The Warfare Is Mental

Open Response To Alonzo Fyfe

October 21, 2010

In Luke’s post Morally Permissible Slavery, Alonzo Fyfe of Atheist Ethicist has implied moral defects in my character, here. The backstory: commenter antiplastic said this to Luke Muehlhauser, who replied not by addressing antiplastic’s objection, but by attempting to cast doubt on the sincerity of both antiplastic and myself to understand the theory. IOW, Luke chose to make it personal instead of keeping it professional. Then, Alonzo chimed in, lambasting antiplastic with what were in my opinion uncalled-for accusations about antiplastic’s character. Then, of course, when I came to antiplastic’s defense, Alonzo turned him judgment towards me.

My response follows, written to Alonzo.

Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism III: My Stated Position On Desirism

April 19, 2010

I thought I should take a quick break from discussing the method to clarify my position on desirism. I'm not angry or irritated or anything like that, neither is this any sort of a "point fingers" post. I just want to clarify where I'm at concerning desirism [which is pretty much right where I've always been]. Else, we might have more misunderstanding, when I'd really rather just get a good discussion going.

In general, I'll argue that it's counterproductive to think in black-and-white terms of being "for" or "against" a given theory. In any given field, theories are more like "dynamic knowledge" than neatly-packaged, easily-reducible entities, and people often have mixed attitudes about them. It is both possible and common for an individual to support one or more of a theory's tenets, while maintaining reservations concerning others. Other times people feel they may have something valid to contribute. That's exactly the case with my attitude towards Alonzo Fyfe's desirism. Recently at CSA, Alonzo Fyfe wrote,

Conducting Single-Agent Evaluations With The Hierarchy-Of-Desires Method

We discussed the method and some preliminary objections here. I think the best way to illustrate the method’s strengths and weaknesses would be to just dive in and play around with it.

It is my opinion that any moral theory worthy of being considered “the best” should be able to guide both isolated individuals and interactive groups towards the “moral good” at any given time. So, I’ll begin by considering the effects of any particular desire on the affected desires of an isolated individual, in order to specifically determine whether or not the particular desire tends to fulfill or thwart other desires. My hypothesis was that if desirism’s definition of good is sufficient, the numbers should line up with our moral intuitions most of the time.

Proposed Method For Meaningful Evaluations In Desire Utilitarianism

April 13, 2010

We’ve been discussing the moral theory called desire utilitarianism or desirism lately, and unfortunately, I’ve noticed a tendency towards oversimplified evaluations that lack correspondence to real-world ethical scenarios.

For example, we might debate whether the desire to exterminate a minority is good or bad, according to the theory of desirism. Presuming we agree the desire to exterminate another human being thwarts their desires, proponents of “extermination is bad” might point to this fact and attempt to affix an across-the-board value of “bad” to that desire. Other people dream up all sorts of wild and fanciful “what if” scenarios that purport to disprove the theory: “if extraterrestrials with horrible taste in music threaten to exterminate us unless we worship Milli Vanilli, then worshiping Milli Vanilli is good.”

If only it were that easy.

Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism, II

April 11, 2010

In the thread that followed the Introduction, we discussed,

The type-token distinction as it applies to desires;
The DFAU/DU distinction;
The concept of strength as it applies to desires;
Thomas Reid's objections 1 and 3, and faithlessgod's replies (indexed in Desirism Notes);
Peripheral issues such as DCT, my use of useful, etc.

I'd say more than enough has transpired to warrant a second post, and I'd like to discuss:

How the discussion with Thomas Reid, TaiChi and faithlessgod has impacted my position;
Why my primary objection to desirism remains;
The hierarchy of desires concept;
Old questions that remain unanswered;
New questions that resulted from our discussion.

Desirism Notes, II

April 5, 2010

As with the last set of notes, today's post should be read as a supplement to the series, containing reflections, concerns and open questions. As such, it should not be taken as a formal presentation of arguments either for or against desirism.

Luke has an index of Fyfe's writings on desirism here, and an index of faithlessgod's writings on desirism here. Luke also has what he calls The Ultimate Desirism FAQ here. Luke also conducts interviews with Fyfe in CPD003 and CPD005.

Luke gives us the core principles of desirism in his words, which you may or may not find helpful:

Desirism Notes

March 28, 2010

In lieu of jumping straight into my second post on Fyfe's desirism, I thought I'd spend some more time talking through my own understanding of the theory. My goal is – again – to show that my understanding of desirism's premises, scope and definitions is sufficient to establish both the positive and negative appraisals I pay to the theory. I have a strong desire to avoid meaningless discourse on this or any topic, and though other commenters can always misconstrue our statements no matter how articulate we write them, I believe that demonstrating an impeccable understanding of the theory is the best insurance against that problem.