The Warfare Is Mental

The Atheist Afterlife: p1-17

April 27, 2010

Today’s post covers the Introduction and Chapter 1 of The Atheist Afterlife, by David Staume. In a nutshell, the book aims to demonstrate the plausibility of, well.. an atheist afterlife (as if you needed my review to tell you that, right?).

As stated, my initial reactions about the book are largely positive. Overall, I’d say the author takes the road less traveled, and tends towards conservatively stated beliefs and secure premises. I guess when one is used to online (a)theist discussions, those virtues tend to stand out more. As an example of some statements I appreciated or agreed with,

Proposed Method For Meaningful Evaluations In Desire Utilitarianism

April 13, 2010

We’ve been discussing the moral theory called desire utilitarianism or desirism lately, and unfortunately, I’ve noticed a tendency towards oversimplified evaluations that lack correspondence to real-world ethical scenarios.

For example, we might debate whether the desire to exterminate a minority is good or bad, according to the theory of desirism. Presuming we agree the desire to exterminate another human being thwarts their desires, proponents of “extermination is bad” might point to this fact and attempt to affix an across-the-board value of “bad” to that desire. Other people dream up all sorts of wild and fanciful “what if” scenarios that purport to disprove the theory: “if extraterrestrials with horrible taste in music threaten to exterminate us unless we worship Milli Vanilli, then worshiping Milli Vanilli is good.”

If only it were that easy.

Responding To faithlessgod’s Desirism

April 10, 2010

In a recent discussion at Luke's, faithlessgod defended desirism thusly:

My version of the analysis: We need to evaluate the desire to torture (or exterminate etc.) some group. We compare the presence of the desire to its absence. If it is present and fulfilled what is this causal desire’s material and physical affects on other desires? The other desires are those that are affected by making the target of the causal desire true, that is to bring about any state of affairs where the proposition expressed by the causal desire is made true. These are the affected desires. What is the affect on them? The desire not be tortured or not to feel pain or an aversion to torture or pain is directly thwarted. If this causal desire is absent, then the affected desires are not thwarted. Therefore it is a directly desire-thwarting desire.

I apologize to those eager to discuss Staume's book; I assure you that I'm eager as well. It's just that I felt my response to faithlessgod was relevant enough to merit being transplanted over here. It's pretty clear to me that his argument has non-trivial problems, but as always, let me know if you think I've missed something, or, if you think faithlessgod's desirism differs significantly from Fyfe's.

Desirism Notes

March 28, 2010

In lieu of jumping straight into my second post on Fyfe's desirism, I thought I'd spend some more time talking through my own understanding of the theory. My goal is – again – to show that my understanding of desirism's premises, scope and definitions is sufficient to establish both the positive and negative appraisals I pay to the theory. I have a strong desire to avoid meaningless discourse on this or any topic, and though other commenters can always misconstrue our statements no matter how articulate we write them, I believe that demonstrating an impeccable understanding of the theory is the best insurance against that problem.

Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism: Introduction

March 21, 2010

With a minor caveat or two, I tend to agree with Dostoevsky that, “Without God everything is permissible.”

Alonzo Fyfe hosts Atheist Ethicist, a blog focused on, well.. atheism and ethics. Alonzo defends the moral theory of desire utilitarianism, sometimes referred to as desirism, and I took this to be his introductory-level article on the theory.

It so happens that I accept many if not most of Fyfe’s starting premises. I’ll also freely concede that I (and arguably every other person in the world) will make decisions according to the basic tenets of the theory. To recast a classic Dylan song in desirist language, everyone aims to fulfill some desire, from the selfless servant to the wandering nomad to the greedy capitalist. Even the most ascetic monk struggling to eliminate desire (tanha) acts to fulfill a desire: the desire to spiritually mature.

In the rest of this introduction, I hope to illustrate that I’ve understood Fyfe’s core premises as he himself delineates them, and addressed desirism accordingly, both of which are preconditions for any worthy response.

Exploring My Own Moral Parameters

March 20, 2010

As I'll be discussing morality and ethics a bit more in-depth over the upcoming weeks, specifically Alonzo Fyfe's desirism, I felt I should share my thoughts concerning morality and ethics as they relate to (a)theism, so people have at least some concrete idea of where I stand. This should make it easier to identify areas of disagreement, and I felt I should begin by explaining exactly what I mean when using the terms objective and subjective morality, since most everything else flows from there.

What Is Evidence? Proof Of God’s Existence, 7

February 2, 2010

I’ve fallen behind in my responses to jim’s series Proof of God’s Existence, but that’s okay. In fact, I’d say it’s even preferred. After all, his series is a thought experiment, which means the more we think about it, the more mental heavy lifting we’re doing. Mental heavy lifting is a good thing.

Although Scene 4: The Newspaper is pretty short, volumes could be written in response to it, especially the opening paragraph:

What is evidence? What does someone mean when they say there’s ‘no evidence’ for any particular claim? Is a claim, itself, evidence all on it’s own? Can something be rightly called evidence one day, and not the next? Is evidence automatically strengthened on the basis of multiple claimants?
–jim, Reason vs. Apologetics

Those are definitely meaningful questions, but I must confess to a certain sense of mixed emotion when I hear jim ask them. On the one hand, I believe (a)theists should ask them. In fact, I’d say if (a)theists want to get anywhere in their discussions, they’re obligated to start from common ground. Otherwise, without firmly cemented goalposts that clarify what is and is not acceptable as evidence, (a)theist discussion often descends into an unproductive shell game.

On the other hand, both jim and other atheists have sharply criticized me for similar inquiry, which makes this newfound interest in it seem a little backhanded. After all, I’ve asked jim and countless other atheists these same exact questions, only to be met with accusations of sophistry and insult!

All the while the questions remain: what is evidence? What do people mean when they say there’s no evidence for any given claim? Is a claim evidence all on its own?

Carol Should Have Partied! Proof Of God’s Existence, 6

January 25, 2010

This is my sixth response to jim's series, Proof of God's Existence.

jim spent the first few paragraphs of The Party arguing that science arose from our need to perceive the world as it really is. For example,

All of us want to be objective. That is, we all want to see the world for what it truly is. … This is why we have science. Science is that small part of us that wants to get a handle on how the world REALLY operates. To garner a bird’s eye viewpoint unclouded by ignorance, or purely emotional concerns, or simply by the unwieldiness of way too much information. Science is a process by which we seek to see more clearly and completely.

I would agree with jim there, and would add that granted the methodologies are different, I believe that's why we have philosophy and religion, too. jim went on to create what I saw as a meaningful distinction between the commonplace "little science" normal people use every day, and the not-so-commonplace "Big Science" that professional scientists engage in under controlled circumstances. I took jim's "little science" to be categorically analogous to the "common sense inquiry" he alluded to in the Introduction, and all of this built to the following question:

Conservatively Stated Belief: Proof Of God’s Existence, 5

January 23, 2010

I’ve been slowly digesting jim’s series Proof Of God’s Existence for the past month or so. I hope he keeps it going.

We ended 4 with a provisional definition of justified belief as, “conservatively-stated beliefs or conclusions that correspond to face value observation and are not sufficiently challenged by anomalous data.” We also discussed an hypothetical auto accident and noted that since drivers don’t normally crash into each other intentionally, most people refer generically to most traffic collisions as automobile accidents.

If we see a Mazda t-bone a parts truck at noon on some weekday, our justified belief conservatively stated is that we saw a collision between a Mazda and a parts truck at noon on some weekday. That’s it. We could responsibly paraphrase that by saying we saw some sedan slam into a truck, or that a work-truck got hit by some car, but any description that adds unconfirmed assumptions or omits confirmed facts exhibits some degree of inaccuracy. In the everyday world where pragmatism overrides commitment to technical accuracy, I wouldn’t take issue, but in philosophy and logic such laxity can be lethal.

Some might be tempted to say that since most traffic collisions are in fact accidents that we’re justified to begin with that assumption. While there is certainly enough of an argument there that I wouldn’t call that assumption irrational, at the same time I would not consider the assumption conservatively-stated. Although most likely true (because most traffic collisions are in fact accidents), that we saw an accident between a Mazda and a parts truck is not conservatively stated. It adds the unconfirmed assumption that the collision was accidental. In everyday or pragmatic usage reasonable speakers understand what is meant, but imagine the catastrophe oversight like that might cause in some nuanced philosophical discourse. We should be responsible interlocutors and say no more or no less than statements or data permit. Anything less is a disservice to clarity.

That being said, let’s get back to The Boxes.

When Is Belief Justified, Redux? Proof Of God’s Existence, 4

January 21, 2010

We left off promising a more in-depth discussion of jim's post. I understand that jim offers his series Proof Of God's Existence as a thought experiment, and that he's simply asking what our initial judgments would be, perhaps to help define the parameters of this "common sense inquiry" he alluded to in the introduction. Personally, I'm all for it, and as a writer I've always enjoyed reading jim, even his vitriolic tirades against me which were often colorful and creative (I even recall some limericks).

After setting up an odd series of events between Mary the neighborhood realtor and Carol the neighborhood skeptic, jim closes with the following set of questions:

Are Carol's [suspicion and uneasiness] justified at this point, slight though they be, or can they be summarily dismissed? Is this early foreboding of suspicion rational? Irrational? Pre-rational?

My short answer was that Carol's initial and ongoing uneasiness were justified, but any ongoing suspicion less so. Likewise, I answered that Carol's initial and ongoing uneasiness would also seem rational, but again, any ongoing suspicion less so. Tonight I'd like to address those questions in more detail, in hopes of churning out at least a provisional definition of justified belief.

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