Morality: Well Done, Wrongly Done
Posted in Books, Morality, Quickies on | 1 minute | 10 Comments →
This, more or less, is what I tend to believe about morality:
Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise.
-From Plato’s Symposium
What sayest thou?
lackofcheese
says...I don’t really agree. If you have the noblest of intentions but do something wrong because you were not careful enough, or didn’t think about it, you’ve still quite clearly done wrong.
I think consequentialist reasoning is the only kind that really holds up.
Daniel
says...I think Pausanias is partially right. It is morally significant whether one intends to act nobly or for the right purpose. The mode of which Pausanias speaks sounds something a virtue. I think it is true that some actions are not intrinsically bad (drinking, singing, talking), but can become bad if the mode is in some way deficient or extreme. But, Pausanias errs to assume that actions cannot be good or evil in themselves. Consider what Aristotle writes:
Consequentialism is also partially correct. The consequences of actions are morally significant, but they are not the only thing that is morally significant. As I stated at the outset, intentions and the character of the individual also matter. Just imagine the hapless misanthrope who keeps trying to bring about misery to others, but fails so badly that he accidentally always brings them joy instead. Such a person is at least logically possible, right? I would not call him morally good just because the consequences of his actions are always good.
lackofcheese
says...Yes, with regards to evaluating the character of people, and deciding whether or not I would consider that person “morally good”. However, “is this person a good person” is an entirely different question to “what is the right thing to do?” – they are different questions, with different purposes and different answers.
When people talk about morality, it’s that second question that they tend to be asking, and that’s the one I would answer with purely consequentialist reasoning.
lackofcheese
says...Correction: replace [Yes] with [Yes, intentions do matter] at the start of my previous post.
Garren
says...Reminds me of the normative shifting Scanlon does by characterizing right and wrong as what we have reason to do.
Daniel
says...lackofcheese,
I would agree with you that when most people talk about morality they have the second question in mind. The moderns cleaved morality in half by focusing almost all of their ethical concerns with moral acts while ignoring the question of how morality relates to persons.
Such a strict dichotomy is not found in ancients like Aristotle. Their more holistic approach to morality provides a corrective that is entirely lacking in modern deontological, or utilitarian theories. As a result, we have the Eichmanns of the world who follow the orders given to them by the State, like dutiful Kantians. And we have the Singer’s of the world who can’t figure out exactly why bestiality, necrophilia, and infanticide are morally wrong.
So it seems that we agree that intentions, consequences, and character are all part of moral evaluation in different ways. The difference is that I don’t think the questions should be separated out as if they can stand independent of one another. To me, asking “What is the right thing to do?” raises related questions like “What kind of being am I?” “What is my purpose?” “What are my obligations given the kind of being I am?” etc.
cl
says...Lackofcheese,
What don’t you agree with? Surely you’re not disagreeing that motive is essential in any reliable moral judgment? I suspect you’re disagreeing that motive is the only essential in any reliable moral judgment.
Well, like anything, this seems able to go many ways. If Joe cuts his neighbor’s hand off on some noble notion this will help her develop perseverance, I would agree with you that Joe has done wrong, despite the noble intention. However, let’s say Joe sees his neighbor’s car running with the keys inside, then shuts it off and locks it up in the interest of preventing a theft, but his neighbor comes out and gets mad because she was just running inside while her car warmed up. This doesn’t negate the “rightness” of Joe’s act in my book.
That strikes me as too black and white, but perhaps you can explain just what you mean by consequentialist reasoning.
Daniel,
That’s essentially what I was getting at, and to me, this seems true of most acts.
By the way, do you moderate comments? I’ve been visiting your blog, and I left a comment on your latest eugenics post.
Garren,
Sounds interesting. Can you elaborate?
Daniel
says...cl,
Do you agree that some acts do not admit of a mean but are intrinsically bad?
Your comment is now up. I don’t moderate comments, but for some reason your message went to the spam folder. Who knows why? Thanks for the contribution.
-Daniel (formerly “Rufus”)
cl
says...Daniel,
Hmmm… I think I might know why. A few months ago, I went to login to my blogging email, and noticed that Google had shut my account down for unspecified “suspicious activity.” That, combined with a few other anomalous observations, lead me to suspect that somebody hijacked that email. This has been happening at many blogs, so, I suppose I shall no longer use that email.
I’m not sure. I want to say “yes,” but blasphemy is the only thing I can really think of. I mean, even child molestation reduces to sex… but if you’ve got any other examples, I’ll consider them.
Garren
says...cl,
Saying that an action is good if it is “worthy of praise” is an example of normative buck passing because one kind of normative category is explained in terms of another. In Slaves of the Passions, Schroeder lists a number of philosophers who appear to reduce other categories of moral value to reasons, and agrees with this thesis of ‘reasons basicness.’ Then he goes on to argue for a reduction of reasons in fully non-normative terms, thus (supposedly) reducing all moral normativity to non-normative terms.
I don’t mean to say anything especially negative or positive about buck passing, just that it’s useful to notice that it’s happening when it’s happening.
PhilPapers category on it:
http://philpapers.org/browse/buck-passing-accounts-of-moral-value
Not that I’ve actually read any of these yet!