Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism, IIIn the thread that followed the Introduction, we discussed,
I'd say more than enough has transpired to warrant a second post, and I'd like to discuss:
Responding To faithlessgod’s DesirismIn a recent discussion at Luke's, faithlessgod defended desirism thusly:
My version of the analysis: We need to evaluate the desire to torture (or exterminate etc.) some group. We compare the presence of the desire to its absence. If it is present and fulfilled what is this causal desire’s material and physical affects on other desires? The other desires are those that are affected by making the target of the causal desire true, that is to bring about any state of affairs where the proposition expressed by the causal desire is made true. These are the affected desires. What is the affect on them? The desire not be tortured or not to feel pain or an aversion to torture or pain is directly thwarted. If this causal desire is absent, then the affected desires are not thwarted. Therefore it is a directly desire-thwarting desire.
I apologize to those eager to discuss Staume's book; I assure you that I'm eager as well. It's just that I felt my response to faithlessgod was relevant enough to merit being transplanted over here. It's pretty clear to me that his argument has non-trivial problems, but as always, let me know if you think I've missed something, or, if you think faithlessgod's desirism differs significantly from Fyfe's.
Desirism Notes, IIAs with the last set of notes, today's post should be read as a supplement to the series, containing reflections, concerns and open questions. As such, it should not be taken as a formal presentation of arguments either for or against desirism.
Luke has an index of Fyfe's writings on desirism here, and an index of faithlessgod's writings on desirism here. Luke also has what he calls The Ultimate Desirism FAQ here. Luke also conducts interviews with Fyfe in CPD003 and CPD005.
Luke gives us the core principles of desirism in his words, which you may or may not find helpful:
Desirism NotesIn lieu of jumping straight into my second post on Fyfe's desirism, I thought I'd spend some more time talking through my own understanding of the theory. My goal is – again – to show that my understanding of desirism's premises, scope and definitions is sufficient to establish both the positive and negative appraisals I pay to the theory. I have a strong desire to avoid meaningless discourse on this or any topic, and though other commenters can always misconstrue our statements no matter how articulate we write them, I believe that demonstrating an impeccable understanding of the theory is the best insurance against that problem.
Questioning Fyfe’s Desirism: IntroductionWith a minor caveat or two, I tend to agree with Dostoevsky that, “Without God everything is permissible.”
Alonzo Fyfe hosts Atheist Ethicist, a blog focused on, well.. atheism and ethics. Alonzo defends the moral theory of desire utilitarianism, sometimes referred to as desirism, and I took this to be his introductory-level article on the theory.
It so happens that I accept many if not most of Fyfe’s starting premises. I’ll also freely concede that I (and arguably every other person in the world) will make decisions according to the basic tenets of the theory. To recast a classic Dylan song in desirist language, everyone aims to fulfill some desire, from the selfless servant to the wandering nomad to the greedy capitalist. Even the most ascetic monk struggling to eliminate desire (tanha) acts to fulfill a desire: the desire to spiritually mature.
In the rest of this introduction, I hope to illustrate that I’ve understood Fyfe’s core premises as he himself delineates them, and addressed desirism accordingly, both of which are preconditions for any worthy response.