reason for wanting me to stop skating the curbs, and the demeanor in which you present your request. If you come out and get hostile, we might be well on our way to (6). If, on the other hand, you come out cool, calm and collected, I might just yield to your desire and choose (3). If you are simply a cranky old bat that “doesn’t like skateboards,” and that is why you want me to stop, I’m not going to be very sympathetic. After all, I like skateboards, and since we’re both presumably tax-paying citizens of the same community, why should I stop just because you don’t? To those leaning towards the argument from private property, how would the situation change if the setting was a public park?
I’ve seen each of these play out in real life.
Perhaps your reason is that you don’t like the scuffs on the red curbs. How is that any different than disliking a certain artist? Is this not a purely subjective aesthetic preference? Why should your desire to see red curbs without minor scuffs take precedence over my desire to skate them? What if I agree to periodically repaint them for you?
Perhaps your desire is preventing a lawsuit. As is the case with every skateboarder I’ve ever known, what if suing you would never even enter my mind as a viable option should I get hurt? After all, I’ve hurt myself in who-knows-how-many places, and never once have I thought to sue the owner of the property. If I get hurt skateboarding, more often than not, it’s my own fault. So, why should I have my desire thwarted simply because you worry about a situation that will never materialize in reality?
Questions like these lead me to question the appropriateness of using desire fulfillment as the sole criterion for good, and more importantly, questions like these lead me to remain skeptical of the claim made by Harris, Fyfe, Muehlhauser et al. that science should be the ultimate arbiter of morality.
How in the world is science going to help in a situation like this?
dguller
says...Personally, I believe that most human beings share the same fundamental values, such as community, autonomy, self-respect, productivity, relaxation, privacy, love and affection, justice, mercy, forgiveness, vengeance, free speech, and so on. We differ in terms of the ORDER of these values, such that one individual may prioritize autonomy over community, whereas another may prioritize community over autonomy, and that could certainly lead to a conflict in need of resolution.
I think that science can play a role in determining which orders of values lead to the maximal happiness for the maximum number of people. I do find Harris compelling on this point, and find it difficult to argue with him, except in a fallacious fashion that he explicitly addresses in his works. Similar to how one would study a number of risk factors for an illness, it seems possible to study a number of values and the degree to which they contribute to happiness in a scientific fashion.
Would this result in a mathematical equation for happiness that is absolutely incorrigible? Of course not, but it would serve as a more useful guide than general ethical maxims, which ultimately contradict themselves, because each represents a different set of values, and our values inherently contradict themselves, because they are rooted in different needs that we have.
Turning to your example, I think that science can help by studying similar instances and analyzes the consequences of the different set of options that you presented. Maybe (7) leads to mutual satisfaction more often than (6), for example. I mean, ultimately, we want to actualize as many of our values as possible, which I feel is the road to happiness, and you can analyze which of the possible options that you presented ultimately leads to a maximum actualization of each individual’s values, which would be a scientific endeavor.
Matt
says...The fact that you actually read Harris as saying desire fulfillment is the basis for morality leads me to believe you haven’t actually read his work. That’s quite a far leap from what’s actually being suggested.
cl
says...dguller,
As do I. I also believe Harris’ definition of “the good” is far more realistic and accurate than Fyfe’s. To me, “that which advances the well-being of sentient creatures” [to paraphrase Harris] is a much more useful criterion than, “desires that tend to fulfill other desires.” The former at least gives us a semi-reliable guideline, whereas the latter is circular and begs the question.
I agree.
Again, I agree. The problem–and the point I question whether or not I’ve successfully communicated here–is what to do when people have conflicting values. On what grounds can we enforce across-the-board prescriptions based on generalities, which inevitably vary from culture to culture and epoch to epoch?
Matt,
No offense, but the fact that you left that comment leads me to believe you’ve leaped to your conclusion in haste. Note my sole mention of Harris as follows: “…questions like these lead me to remain skeptical of the claim made by Harris, Fyfe, Muehlhauser et al. that science should be the ultimate arbiter of morality.” Indeed, Harris does in fact argue that science should be the ultimate arbiter of morality. I do not read Harris as you imply. Unlike Fyfe and Muehlhauser, Harris does not defend the theory of desire utilitarianism. I hope this helps.
On another note, do you live in North Beach? Or, is that just a visiting photo? I’ve got some buddies that live a stone’s throw from where you took that photo. If I had a dime for every good deli and restaurant in that neighborhood… :)
dguller
says...cl:
>> The problem–and the point I question whether or not I’ve successfully communicated here–is what to do when people have conflicting values. On what grounds can we enforce across-the-board prescriptions based on generalities, which inevitably vary from culture to culture and epoch to epoch?
The same way that you would decide which risk factors to treat to prevent an illness from developing, I would imagine. Similarly, you can study what happens to individuals’ happiness or well-being when they choose to prioritize certain values over others, and compare their well-being to others who choose different priorities. Practically, this would be enormously difficult to perform, but theoretically, it appears to be sound, at least to me, especially if we agree that most human beings agree upon the set of values that make life worth living.
I agree with Sam Harris in that it is highly unlikely that there is a single set of ordering for values that maximizes well-being, and that there are multiple peaks in the moral landscape, but the best way to determine this is to study large groups of individuals scientifically to determine which maximize well-being and which do not, and to relate that to the values that they prioritize.
woodchuck64
says...Actually, I think the desirist would be taking a more general approach: does riding skateboards into red curbs tend to fulfill or thwart desires overall? If it tends to fulfill desires, fine, it’s okay. If it tends to thwart desires overall then, as a desirist society, we should adjust our moral intuition of skateboard riding into red curbs to view it as immoral.
To determine if that skateboard action tends to fulfill or thwart desires, in theory, we would have to examine all people who skateboard, all business owners close to red curbs, and how their desires are fulfilled or thwarted by prohibiting skateboarding, restricting it, permitting it etc.; a truly difficult task.
However, in practice, I think desirism could proceed much like law proceeds today: by study of facts at hand, argument, case precedent. Desirist conclusions would have to be probabilistic, though, i.e.: we are 55% certain that skateboard riding into red curbs tends to thwart desires, therefore we will make it immoral with a penalty reflecting the degree of desire thwarting we estimate as well as the 55% uncertainty in the overall calculation.
As technology progresses, I would expect desirist conclusions to converge to 100%, assuming there is no scientific barrier to desirism.
Alemann
says...Why do people waste their valuable time with desirism? It’s a fringe ethical theory held by two nobodies on the internet. Serious discussions in moral philosophy are more productive.
cl
says...woodchuck64,
Actually, the desirist has no recourse here [forgive me I’m a bit out of the loop]. Recall that Alonzo said desirism, “has nothing to say to a moral agent at the time of decision.” [Short-List Theories of Morality, September 3, 2010]
For all pragmatic purposes, I think it’s impossible. That’s just one reason why I’m suspect of this whole, “science should be the arbiter of morality” line of thinking.
I can’t get down with that. This is basically enforcing an across-the-board rule when people’s liberty should be respected. If person A owns a shop and has no problem with skateboarding, why should I be penalized?
Alemann,
While I can only speak for myself, neither the fact that Luke and Alonzo are “nobodies” or that desirism is a “fringe theory” pose any real problem for me. After all, Einstein was once a “nobody” with a “fringe theory,” too. There was a time when critical thought and response to desirism fulfilled a purpose of mine, but that time has passed. I mean, one can only stay so enthused when Luke and Alonzo won’t even answer one’s questions and feel fit to attack one’s personal character instead. I also questioned desirism because–despite the kernel of truth I think it has–I honestly believe that Alonzo’s application of it is downright prejudiced and dangerous. With no math or science whatsoever, he goes around making unfounded claims such as, “Unless there is some sort of medical condition at work, the parent of an obese child is an abusive parent by that fact alone,” [Gluttony and Superlust, August 25, 2010], and, “…spectator sports is a waste of time, money, and real-estate. … We would be better off if people had no taste for such things.” [Trivial Hobbies, June 17, 2010]
Personally, I’m a fan of freedom and liberty. I don’t need Alonzo Fyfe to prescribe anything for me, especially in the absence of the very “empirical science” he claims to be relying on.
dguller
says...cl:
>> For all pragmatic purposes, I think it’s impossible. That’s just one reason why I’m suspect of this whole, “science should be the arbiter of morality” line of thinking.
Then what should “the arbiter of morality” be?
woodchuck64
says...cl,
Yeah, I’m waiting to hear him clear that up, looks like it will take a few more podcasts on CSA. However, in this particular case, I’m avoiding that by taking the desirist-society point-of-view, rather than the individual.
Impossible to do it perfectly, yes. But imperfectly I think is possible, and most of what humans do is imperfect anyway. The trick is doing it less imperfectly little by little over time, which is what I see science doing.
Okay, then the “desirist council” would reflect on your reasoning, deliberate,and finally agree that skateboarding in front of a shop is not immoral as long as the shop-owner permits it (75% confidence, say). Then it would pass this new law to media, teachers, parents, i.e those that do the most to shape social mores, and request that all no longer condemn skateboarding if a shop owner is okay with it. It’s always possible to break rules down further and add conditions, essentially creating brand new moral rules for new situations.
In theory, this could go on forever until you have a rule for every conceivable situation, but I think we would need a lot of new technology to overcome the impracticality of teaching and enforcing that many rules.
tmp
says...Here is a belated drive-by comment.
According to the “The Basic Claims of Desirism, point 15” only 2 and 6 are moral actions at all. That is, an agent is using social tools(violence should qualify: do as I say or be punished) to alter some other agents desires to be more amenable to his own. And, well, if I beat you severely and you develop an aversion to skating on my curb, then that beating was a morally good act, because it was successful and efficient in altering your desires to be more in line with my own.
This definition actually seems to make (successful) terrorism a morally good act, which is kind of ironic, I think.
tmp
says...I should elaborate a bit now that I have more time.
If you define morality as a practice, then a moral agent is someone who participates in that practice. A morally good agent is someone who is good at the practice of morality. And a morally good act is an act which is A) part of that practice and B) good at achieving the purpose(altering desires of other agents) of that practice. So morally good acts happen when someone does morality well. Burning down a random orphanage would not be morally good or bad, because burning down random orphanages is not a part of the practice of morality, UNLESS your purpose is to make people desire fire insurances, and then it would probably be a morally good act.
Also, I agree with Cl:s actual point, but I believe it has been sufficiently discussed in this thread already.
Shmuelish
says...cl wrote:
I’ve posted similarly at Luke’s blog now, but I thought I’d spread the word seeing that not too many people seem to discuss this point: surely this line of objection can be applied to any system of morality?
Why should adhering to God’s will/nature be “good”?
“God’s very nature is, by definition, the Moral Good”?
How is that assertion in any way different from someone asserting that the Moral Good just is, by definition, alleviating suffering/Desire-Utilitarian’s definition/definition “x”?
I don’t get why anyone takes the moral argument seriously – on either side of the fence – it’s blatantly self refuting. What a waste of time.