Conservatively Stated Belief: Proof Of God’s Existence, 5

January 23, 2010

I’ve been slowly digesting jim’s series Proof Of God’s Existence for the past month or so. I hope he keeps it going.

We ended 4 with a provisional definition of justified belief as, “conservatively-stated beliefs or conclusions that correspond to face value observation and are not sufficiently challenged by anomalous data.” We also discussed an hypothetical auto accident and noted that since drivers don’t normally crash into each other intentionally, most people refer generically to most traffic collisions as automobile accidents.

If we see a Mazda t-bone a parts truck at noon on some weekday, our justified belief conservatively stated is that we saw a collision between a Mazda and a parts truck at noon on some weekday. That’s it. We could responsibly paraphrase that by saying we saw some sedan slam into a truck, or that a work-truck got hit by some car, but any description that adds unconfirmed assumptions or omits confirmed facts exhibits some degree of inaccuracy. In the everyday world where pragmatism overrides commitment to technical accuracy, I wouldn’t take issue, but in philosophy and logic such laxity can be lethal.

Some might be tempted to say that since most traffic collisions are in fact accidents that we’re justified to begin with that assumption. While there is certainly enough of an argument there that I wouldn’t call that assumption irrational, at the same time I would not consider the assumption conservatively-stated. Although most likely true (because most traffic collisions are in fact accidents), that we saw an accident between a Mazda and a parts truck is not conservatively stated. It adds the unconfirmed assumption that the collision was accidental. In everyday or pragmatic usage reasonable speakers understand what is meant, but imagine the catastrophe oversight like that might cause in some nuanced philosophical discourse. We should be responsible interlocutors and say no more or no less than statements or data permit. Anything less is a disservice to clarity. 

That being said, let’s get back to The Boxes.

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When Is Belief Justified, Redux? Proof Of God’s Existence, 4

January 21, 2010

We left off promising a more in-depth discussion of jim's post. I understand that jim offers his series Proof Of God's Existence as a thought experiment, and that he's simply asking what our initial judgments would be, perhaps to help define the parameters of this "common sense inquiry" he alluded to in the introduction. Personally, I'm all for it, and as a writer I've always enjoyed reading jim, even his vitriolic tirades against me which were often colorful and creative (I even recall some limericks).

After setting up an odd series of events between Mary the neighborhood realtor and Carol the neighborhood skeptic, jim closes with the following set of questions:

Are Carol's [suspicion and uneasiness] justified at this point, slight though they be, or can they be summarily dismissed? Is this early foreboding of suspicion rational? Irrational? Pre-rational?

My short answer was that Carol's initial and ongoing uneasiness were justified, but any ongoing suspicion less so. Likewise, I answered that Carol's initial and ongoing uneasiness would also seem rational, but again, any ongoing suspicion less so. Tonight I'd like to address those questions in more detail, in hopes of churning out at least a provisional definition of justified belief.

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The Secret Life Of Chaos

January 20, 2010

Just a short one today: you heard of The Secret Life of Chaos yet?

If we say that "simple things give rise to biology and intelligence" then the premise that any designer God capable of designing MEST must be at least as complex as MEST seems fatally undermined. It is not required that explanations be at least as complex as the things they cause and reality contradicts that premise as well (TENS, Grand Canyon, etc.). If we deny the believer the luxury of defining God as "simple" we must either provide sufficient warrant for doing so, or stand rightly accused of special pleading. 

What do you think?

*MEST = matter, energy, space, time






Why Is That? Proof Of God’s Existence, 3

January 18, 2010

Happy MLK Day, all. I encourage you to read jim's third installment of his series Proof of God's Existence for yourself before reading mine.

After setting up an odd series of events between Mary the neighborhood realtor and Carol the neighborhood skeptic, jim closes with the following set of questions:

Are Carol's [suspicion and uneasiness] justified at this point, slight though they be, or can they be summarily dismissed? Is this early foreboding of suspicion rational? Irrational? Pre-rational?

As far as justification goes, my first thoughts were that suspicion and uneasiness are ontologically distinct from beliefs. I'd say what we call uneasiness is pure feeling that may or may not be rooted in some observation or experience. On the other hand, suspicion seems to be a little bit of both feeling and belief. To me, a suspicion is basically a provisional hypothesis cast in response to some (often anomalous) observation or experience. As such we should evaluate each according to their own merits.

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If I Say Food Is Cheap, Especially Meat…

January 4, 2010

Lately I’ve been looking for new strategies in my discussions with atheists. I’ve come to realize, that which people need to see has often already been said, so sometimes it’s best to just restate things exactly as they’ve already been stated, and keep my commentary to a minimum.

I recently spent some time dissecting the 200+ comments in the thread of SI’s I Wish I’d Written That, and I’ve noticed that demands for clarity and accountability are very annoying to many atheists, for example PhillyChief:

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When Is Belief Justified? Proof Of God’s Existence, 2

January 3, 2010

jim has written the second installment of his series titled Proof of God's Existence. The post introduces four fictional characters that jim uses in an intentionally loosely-framed thought experiment:

Bob Smith Bob is a somewhat elderly man, retired, whose wife and friends find innocent and trusting to the point of being gullible.

Carol Smith Bob’s wife is the counterpoint to Bob’s trusting nature, skeptical to a fault, and always on the lookout for a scam. (note: both Bob and Carol always try to be scrupulously honest with each other).

Mary Jones The Smiths’ nextdoor neighbor, as well as the local real estate agent. She’s a recent move-in, and neither of the Smiths know her very well.

Mr. Garcia The mysterious man across the street.

So far, everything sounds good to me.

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A Trip To The Hypothetical Fish Farm: Proof of God’s Existence, I

January 2, 2010

jim at RvA has blessed us with a new series titled Proof of God’s Existence, and I intend to respond to each installment of his series, which seems designed to corral the believer’s claims into the confines of what jim calls “common sense inquiry.” I suppose we’ll see just what that means as time unfolds.

He begins with words likely all too familiar to veterans in this game, centered around the question of what constitutes adequate proof of God’s existence:

It’s a common question on the tip of many a Christian’s tongue when confronted with skepticism regarding their theistic worldview, yes? Responses from skeptics generally revolve around some kind of convincing display(s) of ‘miraculous’ interventions, or other manifestations i.e. events beyond the generally accepted, deterministic norms of the most current naturalistic paradigm, and supported by scientific methodology such as observation, controlled testing, repeatability and the like.jim, reason vs. apologetics

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Why I Do What I Do

December 21, 2009

Every now and again it's helpful to ask oneself why one does the things they do. Recently, I found myself asking myself why I actually blog, and more particularly, why I comment on other blogs. I encourage you to skip this post, actually. It's not about epistemology or consciousness or potency or any of the more stimulating things we've been talking about these past weeks. I just needed to think some stuff out, and figured, why not do it in public? [weird little interview with myself follows]

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A Pact Of Ignorance

December 20, 2009

My ears had been burning: I just knew on faith that ol' jim had somethin' nasty brewin' over there! He'd been way too quiet lately. He's written a letter to Team Scarlet A, an open invitation to a pact of ignorance amongst the likeminded:

What I’d like to suggest is a pact amongst the likeminded – the ‘haters’ as cl surely would dub us – to simply ignore the guy. I know, I know! LOL! Easy to say, yes? But it’s become absolutely crystal clear to me that cl does not have the ability to play well with others. At least, not with those who seriously challenge him.
jim, reason vs. apologetics

Well, where to start? First, I like the use of the word "likeminded" and think it's an especially useful adjective for describing Team Scarlet A. Second, jim saying that I lack the ability to play well would be hilarious were it not for statements like these from him:

You're nothing but a big baby, cl. Put up or shut up, ya wuss… Suck THAT ass, you internet miscreant. Grow some.
jim, reason vs. apologetics

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Veridical Dreaming: Anomalous Mental Phenomena, IV

December 17, 2009

In Pt. III, we introduced Marianne George (Cultural Anthropologist, Ph.D, University of Virginia).

The context of that discussion was simultaneous dreaming, and it ended with Marianne deciding that republishing her paper in its entirety would be the best approach. She added that if I were to do so, she’d be happy to receive criticism, answer questions, and/or discuss the paper. Well! I don’t know about you, but I’m certainly glad she’s given us this opportunity, as it’s not everyday we get to talk to the scientists who actually publish the papers we read and cite in our discussions of (a)theism.

Although Marianne saved me the work of having to relay her words to you, which also nicely eliminated the possibility of me getting any of her words wrong, I’d still like to address the relevance of Sleepdream #3 to our ongoing discussion on consciousness. For those who’d like to skip my thoughts and go straight to the source first, please do: you’ll find links to Marianne’s paper (in its entirety) at the end of this post.

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