The Warfare Is Mental

Proposed Method For Meaningful Evaluations In Desire Utilitarianism

April 13, 2010

We’ve been discussing the moral theory called desire utilitarianism or desirism lately, and unfortunately, I’ve noticed a tendency towards oversimplified evaluations that lack correspondence to real-world ethical scenarios.

For example, we might debate whether the desire to exterminate a minority is good or bad, according to the theory of desirism. Presuming we agree the desire to exterminate another human being thwarts their desires, proponents of “extermination is bad” might point to this fact and attempt to affix an across-the-board value of “bad” to that desire. Other people dream up all sorts of wild and fanciful “what if” scenarios that purport to disprove the theory: “if extraterrestrials with horrible taste in music threaten to exterminate us unless we worship Milli Vanilli, then worshiping Milli Vanilli is good.”

If only it were that easy.

Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism, II

April 11, 2010

In the thread that followed the Introduction, we discussed,

The type-token distinction as it applies to desires;
The DFAU/DU distinction;
The concept of strength as it applies to desires;
Thomas Reid's objections 1 and 3, and faithlessgod's replies (indexed in Desirism Notes);
Peripheral issues such as DCT, my use of useful, etc.

I'd say more than enough has transpired to warrant a second post, and I'd like to discuss:

How the discussion with Thomas Reid, TaiChi and faithlessgod has impacted my position;
Why my primary objection to desirism remains;
The hierarchy of desires concept;
Old questions that remain unanswered;
New questions that resulted from our discussion.

Responding To faithlessgod’s Desirism

April 10, 2010

In a recent discussion at Luke's, faithlessgod defended desirism thusly:

My version of the analysis: We need to evaluate the desire to torture (or exterminate etc.) some group. We compare the presence of the desire to its absence. If it is present and fulfilled what is this causal desire’s material and physical affects on other desires? The other desires are those that are affected by making the target of the causal desire true, that is to bring about any state of affairs where the proposition expressed by the causal desire is made true. These are the affected desires. What is the affect on them? The desire not be tortured or not to feel pain or an aversion to torture or pain is directly thwarted. If this causal desire is absent, then the affected desires are not thwarted. Therefore it is a directly desire-thwarting desire.

I apologize to those eager to discuss Staume's book; I assure you that I'm eager as well. It's just that I felt my response to faithlessgod was relevant enough to merit being transplanted over here. It's pretty clear to me that his argument has non-trivial problems, but as always, let me know if you think I've missed something, or, if you think faithlessgod's desirism differs significantly from Fyfe's.

Desirism Notes, II

April 5, 2010

As with the last set of notes, today's post should be read as a supplement to the series, containing reflections, concerns and open questions. As such, it should not be taken as a formal presentation of arguments either for or against desirism.

Luke has an index of Fyfe's writings on desirism here, and an index of faithlessgod's writings on desirism here. Luke also has what he calls The Ultimate Desirism FAQ here. Luke also conducts interviews with Fyfe in CPD003 and CPD005.

Luke gives us the core principles of desirism in his words, which you may or may not find helpful:

Desirism Notes

March 28, 2010

In lieu of jumping straight into my second post on Fyfe's desirism, I thought I'd spend some more time talking through my own understanding of the theory. My goal is – again – to show that my understanding of desirism's premises, scope and definitions is sufficient to establish both the positive and negative appraisals I pay to the theory. I have a strong desire to avoid meaningless discourse on this or any topic, and though other commenters can always misconstrue our statements no matter how articulate we write them, I believe that demonstrating an impeccable understanding of the theory is the best insurance against that problem.

Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism: Introduction

March 21, 2010

With a minor caveat or two, I tend to agree with Dostoevsky that, “Without God everything is permissible.”

Alonzo Fyfe hosts Atheist Ethicist, a blog focused on, well.. atheism and ethics. Alonzo defends the moral theory of desire utilitarianism, sometimes referred to as desirism, and I took this to be his introductory-level article on the theory.

It so happens that I accept many if not most of Fyfe’s starting premises. I’ll also freely concede that I (and arguably every other person in the world) will make decisions according to the basic tenets of the theory. To recast a classic Dylan song in desirist language, everyone aims to fulfill some desire, from the selfless servant to the wandering nomad to the greedy capitalist. Even the most ascetic monk struggling to eliminate desire (tanha) acts to fulfill a desire: the desire to spiritually mature.

In the rest of this introduction, I hope to illustrate that I’ve understood Fyfe’s core premises as he himself delineates them, and addressed desirism accordingly, both of which are preconditions for any worthy response.

Exploring My Own Moral Parameters

March 20, 2010

As I'll be discussing morality and ethics a bit more in-depth over the upcoming weeks, specifically Alonzo Fyfe's desirism, I felt I should share my thoughts concerning morality and ethics as they relate to (a)theism, so people have at least some concrete idea of where I stand. This should make it easier to identify areas of disagreement, and I felt I should begin by explaining exactly what I mean when using the terms objective and subjective morality, since most everything else flows from there.

News, Announcements

March 14, 2010

In case anybody actually missed them, I apologize for the absence of posts, but the month-long break felt great! I don't know about you, but I prefer feeling refreshed and full of new ideas to write about (as opposed to feeling burnt out and writing about the same old things).

I imagine the new addition to our family – a cute, sweet and healthy baby girl – has certainly contributed her share to my enhanced interest in all things human. So far, many of the clichés I'd heard about parenthood have proven true, while others, not as much so. Either way, I definitely foresee some posts and arguments referencing the parent-child relationship in TWIM's immediate future. I've always felt the parent-child relationship has significant import to (a)theist debate, and it's not an angle you hear argued often.

Creationist Values Do Not Lead To Death & Maiming: My Response To Luke & Fyfe

October 19, 2009

I'm a semi-regular reader of Common Sense Atheism, maintained by Christian-turned-atheist philosophy student, Luke. If you've never checked out Luke's site, I suggest you do. The commentary is usually thoughtful, and the integrity of the debate more than you typically find in the blogosphere. He's got what might be the most thorough collection of William Lane Craig material besides Craig's blog, and also links to over 400 debates between atheists and believers. Luke's blog is a genuine resource to (a)theism.

What originally turned me on to Luke's style was his sharp dismissal of much of what the New Atheists have to say. Luke ##— like myself — has a very low tolerance for sloppy atheist arguments. He's usually apt to call them when he sees them, too, which is all the better, as I've noticed atheists can be quite fond of towing party lines and refusing to rebuke their own, even when such is clearly called for. The only real negative I'd noticed up until last night was that I've seen Luke threaten to ban commenters (no, not me) for what I'd call nothing more than "disagreeable disagreement." While I don't know that Luke's ever banned anybody, I have absolutely zero tolerance for those who resort to censorship and moderation, and this opinion would not relent even of my own mother. Hence the offensiveness of even the suggestion.