Barbara McBeath On Ghosts

December 9, 2010

I recently read an essay titled My Ghost Theories by Barbara McBeath. I found much of what she said pertinent to the ongoing discussion of anomalous phenomena myself and others were having last year. For example,

Researching and studying the subject of ghosts for so many years, and having my share of ghost experiences, I know that this is something that cannot be researched in the lab. The scientists and serious researchers must go out into the field and study this where it takes place. This may be one reason why such a large part of mainstream science seems to have ignored this phenomenon. It is something that cannot be studied in the enclosed and controlled laboratory. This phenomenon seems to occur on it’s own terms and conditions. And, another thing – to me there are so many amateur and professional ghosthunters and researchers who appear that they feel the need to claim to be psychic, just so they can give some answers. I acknowledge that there are some people that have psychic abilities, but very few can back up what they say, so it does not prove anything. So, like I said, some ghost researchers may have had many ghost related experiences, but there are no experts – just a whole lot of personal beliefs and theories!

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Can Theistic Morality Be Objective?

December 4, 2010

Here and here, I argued that Luke Muehlhauser misled the audience at Colorado State University by declaring as subjective a God-based morality William Lane Craig does not actually endorse [a.k.a., refuting a strawman].

Luke’s response was to attack my character by labeling me a troll in his 7-point rejoinder, which I believe I successfully rebutted. Now, instead of responding to that rebuttal, Luke has declared in some sort of odd, melodramatic exit stage left that he’s “finally given up” on me. I won’t tire you with why I think that’s not a move a person with good desires would make. I’d rather dig a little deeper into one of the counterarguments I made in my aforementioned responses.

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The Science Of Morality: Luke Muehlhauser Responds With A Personal Attack!

December 2, 2010

I kid you not, in no less than twenty minutes of posting my critique of his speech, Luke Muehlhauser fired off two admittedly hurried responses here and here, the former of which contains a personal attack. He labeled me a “troll” when all I did was write a critique of his speech on my own blog! Do those sound like acts a person with a desire for careful and rigorous philosophy would perform? To contrast, I took two hours crafting my critique, let it settle for three more, and then proofread it three times. Nonetheless, let’s see if we can refute some or all of Luke’s claims without resorting to the unprofessional insults and distortions he’s growing unusually fond of.

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Luke Muehlhauser Misleads Audience At Colorado State University

December 1, 2010

Well. I hopped over to Common Sense Atheism today, where I found the transcript from Luke’s talk at Colorado State University, titled The Science Of Morality: No Gods Required.

First off, I wondered how it came to be that Luke – a newbie atheist who was a self-described irrational Christian just a few years ago – was granted the authority to educate students at a major university. What are his credentials? Should anybody with a popular blog be allowed to educate the populace in our public institutions? Lest any hasty inductors be tempted to cry ad hominem, allow me to clarify.

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Response To Morality In The Real World, Episode 10

November 30, 2010

Continuing to explore the concept of intrinsic value, Luke Muehlhauser of Common Sense Atheism writes,

LUKE: Okay, Alonzo. Enough, now. Anyway, one of our commenters, Kip, pointed out that another meaning of the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ is ‘value as an end’, whereas ‘instrumental value’ would be ‘value as a means.’ For example, money has value to me, not because I care about money itself, but because money is a means toward getting things I really do care about: sex, for example. So we might say that money has ‘value as a means’ for me, but sex has ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘value as an end’ for me.

I advise against that, on the grounds that they’re likely to introduce more confusion over an already-confused and equivocated-upon term: intrinsic value. Why not just drop “intrinsic value” entirely and use “desire-as-ends” or “desire-as-means” wherever appropriate? Personally, I find those terms much clearer and easier to work with. I have difficulty following along when Luke and Alonzo use different definitions of “intrinsic value” in different podcasts.

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Response To Morality In The Real World, Episode 9

November 16, 2010

Though no previous objections seem to have been resolved, CSA’s ongoing Morality in the Real World podcast took a turn for the better in Episode 9, where Luke and Alonzo ponder the quantification of desires. For what it’s worth, Alonzo has written on willingness to pay before.

Early in my foray into desirism, I decided that an empirical schema for measuring desires was absolutely necessary in order for the theory to have any practical, real-world import. How else can we check against intuition? If desirism is indeed an empirical, objective theory as its defenders assert, then why not cut all the moralspeak and crunch some numbers? I don’t mean to toot my own horn, but I believe my method – while certainly rudimentary and in need of further work – is a far better tool for quantifying desires than the overly simplified analysis Luke and Alonzo used in Episode 9.

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Response To Larry Moran’s Challenge To Theists

October 25, 2010

It’s always tough when somebody one admires makes a move that one can’t approve of. That was exactly the feeling I had when I heard of Larry Moran’s Challenge to Theists and Their Accommodationist Supporters, but, before we get to that, a brief note about why I admire Larry Moran, an atheist and Professor of biochemistry with whom I would seem to share little in common [ideologically, that is].

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On Intrinsic Value

October 22, 2010

As opposed to his usual complaining that he “doesn’t have time” or falsely accusing me of “not listening” to his arguments, Luke Muehlhauser actually had some salient things to say about my response to his article, In Defense of Radical Value Pluralism. I will respond to Luke here, and use those responses to articulate my broader position on the concept of intrinsic value, and how it relates to our ongoing discussions of morality.

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Open Response To Alonzo Fyfe

October 21, 2010

In Luke’s post Morally Permissible Slavery, Alonzo Fyfe of Atheist Ethicist has implied moral defects in my character, here. The backstory: commenter antiplastic said this to Luke Muehlhauser, who replied not by addressing antiplastic’s objection, but by attempting to cast doubt on the sincerity of both antiplastic and myself to understand the theory. IOW, Luke chose to make it personal instead of keeping it professional. Then, Alonzo chimed in, lambasting antiplastic with what were in my opinion uncalled-for accusations about antiplastic’s character. Then, of course, when I came to antiplastic’s defense, Alonzo turned him judgment towards me.

My response follows, written to Alonzo.

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Response To “In Defense of Radical Value Pluralism”

October 16, 2010

In his post In Defense of Radical Value Pluralism, Luke Muehlhauser attempts to falsify value monism. Before addressing his claims, I’d like to comment on a few lesser issues and get them out of the way. On value, Luke writes,

A cup of coffee has value when I desire it. Sunshine has value when I desire it. Sex has value because you desire it.

Come from someone who emphatically denies intrinsic value, I think imprecision with language invites confusion here. Luke’s language lends all too easily to the idea that coffee, sunshine and sex can “have” or possess value, as if value is some sort of object that can be possessed. He writes as if value were a noun, but the only way value can be a noun is if it’s a person, place or thing. Many will see this as trivial, semantic, or nitpicking, perhaps because they feel the language is accurate enough to get the point across. I agree the language is accurate enough to get the point across, but that’s too low of a standard for rigorous philosophy. I think using value as a verb would allow Luke to make his arguments with more clarity and less amenability to confusion. Nothing has value, ever: people value.

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