Check Out This Blog
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A passive agnostic by the name of Andrés Ruiz / Deux Ex Machina runs this blog. Warning: it’s addictive. I recommend the posts on the evidential POE. Much food for thought, with plenty of slow and careful philosophy (in contrast to the “buckshot” approach I’ve been indulging in lately).
Andrés: Are you the same “Ex Machina” I occasionally tangled with at Daylight Atheism, before, you know… Ebonmuse brought down the iron fist of censure? If so, howdy, and no hard feelin’s. Either way, nice blog.
Andres
says...Woah, thanks for the shout out. I enjoyed your comments over at commonsenseatheism and love this blog too.
Im not the same Deus Ex Machina actually, I don’t think I’ve ever hung around Daylight Atheism much.
Anywho, thanks for the recommendation. :-)
bossmanham
says...I dunno. His post on the POE is the same ol same ol I always see. One thing in particular, “The problem here though is that, quite simply, no argument for God’s existence gives us such a strong confidence that He exists that it makes the plausibility of premise “there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being” higher than “There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.””
There are at least a half a dozen reasons this doesn’t hurt any defense the theist can give against the problem of evil. First off it assumes there is such a thing as evil, which is far more problematic for the atheist than evil existing is for a theist (ie it assumes an objective morality). Second, there are lots of good arguments for God’s existence that, all things being equal, seriously point to His actual existence, so to say there aren’t any that add to the support that He does exist is either ignorant or hard-headed. Third, it assumes that the GE Moore shift is the only way to reconcile the issue. Perhaps in this life there are no real goods that proceed from certain evils. But the apostle Paul addressed that when He said it is a privilege to suffer for Christ (Phil 1). Eternal life with Him would also seem to alleviate the issue with suffering, since you live forever, and any evil you suffered would continually fade away as you experience great goods forever and ever (Romans 8:18). Fourth, it assumes that no one actually deserves to suffer. But clearly if one breaks the law, they do deserve to suffer something. Christian theism posits that all people have, and therefore all deserve to suffer (of course this issue would be a problem for babies and young children, but that can be addressed numerous other ways too). Finally, since we can think of various goods that could proceed from evil in general (like the great good of the Christ event) it really relegates the POE to an interesting argument that atheists used to be proud of.
I’m not that impressed with that post, but the blog over all is fairly interesting and the guy is clearly intelligent.
Andrés Ruiz
says...Hi Bossman, thanks for the comments. A couple of things:
The evidential problem of evil does not assume the existence of evil in the world. It’s a conter-factual: “If God exists, we would not expect to see so many instances (if any) of gratuitous suffering in the world.”
I don’t believe the atheist is sneaking in any value-laden language there. Gratuitous simply means “without a justifying reason.” And in fact most theists agree with such a claim, hence why most theists attack the *second* premise: “Gratuitous suffering exists” by appealing to our limited epistemic positions.
Hence why the argument is called “The evidential problem of gratuitous suffering.” The atheist need not be committed to any type of moral realism in order to invoke it since he/she can merely claim that “this case of gratuitous suffering would be considered an ‘evil’ under theism.” So, even if you’re right in claiming that moral values can only exist under theism, the atheist can completely agree with you and say “yeah, moral values don’t exist in our world, but look at that, if theism were true this case of animal suffering would count as an evil.” The counter-factual remains true even if in the actual world no such values exist.
But regardless, the claim that morality is dependent on God is a false one. We could argue about this elsewhere, and I’ve taken on Craig’s Moral argument here: (http://philosophiadeus.blogspot.com/2010/08/notes-on-moral-argument.html)
It’s a bit messy since it essentially is a skeleton of a paper I want to write, but you can get the gist of the objections to the argument from it.
“Second, there are lots of good arguments for God’s existence that, all things being equal, seriously point to His actual existence, so to say there aren’t any that add to the support that He does exist is either ignorant or hard-headed.”
Notice I didn’t say there aren’t any arguments, I simply said that, in my opinion, none of the arguments give me a high enough confidence such as to call into question our observations that it certainly *seems* as though there is gratuitous suffering in nature.
Essentially what I’m saying is this: I’m far more confident in the truth of the proposition:
“There is much gratuitous suffering in nature” than I am confident of crucial premises of arguments for God’s existence like “Everything that begins to exist has a cause” or the principle of sufficient reason.
My epistemic confidence in something we can clearly observe in nature is much higher than intuitively plausible sounding, yet difficult to establish premises like the ones I mentioned above.
“Third, it assumes that the GE Moore shift is the only way to reconcile the issue.”
Not at all, I know the GE Moore shift is just one among many moves a theist can make in response to any kind of argument from evil/suffering.
One pretty impressive move that I have not addressed is Van Inwagen’s “No Minimum Goods” defense. There is also the skeptical theism response, etc. I’ve addressed skeptical theism in two of my blog posts (one of them being “Descartes and The Problem of Evil.”) Obviously I can’t cover all the bases in one simple post.
“Fourth, it assumes that no one actually deserves to suffer. But clearly if one breaks the law, they do deserve to suffer something. Christian theism posits that all people have, and therefore all deserve to suffer (of course this issue would be a problem for babies and young children, but that can be addressed numerous other ways too).”
Notice though that we can simply limit the scope of the argument to just animal suffering. Clearly (I should think) animals don’t deserve to suffer.
” Finally, since we can think of various goods that could proceed from evil in general (like the great good of the Christ event) it really relegates the POE to an interesting argument that atheists used to be proud of.”
And I don’t deny that many instances of suffering do/could have justifying overriding reasons, but the claim of the evidential problem of evil is that there are just *so many* cases of suffering that it is very difficult, if not impossible to see how on Earth they could *all* have overriding justifying reasons.
Anywho, thanks for the comments. :)
cl
says...Bossmanham,
Howdy. Been a while. I’m not persuaded by his POE arguments, either, but at the same time, they’re definitely not run of the mill in my opinion. I say this because he presents both sides. He considers responses, and does a sort of “back-and-forth” in his dialog with himself. He at least acknowledges the validity [or apparent validity] of various theist responses, even though he does not find them persuasive. Plus, aside from POE stuff, that trend continues in other post. Did you read the stuff about Street and Darwinian ethics? Talk about a fair shake! Also, he critiques New Atheists like Loftus, and seems to also be very critical of scientism. In short, his blog is much how mine might be if I were atheist.
Well obviously, that’s problematic, but I didn’t consider that part of the POE progression. Sure, he uses “us” rhetorically, as if what he said also applies to the reader, and sure, he seems to appeal to an objective criterion for plausibility that is not well-defined, but in particular, I was impressed by the way he handled the “dead Bambi” line of thought. I’ve thought that very same thing myself many times, and the way he articulated was just fascinating IMHO.
Don’t get me wrong; I agree with one or more of your criticisms. I just think what I’ve found over there is far better than most of the blogs I’ve seen, atheist or not. I’ll let you guys hash it out a bit, and if I feel I have anything to add, I’ll jump back in. I’m a bit pressed for time at the moment.
cl
says...Okay, so I couldn’t resist…
Andrés,
Why not? Isn’t this just founded on intuition? How can we know this premise is true? I’ve been having this same discussion with Peter Hurford in various threads around this blog, and, as you well know because you said it yourself, this line of reasoning is ultimately founded on incredultiy. IMHO, your response to the “Bambi” argument is strong enough to refute this, as is. The only counter-thought I recall reading was, “Well, what about those instances where nobody encounters the carcass?” Even then, parasites benefit and the cycle of life continues.
I don’t think that’s correct, because there is no de facto proclamation in Scripture that says “suffering is evil” or even “gratuitous suffering is evil.” In fact, many verses appeal to the idea of suffering as a virtue, and this resonates with what I experience in my own life. Trial by fire. Perseverance through hardship. Etc. So, in short, I don’t think the atheist can just declare that gratuitous suffering is evil, and we haven’t even begun to talk about the possibility of current suffering being atoned for in a future world. IOW, is any of my suffering “immoral” or “gratuitous” if it 1) motivates me to become a better person; and, 2) if it is entirely washed away when I am raised anew?
Well, you said “us,” but I read that charitably as you speaking for yourself. Also, it certainly seemed that the sun went around the Earth, and it certainly seemed that QM was false. In and of itself, that’s not good enough.
If you are referring to the premises underlying Aristotleian or Thomist arguments for a necessary being, I strongly disagree. To me, the premises are based on undeniable observations of nature, and they are not difficult to establish. It might interest you to know that I wasn’t always persuaded by them, despite my being theist. Only once I really made an effort to think them through did I come to accept them. I used to be a believer who thought they were false. Also, I’m not implying you haven’t thought them through, in any way, shape, or form. Just saying that I once thought I had thought them through, and one day I realized how wrong I was. And, I was already a believer when this happened!
Andrés Ruiz
says...“Why not? Isn’t this just founded on intuition? How can we know this premise is true? I’ve been having this same discussion with Peter Hurford in various threads around this blog, and, as you well know because you said it yourself, this line of reasoning is ultimately founded on incredulity.”
Well, incredulity is one way, but I think most theists and atheists agree that at the very least, on the face of it, a maximally great being would allow suffering only insofar as said suffering was conducive to a greater good. This seems to be, on the face of it, as certain as any moral claim could possibly be. I hate to use the word “self-evident” in such a case, but at the very least it certainly sounds more plausible than the alternative, that a maximally great being would allow suffering for no reason whatsoever.
It is an intuition, but I’d say it’s as plausible as anything, as the Howard-Snyders explain: “on the face of it, the idea that God may well
permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?”
“I don’t think that’s correct, because there is no de facto proclamation in Scripture that says “suffering is evil” or even “gratuitous suffering is evil.”
I’m not sure how true this is, but at any rate, the atheologian arrives at said position based on consideration of God’s attributes and how it would be most plausible for such a being to behave in response to certain features of the world. You mention “trial by fire” type scenarios which remind me of Swinburne’s soul-making theodicies which I could easily grant work for some evils in the world; it’s hard to see however how soul-making theodicies have anything to do with animal suffering since after all, animals don’t develop the same virtues that humans due after prolonged periods of suffering, specially not those animals that die a painful death.
” in short, I don’t think the atheist can just declare that gratuitous suffering is evil”
True enough, it shouldn’t merely be asserted, yet as with most moral philosophizing, we can only work with the intuitions we already have. We can dialogue about the types of things we believe to be evil and through a process of reflective equilibrium try to balance out our intuitions. I would be very surprised to hear any theist proclaim that the existence of suffering in the world, *gratuitous* suffering, that is, suffering for no reason at all, would be compatible with the God they worship. That certainly seems strange. Sure, the atheist has some explaining to do, but it would seem that the theist does as well as it (at least to me) seems very strange to think that a maximally great being would simply allow suffering for no reason at all.
“If you are referring to the premises underlying Aristotleian or Thomist arguments for a necessary being, I strongly disagree.”
I think this would just get us sidetracked into arguments for/against classical theistic arguments for the existence of God. I’m not that interested in attacking those things right now (busy busy), but needless to say, I was merely making a psychological report.
Andrés Ruiz
says...Cl,
I am interested to know why you think something along the lines of:
“If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that
evil to occur unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.”
is false.
Andrés Ruiz
says...Also, not sure how much of a difference it makes, but I don’t call myself an atheist. I’ve no desire to be associated with the Loftus/Dawkins/Harris/Hitchens/Myers fools of the world.
Passive agnostic would be better.
Crude
says...I think it’s clear that a maximally great being would permit seemingly gratuitous evil. But the accent there is on the seemingly – that says more about us than any maximally great being. Part of the problem seems to be (at least this is the impression I get) we pretend we’re able to put ourselves the shoes of the maximally great being and judge what to do. We forget the part about standing outside of time, seeing (for lack of a better word) the whole of existence and causes/effects at once. It’s easier said than done.
To throw my own two cents in: I have severe trouble believing in ‘gratuitous suffering’, in part because any suffering that takes place results in a unique being who could not exist without the suffering having taken place in their life. To put it another way: What’s being suggested, if not directly, by people who object to seemingly “gratuitous suffering” is that no person who experiences gratuitous suffering should ever have been allowed to exist.
(This is where a common reply is, ‘No, they should exist, just without the suffering!’ But I say that’s not possible. A Crude who never suffered – or who never did evil, for that matter – is a Crude who is not me. It’s a different being, no matter what similarities there are between the two. I am, unfortunately, wrapped up with my suffering and my evil. Everyone is.)
cl
says...Andrés,
I agree. My “incredulity” remark only applies to the argument, “I can’t see how instance of suffering X could possibly lead to a greater good, ergo no God.” That is an argument from incredulity, and anyone who rests on that rests on sand.
However, I don’t need to contest the first premise. I only contest it because I think it’s important to point out that POE arguments are hopelessly dependent on intuition, then I point out the inconsistency between atheists relying on their intuition to make POE arguments, while denying theists the same privilege in other contexts. But that’s all beyond the scope of what we’re talking about, right now. I can agree with the opening premise, and still make my case — with a caveat.
When we agree that God would only allow suffering insofar as it was conducive to a greater good, are we talking about the same thing? I suspect we’re not. To date, every atheist I’ve heard interprets this to mean that every instantiation of suffering requires a greater, causally entangled good in this life [for example, your hypothetical hiker turned philosopher]. I think extra work is required to justify that premise.
So, we really have something like:
1) a maximally great being would allow many instances of suffering only if each instance was conducive to a causally entangled good; and,
2) a maximally great being would allow many instances of suffering only if net suffering was less than net good.
You appear to endorse 1. I endorse 2. The theist who endorses 1 must argue that every instance of evil leads, causally, to a greater good. Yet, if that’s the case, the argument can’t progress. As you pointed out, the atheist can say, “What about Bambi?” Well, the theist can say what I just implied: “That we can’t identify the greater good doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.” Then, voila! Stalemate.
The theist who endorses 2 seems to be on much stronger ground. They can accept many instances of gratuitous suffering and say, “Yeah, you’re right, those things are absolutely terrible, and probably don’t lead to a greater good in our world. But on the traditional Biblical view, all the temporary suffering we experience is going to be replaced by eternal good.”
We end up with a state of affairs in which God allowed suffering — even gratuitous suffering — in the interest of a greater good. That’s why I reject the POE.
I don’t think that’s false. I argue that allowing suffering, even gratuitous suffering, results in an eternal good that outweighs it.
Ha! Man, are you my long lost twin brother? That’s exactly how I feel about being categorized as Christian. I changed the OP.
bossmanham
says...Hey guys. Thanks to both of you for engaging my comments. I just started classes again, and they’re on Wed. and Thurs. nights, so bear with me as I find time to type out a full response.
bossmanham
says...Andres,
The evidential POE may not rest on any moral statements, focusing on suffering rather than evil. However, it does assume that suffering is BAD, in that suffering is not normative. It’s not the way things should be. But in a completely naturalistic universe, how on earth could one make that judgment? You have to assume there is some way things ought to be, and suffering is counter to that, dare I say, plan.
So you do have to commit to the assumption that there is a way things ought to be. How on earth is that any different than any faith commitment a Christian makes regarding God? The difference is that Christians have good reasons to trust what GOd has revealed to us, where you just blindly accept the premise that there is something wrong with evil.
Now, perhaps you’re making an internal critique of Christianity, saying that Christianity posits two things, God and evil, that simply can’t exist together. But that would be the logical POE, would it not?
Further, if you’re committing to the premise that there’s no reason that you can see for a perfect God to allow gratuitous suffering, then you’re taking on an enormous burden of proof are you not? First you’re looking at acts and coming to the conclusion in your own mind that they aren’t justified given what you know. Okay. Fine. But you’re making a judgment based on the assumption, the faith, that you have sufficient knowledge of the world to know that that. If God does exist, then only He would know if an event of suffering is gratuitous, don’t you think? The scope of your knowledge just isn’t vast enough.
In fact that’s the biggest problem with your post. You criticize the Christian for not using reason to figure this out, and for resorting to faith in God, but it’s you who is putting faith in your own scope of knowledge, when it could be that it’s just not enough to discover the true justification of the suffering that happens. I mean we all have things that we can’t prove evidentially don’t we? If that’s the case, then I don’t think your argument justifies atheism. Perhaps agnosticism, but not atheism.
Regarding your other post on the moral argument, I really don’t care to get into it at this point, but I would just say that I am convinced that the only way that objective morality could exist is if God exists, and no naturalistic account has been developed to dispute that claim. And frankly, your post didn’t really do anything to dispute that.
Finally, regarding animal suffering, I can think of a reason God would allow it. One could be related to the curse humanity incurred on the world. Not only do we suffer, but our animal companions do as well due to the breaking of God’s law. Another could be that animal suffering was necessary for the development of homo sapiens. I mean perhaps all of the evolutionary development that has been advanced due to the suffering of animals was necessary for the formation of the human biological organism, which is a greater more valuable good? That’s speculation, but it’s good enough to dent the evidential POE to the point that it isn’t a very good defeater for God’s existence at all.
cl
says...bossmanham,
While I agree with you that the claim, “suffering is wrong / evil” requires a teleological commitment, I disagree that atheists need to *ACTUALLY BELIEVE* suffering is wrong / evil to formulate a POE argument. I think Andrés and other atheists only need to use *OUR* position on suffering to argue against our idea of God. They’re saying something like, “If God is all you say God is, why all this gratuitous suffering?” That is to say, they’re temporarily assenting to *OUR* views on suffering, to highlight a perceived inconsistency with our theology and reality. IOW, they don’t need to have an *ACTUAL* view of suffering that dovetails with ours. Rather, they assent to ours for the sake of argument, then attempt to hoist us by our own petard. It’s kind of like when we argue things like, “Okay, if evolution is true, how come X?” where X represents some fact of reality that appears inconsistent with the evolutionary hypothesis.
No, not fine. That’s the position of incredulity I’ve been referring to. It’s the same thing as vestigial organs: “I can’t discern a function for organ X, therefore organ X is a vestige of an earlier, more useful organ.” Incredulity all the way.
Correct.
I agree, but the problem with this is that atheists will retort, “Oh, so God is mysterious, eh?” So we need a line of thought that doesn’t permit that retort, and I believe the explanation I offered above gets around that problem.
I agree with you, but I think we can do better. I think we can actually falsify the evidential POE by accepting the premise that God would only allow suffering if a greater good resulted, then pointing out that a greater good WILL result. That seems as airtight as can be (if the Bible is true, of course). Using a modified version of Andrés’ formulation:
P1) If [a maximally great being] is in a position to prevent [all] evil, [the maximally great being] should not allow [any evil] to occur unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it;
P2) God is a maximally great being, and in a position to prevent all evil;
P3) Evil exists;
P4) The evil that exists will be followed by an eternal ontology with zero evil;
5) There is no inconsistency between the evil that exists and the God on offer.
bossmanham
says...Lol, when I said fine, I didn’t mean fine. Just rhetorical fluff to fill space. You’re correct, I can accept that this is meant to be an internal critique of theism.
No I don’t think that’s the case at all. If we’re dealing with an omniscient God, then it’s no mystery at all. We would know He would know the reasoning behind any suffering that happened. That’s not mysterious. It just means He know something we don’t.
I agree with your last points too. When dealing with this argument, however, I go overkill. I put every single reason I can think of to not take it seriously, because it does implicitly assume a lot of different things that are easy to undermine.
tmp
says...cl,
“the premise that God would only allow suffering if a greater good resulted, then pointing out that a greater good WILL result”
This premise assumes, that God NEEDS suffering to achieve that greater good, and thus is NOT omnipotent.