Proposed Method For Meaningful Evaluations In Desire UtilitarianismWe’ve been discussing the moral theory called desire utilitarianism or desirism lately, and unfortunately, I’ve noticed a tendency towards oversimplified evaluations that lack correspondence to real-world ethical scenarios.
For example, we might debate whether the desire to exterminate a minority is good or bad, according to the theory of desirism. Presuming we agree the desire to exterminate another human being thwarts their desires, proponents of “extermination is bad” might point to this fact and attempt to affix an across-the-board value of “bad” to that desire. Other people dream up all sorts of wild and fanciful “what if” scenarios that purport to disprove the theory: “if extraterrestrials with horrible taste in music threaten to exterminate us unless we worship Milli Vanilli, then worshiping Milli Vanilli is good.”
If only it were that easy.
Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism, IIIn the thread that followed the Introduction, we discussed,
I'd say more than enough has transpired to warrant a second post, and I'd like to discuss:
Desirism Notes, IIAs with the last set of notes, today's post should be read as a supplement to the series, containing reflections, concerns and open questions. As such, it should not be taken as a formal presentation of arguments either for or against desirism.
Luke has an index of Fyfe's writings on desirism here, and an index of faithlessgod's writings on desirism here. Luke also has what he calls The Ultimate Desirism FAQ here. Luke also conducts interviews with Fyfe in CPD003 and CPD005.
Luke gives us the core principles of desirism in his words, which you may or may not find helpful: