Question #1: Compassion & Suffering
Posted in Logic, Questions, Quickies on | 1 minute | 74 Comments →
Are empathy and compassion logically possible without experiencing suffering?
In honor of twimfanboy’s obsession with the “firmly cemented goalposts” thing, I’m looking for—and trying to encourage in general—direct, “yes” or “no” answers to questions. This is how you cement firm goalposts, fanboy! Sure, many questions don’t have only yes or only no answers. I get that. Explanations and caveats are welcomed, just prefix them with a “yes” or “no” whenever possible.
To demonstrate my own willingness in abiding by this principle, I say no, neither is logically possible without experiencing suffering.
Karl Grant
says...Well, considering that Merriam-Webster defines compassion as a sympathetic consciousness of others’ distress together with a desire to alleviate it I am going to answer no, you cannot define compassion without suffering.
Peter Hurford
says...Here’s a very clear “yes and no”: Empathy (the ability to understand and share the feelings of another) is possible without suffering, but compassion (sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others) is not.
I suspect differences in answers to this question may not come from a thorny philosophical issue, but rather differences about what the words “empathy” and “compassion” refer to.
Thinking Emotions
says...Everyone thus far has talked about the semantics of compassion and empathy, but I think the real problem in answering this question is going to be deciding what counts as suffering. For example, is it just physical suffering or also emotional? Does internal turmoil with no real external explanation/cause qualify?
There’s also a metaphysical question of sorts at play here. For example, what does it mean to experience empathy or compassion? Suffering need not actually exist for us to evoke those emotions, or at least, it doesn’t need to exist in the “real world.” Countless numbers of fictional works include instances of great suffering, which would certainly evoke compassion and empathy from a reader. What if there were a world where there was no suffering, but there were plenty of authors and poets that still included instances of suffering and tragedy into their works?
Also, I’m beginning to side more and more with you that atheists that expect God to prevent every single little ounce of suffering, no matter how minute, are being unreasonable. What the hell would a world without any sort of suffering, no matter how infinitesimal and trivial, even look like? Methinks that a world without any content we would deem as suffering would adapt a different definition for suffering, and it would continue to exist. In a way, I think existence without suffering is almost absurd. This might be a bunch of existential mumbo jumbo, but it seems perfectly rational at the moment.
Anyway, very interesting question, cl. I think empathy and compassion need to be brought up more often in conversations about the PoE, God’s benevolence, etc.
Thinking Emotions
says...Oh yeah, that’s right, answering the question. Hmm… when it comes down to it, I say yes. One can still feel plenty of empathy and compassion without having to directly experience any suffering. You can’t tell me that you don’t empathize, and feel compassion for, the hero in a tragedy.
Peter Hurford
says...This is why the distinction is made between pointless/needless/gratuitous suffering and suffering that is “necessary for a higher good”.
I’d agree with you (and indirectly with Cl’s “Cosmic Coddler” arguments) that it is a bit weird to be overly concerned with infinitesimal and trivial bits of suffering — tough, I think this is the weirdness that comes from taking omni-goodness all the way to infinity, not a weirdness in the Problem of Evil itself.
However, I’d put forth that the world contains suffering that is not trivial and infinitesimal.
Adamoriens
says...Hi Thinking Emotions. You wrote:
My mind ran with yours to fiction as well, but I’ve reconsidered. To empathize with a suffering person, fictional or real, is to participate in their suffering ourselves.
Ronin
says...cl,
You asked,
I say, “No.” Because, you framed the question with both empathy and compassion combined. I would agree with Peter on post 2 with regards to empathy if you would have separated the words but you did not; so, I am going with “No.”
Matt DeStefano
says...My mind ran with yours to fiction as well, but I’ve reconsidered. To empathize with a suffering person, fictional or real, is to participate in their suffering ourselves.
How can you “participate” in fictional suffering? When reading Game of Thrones, am I participating in their fictional world when Martin kills off my favorite character? What does that even mean to participate in a fictional suffering?
cl
says...Well, I got a few straight answers… not bad for a start.
Peter,
Yes, agreed, good distinction. I’ve always thought of “empathy” in the limited context of suffering, but one could understand and share feelings of joy with another. That would technically qualify as empathy with no suffering required. I agree with you that compassion is not logically possible without suffering.
ThinkingEmotions,
I can’t say I agree there. Yes, fictional characters evoke compassion, but isn’t that only because we have felt similar pain in the real world? Would it be possible to feel compassion for a hurting character if we’ve never hurt? I say no.
I think they’d have a major disconnect with their audience. How would their audience know what suffering and tragedy were if they never existed in the real world? I’m curious to hear if you still say “yes” to the original question.
Adamoriens,
Well sure, but you avoided the question: is this *POSSIBLE* without actually experiencing suffering ourselves?
Ronin,
I agree with Peter @ #2, so I think the three of us—actually the four of us, along with Karl Grant—are on the same page. Adamoriens and Matt DeStefano have yet to answer.
Matt DeStefano
says...“Are empathy and compassion logically possible without experiencing suffering?”
If we truly want to have cemented goal posts, this question still needs a great deal of clarification. Does it refer to the individual (i.e. it is logically impossible for me to have empathy or compassion without experiencing suffering), or to all beings capable of suffering?
If you mean experiencing suffering directly – then yes, it’s logically possible. I don’t think that there is anything logically contradictory about asserting that I haven’t suffered but I feel bad that others do or “I understand your suffering and wish it wasn’t the case” (it may be that this is not naturally possible, but that’s quite a different story).
If the context is all human beings at all times, the question becomes a lot murkier. My intuition is that there is still no logical contradiction. I remember watching Star Wars with my wife for the first time, and she told me she “didn’t get all the fuss”.
Besides rage and contempt for her complete inability to appreciate such film mastery, I also felt what seems like compassion and empathy that she will never quite feel the “depth” of satisfaction and joy that watching Star Wars brings me.
She’s not suffering in any discernable way (although she might when I force her to watch it when it inevitably comes on Spike TV), but she does have the misfortune of not being able to appreciate Science Fiction in the same way that I do.
tl;dr I think that empathy and compassion are both logically possible without experiencing suffering directly, or entirely. As for the latter, I think that they merely require a spectrum of experience, rather than suffering per se.
Thinking Emotions
says...cl,
Not necessarily. If we are capable of empathy, then we can place ourselves in the situation a fictional character would be in. If we can imagine being that character, we can also imagine going through the same trials. If we go through the same trials, then it would be pretty hard not to experience compassion.
In response to the first question, I only think that goes so far. Sure, having experienced the same suffering would certainly enhance our insight and motivation to sympathize perhaps, but generally speaking, we don’t need to suffer in specific ways to feel sympathy. I’ve never had a drug addiction, but I could sympathize with a heroin addict. Both of my parents are still very much alive and not divorced, which I’m immensely thankful for, but I can really sympathize with those have lost their folks or had to watch them split. This is because I can imagine what a heroin addiction would be like, or what it would be like to have one of my parents die, or to watch them divorce as a child.
I’m playing devil’s advocate, to be blunt. The two people before me said no, but I wanted to shake things up a bit. In truth, I can see merit in both answers to the question.
I don’t think it matters if they would have a disconnect with their audience. The question isn’t, “will writers and poets write about different things now that the world no longer contains suffering?” Rather, it’s just a hypothetical question asking if empathy and compassion could still exist in the absence of suffering.
The metaphysical debate begins when you suggest that tragedy and suffering don’t exist in the real world. In a sense, these things don’t “exist in the real world” anyway; they are mental concepts that supervene upon certain incidents. You may think this is a brave claim, but I think suffering is no different from love or friendship. You may see someone crying over the loss of his pet dog, or see a person help his friend get around after he broke his leg, or see a husband and wife share a tender moment together, but that does not mean suffering, friendship, or love are real, respectively. We are trained to see these things as the concepts we’ve made for them.
So… is it the case that we still have the concept of suffering in our minds though no one is suffering, or is it the case that we do not have the concept of suffering in our minds and no one is suffering? I feel as if you’re suggesting that we could not have the concept of suffering in our minds if we’ve never suffered, but again, through empathy and imagination, it is possible to relate to suffering and imagine it.
But that leads me to another issue…
Adamoriens,
Interesting point. I also tossed this around in my head when thinking about my response to cl’s question. Although it seems reasonable in this context, I think we can easily reduce it to absurdity. For one, there is a giant difference in imagining being hit by a car and actually being hit by one. A person hit by a car would definitely qualify as suffering, but our reading of his account would not mean we were suffering. We may have followed his commentary on that day: how he felt right as the car hit him, the pain that followed, the uncertainty of his prognosis, etc. Despite all that, it just doesn’t then follow that we have also suffered.
Quick note: I am not being stubborn. I just want to see if there is anything we can extract from this discussion. I am open to both perspectives.
Thinking Emotions
says...Related essay: What It is Like to be a Bat. tl;dr – I’m saying we can imagine what it’s like to be a bat, but not experience bat-ness.
cl
says...Matt DeStefano,
I disagree. The rest of us were able to answer quite easily.
It’s false—logically contradictory—to assert that you haven’t suffered. You have suffered, and I’m suggesting it is only because you have suffered that you can have compassion on others who suffer.
I’m interested. Can you explain?
I think that sounds more like pity.
dale
says...NO. Because to be alive is to suffer. There is not one human life that has been void of suffering.
YES. Because I do not think I need to suffer the situations of other in order to feel sympathy for them. My lack of their suffering gives me the ability to feel for them as that I wish they could feel as I do, in that specific situation.
This question is a Catch-22. There is no possible existing, uncontaminated control subject for this test to be held in measure to.
cl
says...ThinkingEmotions,
You said, bold mine:
Exactly my point. Therefore, doesn’t it follow that if we *DON’T* go through the same trials, i.e., if we haven’t suffered at some point ourselves, then it *WOULD* be pretty hard to experience compassion?
If that’s true—if via compassion we experience suffering—then it seems pretty straight forward that empathy / compassion *ARE* logically impossible without experiencing suffering.
I’d agree to, “We can imagine what it’s like to be a bat, without actually being a bat.” However, I think that when we imagine what it’s like to be a bat, we experience bat-ness to some degree. If you visualize yourself as warrior going through the jungle, even though it’s a simulation in your mind, don’t you literally experience a slice of the warrior’s life?
cl
says...dale,
I understand. For example, you don’t need to actually slam trying to ollie 20 stairs in order to feel sympathy for the guy that does, right? After all, you’ve probably fallen off your bike onto hard pavement, or something similar like that before. Therefore, by analogy of experience, you can empathize with our skater. But that’s not my question. What if you had *NEVER* experienced anything similar? What if you’d never experienced any suffering yourself?
My initial reaction was to agree with you, but I’m not so sure. I actually think AI would be the perfect candidate. It might be a bold starting assumption, but it seems we can be fairly confident a robot has never suffered. Interesting ideas, if nothing else.
Matt DeStefano
says...I think this may indicate a faulty sense of what logical possibility is. False claims about states of affairs in this world can still be logically possible. A logical possibility is a claim that can be asserted without logical contradiction. It’s certainly false to say that I haven’t suffered, but it’s logically possible. It’s also logically possible that human beings fly, Justin Bieber is the greatest singer who ever lived, and I like the Miami Heat. None of these are true, however. From Wikipedia:
“Thus, “the sky is blue” (and all other actually true propositions) is logically possible: there exists some logically coherent way for the world to be such that it is true, viz., the way that the world actually is. But this “way for the world to be” need not be the way the world actually is; it need only be logically coherent. So, for example, the false proposition the sky is green is also logically possible, so long as we are able (as we indeed seem to be) to conceive of some logically coherent world in which the sky is green.”
Given the way human beings are made up physically (in this world), it might be impossible for us to experience compassion and empathy without first experiencing suffering. I’m not convinced either way on this argument, but it seems to me that the only way I can experience compassion or empathy is reflecting on my own past suffering and wishing others did not have to endure some similar experience.
Pity and compassion sound almost identical to me. Can you parse out an important difference?
Pity: Noun:
The feeling of sorrow and compassion caused by the suffering and misfortunes of others.
Compassion: Noun:
Sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others: “the victims should be treated with compassion”.
dale
says...cl
In regards to your re-emphasizing the *NEVER* part in your question, I also want to bring up the “similar” in that part of your reply. What constitutes “similar”? How far are we willing to extend the boundaries of this definition.
What if any and all suffering was comparable?
Could the “suffering” of an over privileged 1st world child not getting the birthday present they wanted was comparable, in relative terms of what is considered pleasure and pain, to the “suffering” of a 3rd world child in watching their family be murdered in the course of war?
I cannot, at the moment, recall which book it was, but I think the idea of relative suffering was a topic that CS Lewis tackled in regards to judgement.
I’m just curious as to where you feel this could play into the proposed question, as this was the thought that prompted me to give you two answers, as well as the “Catch-22” reference. This is where I go back to the lack of an impossibility of a uncontaminated control in this debate.
The “Catch-22” of the “Catch-22” in the AI theory is: could you find a human being who has never “suffered” that could build the said AI? And, if you couldn’t, could you guarantee that their experience with “suffering” would not affect the aspect of suffering in the situation with the proposed AI?
I want to hang in there on this topic, but I just feel that though the questions are black and white, I feel that most of the answer field is grey. Regarding the skateboarder’s “suffering” in their failed ollie and my ability to feel emotionally for them. YES I have felt for people in this situation, though NO I had not yet experienced the said bike accident prior to my seeing the suffering of said skater.
SO, maybe to get to a conclusion, we may need to define the elasticity of the definition of “similar”?
cl
says...Matt DeStefano,
I agree.
Not WRT to this discussion, no. You can disregard that remark.
cl
says...dale,
Good questions.
Okay… then scale it back: could you feel compassion for them if you never experienced any pain or discomfort, whatsoever? This way, we skip deliberation over “similar” altogether.
dale
says...cl
No.
I could not feel compassion for them if (I) never experienced any pain or discomfort, whatsoever…because I had no choice in the matter, as life on earth as a human being is impossible to live without experiencing suffering.
What I do have choice in is whether I choose to think outside of myself and consider others and their suffering, and that I hold their own suffering in the same regard as my own, or as I would like them to view my suffering from their point of view.
It’s like asking if the you could speak on life if you we’re never born.
cl
says...dale,
I agree.
This is good. So far, I’ve been able to get a straight answer from all but one. Moving forward with new discussions and whatnot, this is how I want to run things. Straight answers, buttressed by explanations when necessary. This, I think, is a better, more honest way to have discourse. Discussions tend to get bogged down. It’s too easy to just ignore questions on the internet. Firm “yes” and “no” answers really work wonders as far as cementing goalposts and understanding opponents.
Matt DeStefano
says...While I’m enjoying this fast and furious version of question and answer, I’ve got to hold your feet to the flames. This question rests upon a faulty understanding of a concept as simple as “logical possibility”.
cl
says...No more naked assertions Matt. Explain yourself.
Matt DeStefano
says...To claim something is not “logically possible” is to claim that it is not logically coherent. Your previous claim:
It’s pretty obvious you don’t understand what “logical possibility” is. Your answers, therefore, are likely based off another question that you intended to ask. Perhaps, “If you hadn’t suffered, would it be possible for you to feel compassion/empathy?” or another question.
cl
says...Matt DeStefano,
Correct. IOW, I understand the concept exactly as you do. Reparse, then move along. It’s quite boring already.
***NOTE: see the following comment. I actually can’t agree or disagree with Matt here, because I don’t know what he means by “coherent.”
cl
says...Actually, for the purposes of this discussion, your previous Wikipedia definition was better: “A logically possible proposition is one that can be asserted without implying a logical contradiction.”
At any rate, that’s it for me.
Thinking Emotions
says...cl,
I regretted that the moment I read over it! I wish there was an edit function on here. I meant to say that if we can imagine what these trials were like (how unpleasant they were, how we would feel in this situation, etc), we can get enough of an idea to be compassionate toward the character. I don’t actually think we have to go through them or experience them ourselves.
Yeah, but you’re simply *not* participating in the suffering in a literal or direct way. That line is very poetic, but I don’t think compassion causes us to suffer or necessitates suffering on our end. It involves sympathy and understanding, and even further, respect.
I hate to give you the TE typical example (everybody’s like, “man, if I had a dollar every time he did this…”), but bear with me for a minute. Let’s say a person is reading a fictional story in universe A where nobody is suffering. This story details the grueling trip of a man and his wife through the plains of Africa. The man gets sick and knows he will eventually die. As he lies on his deathbed, he reflects on his life and tries to come to terms with all his mistakes and regrets. He eventually dies, bitter with regret.
This is basically the abridged version of Hemingway’s The Snows of Kilimanjaro. The person reading this imagines being the ill, dying man, and how awful it must be to die knowing you had so much more you wanted to live for. You see, this kind of story in a world without suffering would just be a fantasy. In our universe, we don’t travel through galaxies and go through time and live in massive space ships, but in TV shows like Star Trek, this is a very normal thing.
So yeah, the person in universe A doesn’t actually experience anything. This is my key point. Assuming the story was based on an actual event, the only ones experiencing it would be those involved. It’s really just a glimpse into a world that contains suffering, and an invitation to imagine what suffering would be like.
You do not actually taste or even come close to the phenomenological essence of a bat, or in your case, a warrior. There is no experiential quality to closing your eyes and imagining being a bat. Even further, there isn’t even any true experiencing of bat-ness if we were to dress up like a bat and try to do things that bats do. We would just be silly people pretending, or imagining, that we were bats. We would not be bats, as there is an active component to being something conscious. There is something “fundamentally alien” to us about being a bat.
The same is true of those in universe A reading the story. There’s no experiential quality to reading and even vividly imagining the outcome of the narrator. Indeed, they are trying to grasp something very foreign to them: suffering (though not as foreign as being a bat!). Nevertheless, they can use their imaginations to realize suffering is not pleasant, and then be thankful that they are not subject to such a thing: “Wow, I sure am glad nothing bad ever happens to anyone here. Still, I feel bad for the dying man in the story — he wouldn’t have had to go through that if he lived here.”
In the same way that we don’t need to be a bat to know what a bat is, universe A inhabitants do not need to be suffering or to have suffered to know what suffering is. In fact, suffering need not even exist for them to know what it is. They can understand suffering is an emotional state, albeit a fictional one to them, and they can use their range of emotional states as background for contrast.
So yeah, it seems to me that they would be plenty capable of experiencing sympathy. I can see why you and others would be tempted to propose that one must experience suffering to sympathize, but I think the only necessary prerequisite for compassion is empathy.
Adamoriens
says...I think that, were we to empathize with this man’s pain, we would experience adverse emotions. Does this constitute suffering? Also, these studies may be of interest:
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/303/5661/1157.abstract
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/129/9/2494.abstract
dale
says...cl,
I change my answer.
YES, empathy and compassion are possible without experiencing (similar) suffering.
Last night I went to a friend’s 32nd birthday dinner, it was a great time. Myself and everyone there is a healthy and positively contributing member of society. We laughed, we joked, we enjoyed delicious Indian food and tasty craft beers. This to me is an example of the joys of life, the opposite of suffering.
When I got home later, there was an envelope addressed to me from a pediatric oncology research center who was hoping for me to make a charitable donation in the name of their fight to cure children of cancer. Included was a calendar of back yard birds, very pretty creatures in full color were there for each month of the year. Also on each month’s page was a smaller, in the scale of each day’s allotted rectangle, photo which profiled a child and a story of their situation.
When I read of each child’s plight, my heart sank and my stomach rolled in nausea. Children who are facing the loss of sight before their 3rd birthday, or worse death. The parent’s who are looking at not only losing their babies, but also every penny they have, because they would gladly give them all up just to watch their child be cured so they may live another day. If this isn’t suffering, what is?
I have never had cancer and I have never suffered from it’s effects. I know of people who have, but that’s not the same thing as my experiencing it. I am lucky enough to, so far in life, as I have never suffered anything more than a temporary flu or bump and scrape here or there. I am very, very lucky.
The no answer you are looking for is impossible in real life. In theoretical debate, and in regards to a reality that is not our’s here on earth, it may be? Here on earth we all suffer, but that is not why we are or are not empathetic or compassionate. Maybe empathy and compassion are more dependent upon each of our own natural inclinations to be so (as comparable to genetically inherited physical ability, or socialized personality traits); or, it’s a choice?
Matt DeStefano
says...“Re-parse”, huh?
Since you actually didn’t understand the concept (and your previous comment shows that despite your predictable inability to admit it), perhaps with your new understanding you can give some reason to think why there is a logical contradiction (A & ~A) with the idea that empathy and compassion exist without experiencing suffering.
The reason I’m pressing is that other commenters (TE’s example of the Hemingway story, Dale’s example of the oncology pamphlet, etc) are arguing about the truth value of the claim “We can have compassion and empathy without directly experiencing suffering”. That’s an interesting debate, but it doesn’t move the conversation at all when discussing whether or not it’s logically possible .
Thinking Emotions
says...Adamoriens,
From the second study: “The results suggest that a normal personal experience of pain is not necessarily required for perceiving and feeling empathy for others’ pain.”
This seems to perfectly align with my argument. That study also mentioned how those with CIP tended to assess the pain of the people as lower than the control subjects. This would be consistent with never feeling pain. After all, they have poor background for comparing and contrasting their sensory experiences to pain — sort of how those that have never suffered would likely not be the same as us in our compassion, but similar.
From here, “[t]he affective component of pain refers to the unpleasantness or emotional distress that invariably attends the sensation of physical pain.” Per the first study, it would seem that compassion would indeed be impossible or at least very different in a universe without suffering.
Matt,
Hi there. Yeah, the conversation has definitely been derailed, but I’m okay with that. To address this concern,
First, let’s decide what would make it logically impossible. In order for empathy and compassion to be logically impossible in a universe without suffering, there’d be a few requirements:
* The defining element of empathy and compassion is a prior experience with suffering, i.e., one can only experience empathy and compassion if they have experienced suffering at some prior point. A person can’t be empathetic or compassionate without having a direct experience with suffering.
* Those who have never suffered would not be able to experience empathy/compassion. Conversely, those who experience empathy/compassion (E/C) would have had to of suffered at some prior point to feeling that empathy/compassion.
If you ask me, it is definitely a logical possibility. E/C doesn’t have anything to do with an experience of suffering, but rather a capacity to experience it. Just because there is no suffering in a world does not mean the people there would not be capable of experiencing suffering if presented with it. So yeah, disregarding all the empirical stuff brought up, it still seems to be a logical possibility.
cl
says...Matt DeStefano,
You know, it’s really become painfully obvious lately, and by “it,” I refer to your tutelage under Gnus like John Loftus. I know, I know… go ahead and accuse me of trying to “poison the well” or something, but it’s true. Just like Loftus, you make claims, but nakedly assert them.
LOL! Perhaps with all your intellectual superiority over stupid YEC’s you can demonstrate basic reading comprehension? C’mon man, you’re so far out in left field this is hilarious. Nonetheless, I can respond to the question despite your clear misunderstanding of what my string “logical contradiction” referred to: Here, in the real world, compassion requires suffering. Therefore, it is logical impossible for compassion to exist without suffering. Note that I prefaced that with “in the real world” because any old barney can say some philosophical mumbo-jumbo like, “but there is a possible world where compassion might not require suffering.” Crap like that gets no love here.
So, yeah… reparse, then move along. Take responsibility for the way you weenied out on DBT01 already. Then let’s get back to those good ol’ amiable exchanges we had before that mess.
Peter Hurford
says...Speaking of arrogance, this really pushes away a lot of rather relevant philosophy in the area.
If there is a possible world where compassion might not require suffering, and if God could have realized any possible world, then it was possible for God to make a universe with compassion and no suffering, and thus your entire line of questioning here ends at the first branch.
cl
says...Peter,
If I had said or suggested that “possible world” thought experiments had no value in philosophy, whatsoever, yeah… I’d agree that was arrogant. That’s not what I said. Is that what you heard? If not, what did you hear?
Peter Hurford
says...You called it “crap” that “gets no love here”. What was I supposed to think that meant, if not something of no value (crap) to be dismissed (no love) from philosophy (what we’re doing)?
Do you see where I’m coming from and why I made the interpretation I did?
cl
says...C’mon man, I can’t answer your questions until you answer mine. I asked you if that was what you heard, where “that” denotes the position, “possible world thought experiments have no value in philosophy, whatsoever.” Is that what you heard? Yes? Or no? If no, what, exactly, did you hear?
Peter Hurford
says...I interpreted you as saying that the possible world argument was worthless and not to be considered. What do you actually think about it?
cl
says...…and I’m trying to establish the scope of your question which is why I asked mine above. Why not just answer? Is it really that hard to give a “yes” or “no” followed by an explanation? For Pete’s sake, no pun intended! Seriously though, without scope or context, I can’t be sure I’m responding to what you’re actually asking.
Did you interpret me as saying, “possible world thought experiments have no value in philosophy, whatsoever?” Did you interpret me as saying, “possible world thought experiments have no value in the context of the current discussion regarding logically (im)possibility?”
Or, did you interpret me as saying something else entirely?
Peter Hurford
says...This one -> “possible world thought experiments have no value in the context of the current discussion regarding logically (im)possibility?”
cl
says...Thank you. Now I’m sure we’re on the same page regarding the interpretation in question. So I guess we’re back to #34:
That gets no love here. First, what exactly does “your entire line of questioning” refer to? Second, how am I arrogant to say what I said?
Peter Hurford
says...That’s just it. Why does it get no love here? I mean, it’s a valid logical argument that you’re wrong:
P1: There is a possible world in which compassion exists without suffering.
P2: God can realize any possible world.
C3: Therefore from P1 and P2, it was possible for our world to have compassion without suffering.
If you agree with P1 (I still don’t, but TE and Matt sure have done a good job trying to make a case for it), then there’s no point in saying God needed to realize suffering in order to obtain (the allegedly higher good of) compassion (because we could have a universe with compassion, yet no suffering).
By calling this line of argumentation “crap” (without saying why).
cl
says...Validity alone doesn’t mean anything. There’s no way to know if P1 is sound. Not only that, even if we grant that P1 is true, your conclusion still doesn’t follow. That there might be *a* possible world where compassion exists without suffering does not necessarily entail that it was possible for *our* world. Hence, crapola, Mr. Hurford.
Besides, though interesting, Matt and I were in the context of his claim that I don’t understand what the term “logically possible” entails WRT to this discussion. Hopefully he’ll clarify.
Matt DeStefano
says...So, possible world “crap” gets no love when talking about “logical possibility”? That’s pretty silly. We can talk about the actual world, and I would agree that compassion requires suffering. But when you ask “Is it logically possible…”, you are inevitably going to have replies that deal in possible world semantics. This is why I continued to harp that you didn’t understand what “logical possibility” entailed, and why Peter is right to push the issue of God being able to instantiate all logically possible worlds.
It has nothing to do with my “smug superiority” or my “allegiance to the Gnus” or “naked assertions” that I make.
Matt DeStefano
says...Sorry, just saw your newest response.
Sure there is. We examine the concepts of compassion and suffering, and see if there is any logical contradiction between claiming the former exists without the latter. If we can show a contradiction, then the argument is unsound. If we can’t, we have (reasonable) epistemic warrant for accepting it.
Again, you asked if it was logically possible , not whether it was possible in the actual world .
cl
says...You claimed I didn’t understand “logically possible” long before any talk of “possible worlds” began, and until your recent comment at #44 you actually discontinued harping once “possible worlds” talk began. I reject P1. I reject the claim that there is a possible world where response to pain can be experienced without pain.
And, more importantly to me WRT the discussion between you and I, you still haven’t substantiated your claim I don’t understand the concept of logical possibility. Can you clarify yourself there? Because it sounds like you’re saying, “cl doesn’t understand the concept of logical possibility because he rejects P1.”
Is that what you’re saying? If not, what are you saying?
Peter Hurford
says...Sure there is — you evaluate compassion and suffering and look for logical contradictions, like Matt has been saying. If you can advance an account that shows they are compatible like TE and Matt have and that account succeeds (though I think it doesn’t), then you have proven P1.
~
The argument is logically valid — if A is a possible world (P1) and our actual world could have been any possible world (P2), it follows that A could be our actual world (C3).
Here, I think you intend to argue against P2, and suggest that there are possible worlds God couldn’t have actualized as our world.
Also, C3 is rather limited — even if it is possible for us to have such a world, that doesn’t mean God (or even an omnipotent, omniscient, ideally utilitarian agent) would find such a world desirable.
~
Possible world terminology is the most popular (and I think most useful) way of discussing logical possibility, but it isn’t the only way. Hence, discussing the logical possibility of compassion without experiencing suffering entails a discussion about whether there is a possible world such that compassion is found and suffering is not (P1 of my argument).
Since you seem to eschew talking about possible worlds in favor of our what is possible of our actual world, I think you mean to talk about what philosophers call “physically possible”, not what philosophers call “logically possible”.
For examples, reinstating the Glass–Steagall Act is logically possible and physically possible, but not politically possible. Going faster than the speed of light is logically possible, but not physically possible. Having a cat that is entirely white and entirely black at the same time is not logically possible or physically possible.
Thinking Emotions
says...Body contains quotes from cl, but this is mostly general content aimed at advancing the discussion
I agree that there is no surefire way to know whether P1 is sound. I guess that’s why I’ve spent so much time analyzing its meaning and soundness. Soundness of P1 aside, what are you referring to with the phrase “our world?” Do you mean our world as in the world where it is not possible to experience E/C without having experienced suffering at some point, i.e., the world we are both living in? If that’s what you meant, then I think you might be missing Peter’s point.
Peter is not saying that E/C is possible without suffering. Rather, he is saying that if it were possible, then God could have created a world that both lacked suffering and contained E/C (the best of both worlds, lolpuns). To say that God could have created a world with the aforementioned qualities, but he couldn’t have made it our world, sounds to me like: “God could have created both a circle and a square, but not a square circle.” I don’t see the value in pointing that out, though. Our world already dictates that E/C is not possible without the experience of suffering (A), so God obviously can’t make a world that both meets A and ~A (E/C is possible without suffering).
I feel I am oversimplifying what you were saying, so if you’re scratching your head, then I misunderstood you.
Careful there. As Peter stated earlier, empathy can exist regardless of whether there is any suffering around to perceive. Compassion, however, is defined as the reaction or treatment to others’ misfortunes or sufferings. Therefore, it would follow that in a world with no suffering, there would be no compassion. HOWEVER, it would not take away one’s capacity to feel compassion or even feel suffering for that matter. I think we’re all having some difficulties with the conceptual properties of this because it’s just so friggin’ odd.
For example, there are actually two types of worlds where suffering doesn’t exist. In W1, there are things happening that we would consider unpleasant or deem as suffering, but nobody in W1 has the capacity to suffer. In W2, there are no things happening that we would consider unpleasant or deem as suffering, and thus everyone could still have a capacity to suffer — it would just be an unused capacity.
The contrast between W1/W2 definitely remind me of the “if a tree falls in a forest” dilemma.
Furthermore, you asked a question regarding logical possibility. What kind of discussion were you expecting? I am no expert philosopher, but every discussion I’ve seen regarding questions of logical possibility all contain references to possible worlds and the like.
Ronin
says...TE responded to cl on post 11 as follows:
TE seems to imply that [if] we can have empathy for someone it would be hard not to experience compassion. I disagree with him, because empathy is defined as follows:
(emphasis is mine)
Empathy does appear to imply we can know X. But, notice how the definition uses “without” having all those things we require in order to come to really “know” something. So, in some sense I would say empathy is superficial knowledge. Compassion on the other hand is as Karl noted on post 1, and it implies awareness (as in NOT superficial). I highly doubt someone can have compassion in the “true” sense of “awareness/come to know” without suffering.
cl
says...Peter,
Really?
Nice quote mine. I mean logically possible. I am saying it is logically impossible for compassion to exist without suffering. Don’t let Matt’s inability to give me even a dollop of charity confuse you, too.
cl
says...ThinkingEmotions,
I appreciate the help, but I understand what he’s saying.
For argument’s sake, let’s grant that compassion can be possible without suffering (though I don’t believe that). Okay, fine. We’ve established that compassion can be possible without suffering. That doesn’t necessarily establish that compassion can be possible without suffering, in our world, all else the same. IOW, there might be one or more features of our world that vitiate the possibility of compassion without suffering. Or, there could easily be a reason why God would prefer that compassion require suffering.
That entire angle got blown way out of proportion. I’m not “anti-possible worlds talk.” Matt came along, whined about the questions being unclear when nobody else really had a problem, then charged me with not understanding the concept of logical possibility. That, among other “lack of charity” remarks from Matt lately, really annoyed me.
Thinking Emotions
says...cl,
You being annoyed at Matt was understandable, but I was mostly referring to the “crap that gets no love here” phrase. Maybe you were just irritated that he didn’t really add anything else to the discussion when he was charging you with those things. To just assert that compassion is possible without suffering and then add no explanation is frustrating to deal with, but I haven’t seen anyone do that yet. Both Matt and I have, albeit at different lengths, tried to justify the proposition that compassion is possible in a world without suffering.
So even if compassion is possible without suffering, it still would not be possible in our world? That’s not making a whole lot of sense to me. We’re talking about a very isolated issue here. I wouldn’t dare try to maintain that a universe God made without suffering and with compassion would be comparable to our world, basically nullifying your “vitiating features of our world” argument — all I’m trying to justify is that perhaps compassion is possible without anyone having to suffer, and that’s all that matters WRT to this discussion, no?
Why might God prefer compassion to require suffering? Here are the possible worlds he could have created assuming compassion is possible without suffering, and also assuming that compassion is desirable and suffering is not desirable (pretty non-controversial assumptions, IMO)…
* W1 containing compassion and suffering (neutral).
* W2 containing compassion, but not suffering (best possible world in the set).
* W3 containing suffering, but not compassion (worst possible world in the set).
* W4 containing neither suffering nor compassion (neutral).
If God can have W2, which both has a desirable thing and lacks an undesirable thing, why wouldn’t he? Other than logical necessity, why would he prefer a world that had a desirable thing and an undesirable thing?
On another note, something interesting revealed by this list of possibilities is how both W1 and W4 are technically neutral. They become the two best choices should it turn out that compassion requires suffering. Perhaps God feels that the benefit of compassion outweighs the detriment of suffering?
If anything, W4 neutralizes the dilemma further than W1 does. In our world, we are grateful for the existence of medicine given the myriad diseases. In a world without diseases, the existence of medicine becomes a non-factor; sort of how compassion becomes irrelevant if no one is suffering.
As medicine loses its purpose without disease, compassion loses its purpose without suffering. So, even though W1 and W4 are mathematically equal (assuming value of W is initially 0, containing suffering is -1 and lacking it +1, containing compassion is +1 and lacking it is -1), it turns out that W4 is rationally preferable to W1.
Ronin,
Good catch there. Indeed, feeling empathy would not entail feeling compassion, but that’s not what I was trying to say. Just because I can imagine what someone is feeling doesn’t mean I always want to help them stop feeling it. A kid that teases dogs all the time eventually gets bitten? You can bet I have no compassion, even though it hurts to get bitten by a dog.
I am going to have a hard time responding to this, simply because I disagree with the analysis that empathy is “superficial knowledge” and compassion involves “awareness” of some sort. First of all, awareness of what? Suffering? If that’s the case, then compassion is impossible without suffering by virtue of definition. Secondly, I am not here to squabble over what suffering or compassion truly is. If you ask me, a person in a universe without suffering is still perfectly capable of empathy. In addition to this, they can still feel suffering — it just so happens that their universe lacks it.
My view is that compassion is contingent upon empathy, but not logically entailed as said above. Therefore, compassion is really just some sort of extension of empathy. If a person from a world lacking suffering can read a story where the main character dies and find this unfortunate and feel bad for the main character, then I’m not sure why we should hesitate to call this compassion. Sure, it’s undoubtedly different from our kind of compassion, and largely different in how its experienced, but it is compassion nonetheless.
Based on what I said to cl, however, I don’t even think it matters anymore whether compassion even exists as long as suffering does not.
Matt DeStefano
says...That’s why I attempted to ask for clarity and supposed that cl didn’t understand the distinction. If you are truly interested in “firmly cemented goalposts”, you’d think that you’d want to clearly differentiate the two and note which one you were truly after.
It seems to me as if there are two very different answers to those two very different questions. But of course, any misunderstanding that you think cl has is due to my own lack of charity.
cl
says...Matt,
Yeah, who cares, right? After all, even after I clarify myself, you can still run around and pretend like I actually *DON’T* understand myself. Have fun playing.
cl
says...TE,
That and his extreme ramping up of Gnu-like qualities lately (i.e., naked assertions, conflating healthy skepticism with an “anti-science” attitude, hostility and misunderstanding whenever he suspects somebody doesn’t swallow the Darwinian narrative the same way he does, etc.).
It’s not that. To just assert that I don’t understand a concept and then completely refuse to extend even a lick of charity when I explain myself… That, among other things, is what’s annoyed me and deflated my interests in continuing with the guy. Look at his last comment. Still, no charity whatsoever.
That’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying, even if compassion is possible without suffering, that doesn’t mean it is necessarily possible for our world, all else the same.
Yeah, that’s all that matters here, but neither you nor Matt has justified it.
Arbitrary.
Matt DeStefano
says...You haven’t clarified yourself. In fact, your only response to the entirety of Peter’s extremely reasonable and charitable post was to accuse him of “quote-mining” and blame his misunderstanding on my lack of charity.
Your lack of clarity, and the misapplication of “logical possibility” actually shine brightest here:
The first claim (“here, in the real world…”) is about physical possibility. However, your conclusion says that it is “logical[ly] impossible for compassion to exist without suffering”. Imagine the same argument reformulated with a different claim:
(1) Here, in the real world, the sky is blue.
(2) Therefore, it is logically impossible that the sky is green.
Of course, this isn’t true, because logical possibility is not dependent upon the circumstances of the actual world, but about whether or not a proposition can be stated without implying a logical contradiction. Consider the difference between “the sky is green” and “Tom is a married bachelor”. Neither are true of the real or actual world, but only the latter is logically impossible.
I’ve already explained this before (and so did Peter in #47), but you seem more intent on discussing my personal character, so I let you ramble.
cl
says...“You haven’t clarified yourself.”
Actually, that’s true. I haven’t clarified myself at all. I’ve been *repeating* myself because you don’t listen. I’ve said the same thing the whole time. In fact, I said it in #50, the very comment you just alluded to. I said, “I am saying it is logically impossible for compassion to exist without suffering.” But of course, who am I to say anything about what I actually believe eh?
But I’ve got a new attitude about it now, summarized by “who cares?” Go right ahead. Believe I don’t understand basic concepts. Accuse me of being things I’m not. Freak out anytime somebody mentions creationism. Spread it all over the internet. It won’t change the facts of any matter.
Peter Hurford
says...To be fair, I’ll admit that I did quote mine you. I went back to your comment and skimmed it again (after having read it the day before), misread what you said, and picked up the quote out of context. Sorry.
I’m still interested in where this is going. If we’re looking to whether compassion is logically impossible with the lack of suffering, that means we’re still looking for a possible world without suffering.
That leaves me with the following loose ends:
Cl,
1.) Why did you want to dismiss talk of possible worlds?
2.) Why all this talk about what is physically possible of our actual world?
3.) What do you make of the arguments laid out in comments #28, #30, and #32?
Ronin
says...TE,
You wrote:
The point is, if you had the “experience” of being bitten by a dog you might be able to be aware of the terror, pain, etc. one may undergo not just on imagination or thought but by way of actual observation and contact of the facts & data.
I said empathy is superficial because it does not require you to actually undergo things and it’s based on “intuition”. Compassion, on the other hand, is “sympathetic consciousness of others’ distress together with a desire to alleviate it” as Karl noted on post 1.
cl
says...Peter Hurford,
Because the logical possibility of compassion without suffering has no bearing on my understanding of logical possibility—which was the issue I was pressing in #34.
Because Matt still can’t understand that when I say, “it is logically impossible for compassion to exist without suffering,” I *REALLY* *DO* *MEAN* “it is logically impossible for compassion to exist without suffering.”
That depends on which one(s) you’re alluding to.
Peter Hurford
says...I still don’t understand. What is your understanding of logical possibility?
What do you mean by something being logically impossible if not that there is no possible world with compassion and no suffering, or that the existence of compassion without suffering entails an A and ~A contradiction?
cl
says...How much more simpler can I make it? From #27: “A logically possible proposition is one that can be asserted without implying a logical contradiction.”
Matt DeStefano
says...*facepalm*
I surrender.
cl
says...Now what’s the problem? Surely you can’t say that my stated understanding is wrong, since you yourself supplied that definition.
Hurford,
I’m still waiting to hear your next response as well. Do you understand what I mean by “logically possible” now? It hasn’t changed at all.
Peter Hurford
says...I get the definition you put forth, but I still don’t understand why you dismissed possible worlds, or what you mean by the “logical possibility of compassion without suffering has no bearing on my understanding of logical possibility”.
Secondly, I’m still confused why you bothered to mention what is physically possible about our world as you do in comment #51.
Lastly, I still think that comments #28, #30, and #32 have some arguments you have not yet addressed, but it’s not really of my interest to insist you address them, because I already agree with you on this question.
cl
says...I’ve answered all your questions but I’d like to focus simply on this for the moment:
What did you think of it? Did it strike you as an acceptable understanding of the concept of logical possibility? IOW, if somebody on the street was running around yelling, “A logically possible proposition is one that can be asserted without implying a logical contradiction,” would you think they were nutters or would you think they understood the concept?
Peter Hurford
says...You may have answered them in virtue of giving a response, but I still don’t understand your answers.
I’d definitely lean to you understanding logical possibility — you did give a correct definition. But I still want to be sure you correctly distinguish it from physically possible and understand the relationship to possible worlds.
cl
says...Peter,
Sorry, you misunderstood again. When I said, “I’ve answered your questions,” I was referring to ALL the questions you asked at #65. I didn’t want to post all those answers because I didn’t want the issue of understanding logical possibility to be overlooked.
Ah, you’d “lean” towards me understanding… Gee, thanks! Given Matt’s total lack of charity I guess I’ll take what I can get. I’d say that “physically possible” just means something like, “possible given the natural parameters we currently experience.” Something that is physically impossible can be logically possible. That’s how they differ. Physical impossibility does not necessarily entail logical impossibility.
Here are the answers from #65:
Because, during #33 / #34, the topic of discussion was whether I understand the concept of logical possibility, and I didn’t want it to divert to whether or not compassion without suffering is logically possible. They’re separate issues. I didn’t want Matt to avoid the former by focusing on the latter. He’s shown some serious “attention difficulty” with regard to things I’ve said lately.
I didn’t. This is another misunderstanding. Go check the comment. There is no mention or inference to what’s physically possible. Matt is the one who introduced that phrase to this thread.
I’m just curious which ones you were talking about, but if you don’t feel like taking the time it’s no big deal.
Peter Hurford
says...Right. I’d say you do understand what is going on, even if we all didn’t understand you in the first place / you were insufficiently clear. Apologies for my skepticism regarding your understanding of the topic.
cl
says...No worries, like I said, I honestly believe Matt’s lack of charity influenced the discussion for the worse. I’m just glad you and I are back on solid ground WRT the issues at hand.
Thinking Emotions
says...Okay, fair enough. I granted you this. I’m not saying it would be possible for our world to remain the same in every other aspect, nor would I expect it to. From #52: “I wouldn’t dare try to maintain that a universe God made without suffering and with compassion would be comparable to our world…” If that doesn’t cover it, I’m not sure what will.
I don’t think it’s possible to justify this outside of thought experiments and philosophical speculation. If we consider those two things, I think I’ve done a fair enough job making my case for it being possible. Since you’ve already said you don’t want to disregard those two things in the context of this discussion, I don’t see why they can’t stand as adequate justification.
You called Matt out for naked assertions, and now this? It doesn’t get much more naked than a one word reply. If you read my argument again, you’ll see my reasons for considering W2 the best possible world in the set are clear and non-controversial, i.e., far from arbitrary. If we assume some very agreeable assumptions:
A world containing suffering is a negative, a world without suffering is a positive, a world with compassion is a positive, and a world without compassion is a negative. This is not unfounded, either. This is assuming that suffering is undesirable and compassion is desirable. Again, safe assumptions.
This means W2 would yield a total of 2, higher than any other value in the set. This would make it the most desirable world if you concede the above assumptions.
I don’t have much else to say since you didn’t give me much to respond to.
Thinking Emotions
says...Ronin,
I’m taking this as squabbling over what compassion or empathy truly is. I am not here to argue about that. Nothing illuminating will come out of it. I think empathy enables a “sympathetic consciousness of others’ distress together with a desire to alleviate it.” If you can feel empathy, then you are able to feel compassion. Just because the “sympathetic consciousness” would not come from one’s own experience but rather one’s intuition does not lessen its magnitude or sincerity.
I don’t think this is necessary.
cl
says...TE,
I agree. That’s part of my hesitance towards “possible worlds” dialog. I probably just leveled the “neither Matt nor TE have justified it” charge while temporarily forgetting the fact that the claim seems impossible to justify at all.
I don’t, but I’m willing to reconsider if you can take the time to cite your best efforts.
That depends on the reply. Stating that something is “arbitrary” is not a naked assertion, and, when we get down to it, your assumptions are far from uncontroversial. At #52, you wrote, bold mine,
The bolded text is a very controversial assumption. As for arbitrariness,
Arbitrary. How do you know? On what grounds? What parameters?
No offense but I really see this as horribly oversimplified, to the point of non-usefulness. I’m not denying that you might have a gem of an idea in there, but it’s not being expressed in a way that I find persuasive or even discernible, for that matter. There’s simply too much to unpack.
Ronin
says...TE,
Okay, then, I have nothing to add.