Presumptions & Inferences
October 25, 2012
Since I’ll be revisiting the following four concepts in various epistemological arguments in the future, especially those pertaining to alleged miracles, I thought it would be good to introduce them now.
October 25, 2012
Since I’ll be revisiting the following four concepts in various epistemological arguments in the future, especially those pertaining to alleged miracles, I thought it would be good to introduce them now.
May 11, 2009
I will soon develop this into a detailed, point-by-point response to the source material, but for now, I would simply like to thank Professor Dawkins for providing me with the most easily refuted false argument in this series to date.
In a discussion concerning the "reconciliation" of science and theology, the following atheist sermon was ironically published in Free Inquiry Magazine, Volume 18, #2:
A dismally unctuous editorial in the British newspaper the Independent
recently asked for a reconciliation between science and "theology." It
remarked that 'People want to know as much as possible about their
origins.' I certainly hope they do, but what on earth makes one think
that theology has anything useful to say on the subject? …[T]he achievements of theologians don't do anything, don't affect
anything, don't mean anything. What makes anyone think that "theology"
is a subject at all?
–Richard Dawkins
The first sentence is Dawkins' subjective opinion entirely, and by implying that theology is not a subject in his second sentence, the Professor reasons in a circle. If our definition of subject is the study of an actual phenomena, that theology is not a subject begins with assumptions about the very questions at hand. As someone keenly points out in the thread, even if God is not real, theology can still be reasonably considered a subject – as much a subject as art or creative writing or music.
What do you think?
February 16, 2009
In the past few months, via several discussions with a variety of learned skeptics and religious people, I've come to better understand the disparities in our concepts of miracles, and specifically, I've been thinking about how falsifiability and confounders diminish the extent to which an alleged miracle can be considered authentic. It may very well be that proving a miracle is impossible, and on this matter I haven't quite decided yet, but I've certainly concluded that there is a wide range of skeptical positions one might take concerning the concept of miracles, and what we can justifiedly say about them, if and when they do occur.
One of the biggest hurdles to overcome regarding alleged healing miracles is developing a reliable method for excluding confounders of spontaneous remission and the placebo effect. Hitherto unexplained, either of these mysterious phenomena would provide good confounding cover for a genuine miracle, and that's not to say that all instances of spontaneous remission and placebo effect are intrinsically miraculous, either. Some skeptics are fond of claiming that only repeatable, observable, systematic instances of miracles would be sufficient to convince them that they were unjustified in their skepticism. This is sounds more like magic than miracle.
February 13, 2009
I'm actually serious in asking that question. Besides skating the streets with zero cars on the road, another one of my fantasies is a supercomputer that can deduce the logical correctness of any argument. Don't get me wrong, I love debating with humans of any and all stripe. In fact, some who know me might say this is an understatement. Yet no endeavor is likely to persist in the absence of a worthwhile payoff, and every now and again I find myself getting really discouraged and sullen about debate.
Right now is one of those times and there is one simple reason for this discouragement: Humans are prone to motivations above and beyond the resolution of pure logic. Unlike computers, humans possess the peculiar ability to deny truth, and the reasons humans do this are as many as the stars in the night sky. If I ask a computer, "Is (X) = (~X)", I'm going to get a straight and honest answer. The computer can't stop to think, "Well, if I admit / deny that (X) = (~X), I'll look weak / wrong / unintelligent / contradictory."
November 7, 2008
Particularly in the context of the atheism/theism debate, there are valid reasons skepticism is usually justifiable. Here are just two quick ones:
1. Many religions permit only a top-down transfer of information, with extra-churchicular programs devoted to 'deeper understanding of the faith' for those with further questions. Contrast this to the Bereans described in the book of Acts, who are described as "more noble" for their habit of "checking the scriptures" to see if what was being preached to them was supported or not. This is a sort of "skepticism" prevalent amongst believers; not as much a skepticism over whether God exists or not as a skepticism over the statements from religious authorities. Essentially, the habit of questioning and fact-checking the pronouncements of religious authorities is applauded in scripture. (Acts 17:11)
2. Many individual adherents of the various faiths either do not, can not, or will not defend most or even any of their beliefs. Contrast this to Peter who admonishes believers to "always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have." (1 Peter 3:15) Or the more obscure New Testament writer Jude: "Be merciful to those who doubt." (Jude 1:22) Not everyone can say their pastor or church conforms to these requirements, but these are requirements the Bible plainly states.
Since the shortcomings of so many religious institutions and believers fall into these and many other categories, is it any wonder people fond of reason often look upon the whole enterprise with an eye of suspicion?